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ERIK P. SMITH, Attorney at Law 
ERIK P. SMITH, P.C. 
311-B Coeur d'Alene Avenue 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Tel. (208) 667-2000 
Fax(208)765-9110 
ISBN 5008 
Attorney for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUmCIAL msTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS !RISH and WANDA IRISH, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JEFFREY HALL and DONA HALL, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV 15-5814 
TRIAL BRIEF 
COMES NOW the above-named Defendants, by and through their 
attorney of record, ERIK P. SMITH, and submit this Trial Brief pursuant to the 
Court's Pretrial Order. 
A. The Essential Elements of Plaintiffs' Cause of Action have Not 
Defamatory Slander [sic] is the Cause of Action the Plaintiffs named in 
their Complaint. To prove defamation under Idaho law, Plaintiffs must prove that 
Defendants: (1) communicated information concerning Plaintiffs to others, (2) 
that the information was defamatory, and (3) that Plaintiffs were damaged 
DEFENDANTS' TRIAL BRIEF -1 
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because of that communication. Clark v. The Spokesman-Review, 144 Idaho 
427, 430 {2007). A fourth element, malice, must also be proven by Plaintiffs by 
clear and convincing evidence, because Plaintiff, Wanda Irish, is a public figure 
{Mayor) and the actions complained of arise from mayoral acts. Bandelin v. 
Pietsch, 98 Idaho 337, 339 (1977). "Malice has been generally defined by Idaho 
courts as a reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of a statement." Weaver v. 
Stafford, 134 Idaho 691, 701 (2000). 
The Supreme Court of Idaho found 3 city councilmen in the small town of 
Jerome to be public officials not immune to criticism in the exercise of their 
official duties. Weeks v. M-P Publications, Inc., 95 Idaho 634, 639 (1973). 
Similarly, in another small town case involving county commissioners in Bannock 
County, the language in their complaint against the defendant was deemed to be 
just a fair criticism of the "public acts of public officials" and the complaint was 
held to be insufficient. Gough v. Tribune-Journal Co., 75 Idaho 502,508 (1954}. 
The Defendants will show that they acted within their rights under the First 
Amendment, that their speech was opinion and not fact, and that their speech 
was in fact true when applicable to the Plaintiffs. 
B. Many of Plaintiffs' Claims are Barred by the Statute of 
Limitations. 
Idaho Code § 5-219(5) bars many of the Plaintiffs' claims that are not 
brought within 2 years of the Complaint. Plaintiffs' claims in several paragraphs 
of their Complaint are barred by the Statute of limitations. 
C. Plaintiffs' Complaint is Barred by the Defense of Accord and 
Satisfaction. 
DEFENDANTS' TRIAL BRIEF - 2 
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"An accord and satisfaction is generally defined as a method of 
discharging a contract or cause of action, whereby the parties agree to give and 
accept something in settlement of the claim or demand of the one against the 
other, and perform such agreement, the 'accord' being the agreement and the 
'satisfaction' its execution or performance." Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 
909 (2009). An accord and satisfaction may be implied from the attendant 
circumstances. Id. 
The Plaintiffs and Defendants entered into a valid accord and satisfaction 
regarding the Plaintiffs' allegations, which were observed by several witnesses. 
D. Plaintiffs' Complaint is Retaliation Resulting from Defendants' 
Valid Public Records Request. 
DATED this Z-{day of November, 2016. 
ERIK P. SMITH, Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the Z I day of November, 2016, a true copy of 
the foregoing was: 
[ ] mailed postage prepaid to: 
[] inter-office: 
t,!faxed to: 
Mischene R. Fulgham 
601 E. Front Street, Suite 502 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Fax: 664-4125 
DEFENDANTS' TRIAL BRIEF - 3 
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ERIK P. SMITH, Attorney at Law 
ERIK P. SMITH, P.C. 
311-B Coeur d'Alene Avenue 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Tei. (208) 667-2000 
Fax (208) 765-911 0 
ISBN 5008 
Attorney for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS IRISH and WANDA IRISH, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JEFFREY HALL and DONA HALL, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV 15-5814 
DEFENDANTS'AMENDMENTTO 
UST OF WITNESSES 
COMES NOW the above-named Defendants, JEFFREY HALL and DONA 
HALL, by and through their attorney of record, ERIK P. SMITH, hereby submits the 
following Amendment to the List of Witnesses: 
32. Joe Cornell, 103 N. Coeur d'Alene, Harrison, Idaho 83833. That the 
witness is anticipated to testify that the Mayor moved the Defendants' property. 
DATED thili._ day of November, 2016. 
ERIK P. SMITH~-~-----'-- ---, 
Attorney for Defendants 
DEFENDANTS' AMENDMENT TO LIST OF WITNESSES - 1 
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CERTIFICATE Of MAIUNG 
. '. 
I hereby ,..""""'"" that on the 
foregoing was: 
day of November, 2016, a true copy the· 
[ ] mailed postage prepaid to: 
[ ] inter-office: 
[X ] faxed to: 
MischeHe R. Fulgham 
Lukins & Annis 
601 E. Front Street, Ste 303 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Fax: 509-363-2478 
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P. 
ERIK P. SMITH, 
311 Coeur d'Alene Avenue 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-2000 
Facsimile: (208) 765-9110 
ISB: #5008 
Attorney for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE RST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS IRISH, et al., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFREY E. HALL, et al., 
) Case No. CV 15-5814 
) 
) DEFENDANTS'SUPPLEMENTAL 
) PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
---------
COMES NOW, the above-named Defendants, JEFFREY HALL AND DONA 
HALL, by and through their attorney of record, ERIK P. SMITH, and hereby submits 
the attached supplemental proposed Jury Instructions. 
DATED this ~( day of November, 2016. 
Erik P. Smith, Attorney for Defendants 
DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION - 1 
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was: 
a true and correct 
LJ Hand Delivered 
LJ Mailed, postage prepaid thereon 
IXl_Faxed: (208) 753-8351 
of foregoing 
to the following interested party on this _1_L day of November, 2016: 
Mishelle Fulgham, attorney at law 
Fax: 664-4125 
DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION - 2 
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DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
To be defamatory, the communication must be false in a material fashion. This means 
that the "gist" or "sting" of the communication, when taken in its entirety and in context, 
must It is not sufficient to prove that some insignificant detail is false if the "gist" 
or "sting" of the communication is otherwise true. 
IDJI 4.88.3 Truth is a defense 
Given 
Refusal 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
Honorable Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
District Judge 
Dennis Irish, etal vs Jeffrey Hall, etal Docket No. 44794 275 of 590 
To be fashion. This means 
that or of the communication, when taken in Its entirety and in context, 
must be fale. It is not sufficient to prove some insignificant detail is false if the "gist" 
or "sting" of the communication is otherwise true. 
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DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 2 
An essential element of defamation is that the information communicated was false. 
Consequently, if the information was, in fact true, there is no defamation, regardless of 
Defendant's motivation. 
!OJI 4.88.1 Defamation - truth is a defense 
Given 
Refusal 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
Honorable Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
District Judge 
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of An essential 
Consequently, if 
Defendant's motivation. 
Dennis Irish, etal vs Jeffrey Hall, etal 
is the information communicated was 
in fact true, there is no defamation, regardless of 
Docket No. 44794 278 of 590 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
Since the plaintiff, Wanda Irish, is a public figure, the plaintiffs can recover only if she 
can prove actual malice, knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth, by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Bandelin v. Pietsch, 98 Idaho 
337, 339 (1977). 
Given 
Refusal 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
Honorable Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
District Judge 
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the plaintiff, Wanda Irish, is a public plaintiffs can recover only if she 
can prove actual malice, knowledge falsity or reckless disregard of truth, by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
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DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
Plaintiffs must prove the following additional element in their defamation claim by clear 
and convincing evidence: 
The Defendants knew that the information was false, or acted with reckless 
disregard for its truth, a the time the information was communicated to others. 
IDJI 4.82.5 Elements of defamation claim - public official or public figure 
Given 
Refusal 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
Honorable Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
District Judge 
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Plaintiffs must prove additional element in their defamation claim by clear 
and convincing evidence: 
The Defendants knew that the information was false, or acted with reckless 
disregard for its truth, a the time the information was communicated to others. 
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DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
When I say a party has the burden of proof on a proposition by clear and convincing 
evidence, I mean you must be persuaded that it is highly probable that such proposition 
is true. This is a higher burden than the general burden that the proposition is more 
probable true than not true. 
IDJI 1.20.2 Burden of proof - clear and convincing evidence 
Given 
Refusal 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
Honorable Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
District Judge 
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When I a party burden on a proposition and convincing 
I mean you persuaded that it is highly ,....,.,..,"""" ..... ' that such proposition 
is true. is a higher burden than the general burden that the proposition is more 
probable true than not true. 
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DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
When defamatory speech is of public concern, the First Amendment requires that the 
plaintiff, whether public official, public figure, or private individual, prove the statements 
at issue to be false. 
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986). 
Given 
Refusal 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
Honorable Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
District Judge 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
When defamatory speech is of public concern, the First Amendment requires that the 
plaintiff, whether public official, public figure, or private individual, prove the statements 
at issue to be false. 
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DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
Defendants have asserted the defense of accord and satisfaction. An accord and 
satisfaction is a method of discharging a cause of action, whereby the parties agree to 
give and accept something in settlement of the claim or demand of the one against the 
other, and perform such agreement, the 'accord' being the agreement and the 
'satisfaction' its execution or performance. An accord and satisfaction may be implied 
from the attendant circumstances. 
If you find from your consideration that there was an accord and satisfaction, your 
verdict should be for Defendants. 
Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 909 (2009). 
Given 
Refusal 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
Honorable Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
District Judge 
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Defendants have asserted the defense of accord and satisfaction. An accord and 
satisfaction is a method of discharging a cause of action, whereby the parties agree to 
give and accept something in settlement of the claim or demand of the one against the 
other, and perform such agreement, the 'accord' being the agreement and the 
'satisfaction' its execution or performance. An accord and satisfaction may be implied 
from the attendant circumstances. 
If you find from your consideration that there was an accord and satisfaction, your 
verdict should be for Defendants. 
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Argued January 6, 1964. 
Decided March 9, 1964.tl 
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA. 
255 *255 Herbert Wechsler argued the cause for petitioner in No. 39. With him on the brief were Herbert Brownell, Thomas F. Daly, 
Louis M. Loeb, T. Eric Embry, Marvin E. Frankel, Ronald S. Diana and Doris Wechsler. 
William P. Rogers and Samuel R. Pierce, Jr. argued the cause for petitioners in No. 40. With Mr. Pierce on the brief were/. H. 
Wachtel, Charles S. Conley, Benjamin Spiegel, Raymond S. Harris, Harry H. Wachtel, Joseph B. Russell, David N. Brainin, 
Stephen J. Jelin and Charles B. Markham. 
M. Roland Nachman, Jr. argued the cause for respondent in both cases. With him on the brief were Sam Rice Baker and Calvin 
Whitesell. 
Briefs of amici curiae, urging reversal, were filed in No. 39 by William P. Rogers, Gerald W. Siegel and Stanley Godofskyfor the 
Washington Post Company, and by Howard Ellis, Keith Masters and Don H. Reuben for the Tribune Company. Brief of amici 
curiae, urging reversal, was filed in both cases by Edward S. Greenbaum, Harriet F. Pilpel, Melvin L. Wulf, Nanette Dembitz and 
Nancy F. Wechsler for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. 
256 *256 MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We are required in this case to determine for the first time the extent to which the constitutional protections for speech and press 
limit a State's power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct. 
Respondent L.B. Sullivan is one of the three elected Commissioners of the City of Montgomery, Alabama. He testified that he 
was "Commissioner of Public Affairs and the duties are supervision of the Police Department, Fire Department, Department of 
Cemetery and Department of Scales." He brought this civil libel action against the four individual petitioners, who are Negroes 
and Alabama clergymen, and against petitioner the New York Times Company, a New York corporation which publishes the New 
York Times, a daily newspaper. A jury in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County awarded him damages of $500,000, the full 
amount claimed, against all the petitioners, and the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed. 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25. 
Respondent's complaint alleged that he had been libeled by statements in a full-page advertisement that was carried in the New 
York 1lmes on March 29, 1960.ill Entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices.'' the advertisement began by stating that "As the whole 
world knows by now, thousands of Southern Negro students are engaged in widespread non-violent demonstrations in positive 
affirmation of the right to live in human dignity as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights." It went on to charge 
that "in their efforts to uphold these guarantees, they are being met by an unprecedented wave of terror by those who would deny 
257 and negate that document which the whole world looks upon as setting the pattern for modem freedom .... " Succeeding *257 
paragraphs purported to illustrate the "wave of terror" by describing certain alleged events. The text concluded with an appeal for 
funds for three purposes: support of the student movement, "the struggle for the right-to-vote," and the legal defense of Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr., leader of the movement, against a perjury indictment then pending in Montgomery. 
The text appeared over the names of 64 persons, many widely known for their activities in public affairs, religion, trade unions, 
and the performing arts. Below these names, and under a line reading 'We in the south who are struggling daily for dignity and 
freedom warmly endorse this appeal," appeared the names of the four individual petitioners and of 16 other persons, all but two 
of whom were identified as clergymen in various Southern cities. The advertisement was signed at the bottom of the page by the 
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"Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South;' and the officers of the Committee were 
listed. 
Of the 10 paragraphs of text in the advertisement, the third and a portion of the sixth were the basis of respondent's claim of libel. 
They read as follows: 
Third paragraph: 
"In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang · My Country, 'Tis of Thee' on the State Capitol steps, their leaders 
were expelled from school, and truckloads of police armed with shotguns and tear-gas ringed the Alabama State 
College Campus. When the entire student body protested to state authorities by refusing to re-register, their dining 
hall was padlocked in an attempt to starve them into submission." 
Sixth paragraph: 
"Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr. King's peaceful protests with intimidation and 
258 violence. They have bombed his home almost killing his wife and child. They have *258 assaulted his person. 
They have arrested him seven times-for 'speeding,' 'loitering' and similar 'offenses.' And now they have charged 
him with 'perjury'-a felony under which they could imprison him for ten years .... " 
Although neither of these statements mentions respondent by name, he contended that the word "police" in the third paragraph 
referred to him as the Montgomery Commissioner who supervised the Police Department, so that he was being accused of 
"ringing" the campus with police. He further claimed that the paragraph would be read as imputing to the police, and hence to 
him, the padlocking ofthe dining hall in order to starve the students into submission.!61 As to the sixth paragraph, he contended 
that since arrests are ordinarily made by the police, the statement "They have arrested [Dr. King] seven times« would be read as 
referring to him; he further contended that the "They" who did the arresting would be equated with the "They" who committed the 
other described acts and with the "Southern violators." Thus, he argued, the paragraph would be read as accusing the 
Montgomery police, and hence him, of answering Dr. King's protests with "intimidation and violence," bombing his home, 
assaulting his person, and charging him with perjury. Respondent and six other Montgomery residents testified that they read 
some or all of the statements as referring to him in his capacity as Commissioner. 
It is uncontroverted that some of the statements contained in the paragraphs were not accurate descriptions of events which 
occurred in Montgomery. Although Negro students staged a demonstration on the State Capitol steps, they sang the National 
259 Anthem and not "My *259 Country, 'Tis of Thee." Although nine students were expelled by the State Board of Education, this was 
not for leading the demonstration at the Capitol, but for demanding service at a lunch counter in the Montgomery County 
Courthouse on another day. Not the entire student body, but most of it, had protested the expulsion, not by refusing to register, but 
by boycotting classes on a single day; virtually all the students did register for the ensuing semester. The campus dining hall was 
not padlocked on any occasion, and the only students who may have been barred from eating there were the few who had 
neither signed a preregistration application nor requested temporary meal tickets. Although the police were deployed near the 
campus in large numbers on three occasions, they did not at any time "ring" the campus, and they were not called to the campus 
in connection with the demonstration on the State Capitol steps, as the third paragraph implied. Dr. King had not been arrested 
seven times, but only four; and although he claimed to have been assaulted some years earlier in connection with his arrest for 
loitering outside a courtroom, one of the officers who made the arrest denied that there was such an assault 
On the premise that the charges in the sixth paragraph could be read as referring to him, respondent was allowed to prove that 
he had not participated in the events described. Although Dr. King's home had in fact been bombed twice when his wife and child 
were there, both ofthese occasions antedated respondent's tenure as Commissioner, and the police were not only not implicated 
in the bombings, but had made every effort to apprehend those who were. Three of Dr. King's four arrests took place before 
respondent became Commissioner. Although Dr. King had in fact been indicted (he was subsequently acquitted) on two counts 
of perjury, each of which carried a possible five-year sentence, respondent had nothing to do with procuring the indictment. 
· ~60 *260 Respondent made no effort to prove that he suffered actual pecuniary loss as a result ofthe alleged libel.I;ll One of his 
witnesses, a former employer, testified that if he had believed the statements, he doubted whether he ''would want to be 
associated with anybody who would be a party to such things that are stated in that ad," and that he would not re-employ 
respondent if he believed "that he allowed the Police Department to do the things that the paper say he did." But neither this 
witness nor any of the others testified that he had actually believed the statements in their supposed reference to respondent. 
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The cost of the advertisement was approximately $4800, and it was published by the nmes upon an order from a New York 
advertising agency acting for the signatory Committee. The agency submitted the advertisement with a letter from A. Philip 
Randolph, Chairman of the Committee. certifying that the persons whose names appeared on the advertisement had given their 
/~·~,. permission. Mr. Randolph was known to the Times' Advertising Acceptability Department as a responsible person, and in 
accepting the letter as sufficient proof of authorization it followed its established practice. There was testimony that the copy of the 
advertisement which accompanied the letter listed only the 64 names appearing under the text, and that the statement, "We in the 
south ... warmly endorse this appeal," and the list of names thereunder, which included those of the individual petitioners, were 
subsequently added when the first proof of the advertisement was received. Each of the individual petitioners testified that he had 
not authorized the use of his name, and that he had been unaware of its use unm receipt of respondent's demand for a retraction. 
261 The manager of the Advertising Acceptability *261 Department testified that he had approved the advertisement for publication 
because he knew nothing to cause him to believe that anything in it was false, and because it bore the endorsement of "a 
number of people who are well known and whose reputation" he "had no reason to question." Neither he nor anyone else at the 
limes made an effort to confirm the accuracy of the advertisement, either by checking it against recent Times news stories 
relating to some of the described events or by any other means. 
Alabama law denies a public officer recovery of punitive damages in a libel action brought on account of a publication 
concerning his official conduct unless he first makes a written demand for a public retraction and the defendant fails or refuses to 
comply. Alabama Code, llt. 7, § 914. Respondent served such a demand upon each of the petitioners. None of the individual 
petitioners responded to the demand, primarily because each took the position that he had not authorized the use of his name on 
the advertisement and therefore had not published the statements that respondent alleged had libeled him. The limes did not 
publish a retraction in response to the demand, but wrote respondent a letter stating, among other things, that "we ... are 
somewhat puzzled as to how you think the statements in any way reflect on you," and "you might, if you desire, let us know in 
what respect you claim that the statements in the advertisement reflect on you." Respondent filed this suit a few days later without 
answering the letter. The Times did, however, subsequently publish a retraction of the advertisement upon the demand of 
Governor John Patterson of Alabama, who asserted that the publication charged him with "grave misconduct and ... improper 
actions and omissions as Governor of Alabama and Ex-Officio Chairman of the State Board of Education of Alabama." When 
·-"J62 asked to explain why there had been a retraction for the Governor but not for respondent, the *262 Secretary of the Times 
testified: "We did that because we didn't want anything that was published by The 11mes to be a reflection on the State of 
Alabama and the Governor was, as far as we could see, the embodiment of the Slate of Alabama and the proper representative 
of the State and, furthermore, we had by that time learned more of the actual facts which the ad purported to recite and, finally, the 
ad did refer to the action of the State authorities and the Board of Education presumably of which the Governor is the ex-officio 
chairman .... " On the other hand, he testified that he did not think that "any of the language in there referred to Mr. Sullivan." 
The trial judge submitted the case to the jury under instructions that the statements in the advertisement were "libelous per se" 
and were not privileged, so that petitioners might be held liable if the jury found that they had published the advertisement and 
that the statements were made "of and concerning" respondent. The jury was instructed that, because the statements were 
libelous per se, "the law ... implies legal injury from the bare fact of publication itself," "falsity and malice are presumed," "general 
damages need not be alleged or proved but are presumed," and "punitive damages may be awarded by the jury even though the 
amount of actual damages is neither found nor shown." An award of punitive damages-as distinguished from "general" 
damages, which are compensatory in nature-apparently requires proof of actual malice under Alabama law, and the judge 
charged that "mere negligence or carelessness is not evidence of actual malice or malice in fact, and does not justify an award of 
exemplary or punitive damages." He refused to charge, however, that the jury must be "convinced" of malice, in the sense of 
"actual intent" to harm or "gross negligence and recklessness," to make such an award, and he also refused to require that a 
verdict for respondent differentiate between compensatory and punitive damages. The judge rejected petitioners' contention 
263 *263 that his rulings abridged the freedoms of speech and of the press that are guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
In affirming the judgment, the Supreme Court of Alabama sustained the trial judge's rulings and instructions in all respects. 273 
Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25. It held that "where the words published tend to injure a person libeled by them in his reputation, 
profession, trade or business, or charge him with an indictable offense, or tend to bring the individual into public contempt," they 
are "libelous per se"; that "the matter complained of is, under the above doctrine, libelous per se, if it was published of and 
concerning the plaintiff"; and that it was actionable without "proof of pecuniary injury ...• such injury being implied." Id., at 673, 
676, 144 So. 2d, at 37, 41. It approved the trial court's ruling that the Jury could find the statements to have been made "of and 
concerning" respondent, stating: "We think it common knowledge that the average person knows that municipal agents, such as 
po8~~n?s~~//{.ee'I'arVs ~~~t~~ri~iia'ie under the contr~cfcigt 9j~~S~9~lf the city governing body, and more pa~i~lgf~9~nder the 
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direction and control of a single commissioner. In measuring the performance or denciencies of such groups, praise or criticism is 
usually attached to the official in complete control of the body." Id., at 67 4-675, 144 So. 2d at 39. In sustaining the trial court's 
determination that the verdict was not excessive, the court said that malice could be inferred from the limes' "irresponsibility" in 
printing the advertisement while "the Times in its own files had articles already published which would have demonstrated the 
falsity of the allegations in the advertisement"; from the limes' failure to retract for respondent while retracting for the Governor, 
whereas the falsity of some of the allegations was then known to the Times and "the matter contained in the advertisement was 
264 equally false as to both parties"; and from the testimony of the Times' Secretary that, *264 apart from the statement that the dining 
hall was pad-locked, he thought the two paragraphs were "substantially correct." Id., at 686-687, 144 So. 2d at 50-51. The court 
reaffirmed a statement in an earlier opinion that "There is no legal measure of damages in cases of this character." Id., at 686, 
144 So. 2d, at 50. It rejected petitioners' constitufonal contentions wilh the brief statements that "The First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution does not protect libelous publications" and "The Fourteenth Amendment is directed against State action and not 
private action." Id., at 676,144 So. 2d, at 40. 
Because ofthe importance of the constitutional issues involved, we granted the separate petitions for certiorari of the individual 
petitioners and of the Times. 371 U.S. 946. We reverse the judgment. We hold thatthe rule of law applied by the Alabama courts 
is constitutionally deficient for failure to provide the safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press that are required by the 
265 First and Fourteenth Amendments in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct.Hl We *265 
further hold that under the proper safeguards the evidence presented in this case is constitutionally insufficient to support the 
judgment for respondent. 
I 
We may dispose at the outset of two grounds asserted to insulate the judgment of the Alabama courts from constitutional scrutiny. 
The first is the proposition relied on by the State Supreme Court-that "The Fourteenth Amendment is directed against State 
action and not private action." That proposition has no application to this case. Although this is a civil lawsuit between private 
parties, the Alabama courts have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on their 
constitutional freedoms of speech and press. It matters not that that law has been applied in a civil action and that it is common 
law only, though supplemented by statute. See, e.g., Alabama Code, Tit. 7, §§ 908-917. The test is not the form in which state 
power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised. See~ 
~;A ng.3 U 
The second contention is that the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press are inapplicable here, at least 
so far as the 11mes is concerned, because the allegedly libelous statements were published as part of a paid, "commercial" 
advertisement. The argument relies on \'., • h e t ,s , 3 . where the Court held that a city ordinance 
forbidding street distribution of commercial and business advertising matter did not abridge the First Amendment freedoms, even 
as applied to a handbill having a commercial message on one side but a protest against certain official action on the other. The 
reliance is wholly misplaced. The Court in Chrestensen reaffirmed the constitutional protection for "the freedom of communicating 
266 *266 information and disseminating opinion"; its holding was based upon the factual conclusions that the handbill was "purely 
commercial advertising" and that the protest against official action had been added only to evade the ordinance. 
The publication here was not a "commercial" advertisement in the sense in which the word was used in Chrestensen. It 
communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on 
behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern. See~ 
~-That the Times was paid for publishing the advertisement is as immaterial in this connection as is the 
fact that newspapers and books are sold. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150; cf. . v U 
64, n. 6. Any other conclusion would discourage newspapers from carrying "editorial advertisements" of this type, and so might 
shut off an important outlet for the promulgation of information and ideas by persons who do not themselves have access to 
publishing facilities-who wish to exercise their freedom of speech even though they are not members of the press. Cf.~ 
3 • S. :4 4, 52: §.!J.M21.Q'.§£..~im;fg._~!Ul~:....l!il....llt1:· The effect would be to shackle the First Amendment in its 
attempt to secure "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources."~ 
Un d S s. . To avoid placing such a handicap upon the freedoms of expression, we hold that if the allegedly 
libelous statements would otherwise be constitutionally protected from the present judgment, they do not forf~it that protection 
because they were published in the from of a paid advertisement.ill 
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267 
·2e7 n 
Under Alabama law as applied in this case, a publication is "libelous per se" if the words "tend to injure a person ... in his 
reputation" or to "bring [him] Into public contempt"; the !rial court stated that the standard was met if the words are such as to 
"injure him in his public office, or impute misconduct to him in his office, or want of official integrity, or want of fidelity to a public 
trust .... " The jury must find that the words were published "of and concerning" the plaintiff, but where the plaintiff is a public 
official his place in the governmental hierarchy is sufficient evidence to support a finding that his reputation has been affected by 
statements that reflect upon the agency of which he is in charge. Once "libel per se" has been established, the defendant has no 
o ,..,.,,n,,_,,,,,n,n . His 
privilege of"fair comment" for expressions of opinion depends on the truth of the facts upon which the comment is based. 
a 5 . Unless he can discharge the burden of 
proving truth, general damages are presumed, and may be awarded without proof of pecuniary injury. A showing of actual malice 
is apparently a prerequisite to recovery of punitive damages, and the defendant may in any event forestall a punitive award by a 
retraction meeting the statutory requirements. Good motives and belief in truth do not negate an inference of malice, but are 
relevant only in mitigation of punitive damages if the jury chooses to accord them weight. il!l.JruJ.;~!.l:j!Jll.j'.2!!J'fill.giJI...J.l:fil'f:Lll:M.Jhrn.. 
7 A , o d, 4 
268 *268 The question before us is whether this rule of liability, as applied to an action brought by a public official against critics of his 
official conduct, abridges the freedom of speech and of the press that is guaranteed by the first and Fourteenth Amendments, 
Respondent relies heavily, as did the Alabama courts, on statements of this Court to the effect that the Constitution does not 
protect libelous publications.Ifil Those statements do notforeclose our inquiry here. None of the cases sustained the use of libel 
laws to impose sanctions upon expression critical of !he official conduct of public officials. The dictum in~ 
3 U . that "when the statements amount to defamation, a judge has such remedy in damages for libel as do 
other public servants," implied no view as to what remedy might constitutionally be afforded to public officials. In~ 
~ the Court sustained an Illinois criminal libel statute as applied to a publication held to be both defamatory 
of a racial group and "liable to cause violence and disorder." But the Court was careful to note that it "retains and exercises 
authority to nullify action which encroaches on freedom of utterance under the guise of punishing libel"; for "public men, are, as it 
were, public property," and "discussion cannot be denied and the right, as well as the duty, of criticism must not be stifled." Id., at 
263-264, and n. 18. In the only previous case that did present the question of constitutional !imitations upon the power to award 
damages for libel of a public official, the Court was equally divided and the question was not decided.~ 
269 ~!,..:i,~WUH~:U!2.J.!....2&:t&· *269 In deciding the question now, we are compelled by neither precedent nor policy to give any 
more weight to the epithet "libel" than we have to other "mere labels" of state law. N. A. A. y u on. U.S. 4 5. 2 . Like 
insurrection,ill contempt,llli advocacy of unlawful acts,lfil breach of the peace,llili obscenity,U11 solicitation of legal business,f.111 
and the various other formulae for the repression of expression that have been challenged in this court, libel can claim no 
talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment 
The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment has long been 
settled by our decisions. The constitutional safeguard, we have said, "was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for 
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people." it a . 3 , $ • 4 . "The 
maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people 
and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental 
principle of our constitutional system." S 3 
one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions," l;![j!IJJ..~y.Ji!.fil![Q£~ldli.Y....§...;~~:IQ.. and 
this opportunity is to be afforded for "vigorous advocacy" no less than "abstract discussion." N. A. A. C. P, v. Button. 371 U. S, 4 i 5. 
270 429. *270 The First Amendment, said Judge Learned Hand, "presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered 
have staked upon it our all." .,.....,.....,._.._.......,.,.,,._...._."""".....,.,......,......,~,...,.r...x.1......,...,..."""":..i...><.><.O&J...,.....a..JUl<.l...:.:....-"'-'-....._....,_...._,=.i,u3l. Mr. Justice Brandeis, 
in his concurring opinion in m'll1I.un:~~l.f!Q:ll11s!....i'1..:.LY..Jt..;gu....~~!il. 
"Those who won our independence believed ... that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a 
fundamental principle of the American government. They recognized the risks to which all human institutions are 
subject But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is 
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hazardous to discourage tnought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; 
that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed 
grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the 
power of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law-the argument of 
force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the 
Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed." 
Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public 
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes 
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. See · i II v ; ~
271 ~*271 365. The present advertisement, as an expression of grievance and protest on one of the major public issues 
of our time, would seem clearly to qualify for the constitutional protection. The question is whether it forfeits that protection by the 
falsity of some of its factual statements and by its alleged defamation of respondent 
Authoritative interpretations of the First Amendment guarantees have consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test 
of truth-whether administered by judges, juries, or administrative officials-and especially one that puts the burden of proving 
truth on the speaker. Cf. a B at, . 5 5- . The constitutional protection does not turn upon "the truth, 
popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered." N. A. A. C. P. v, Button, 371 U.S. 415,445. As Madison said, 
"Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of every thing; and in no instance is this more true than in that of the 
press." 4 Elliot's Debates on the Federal Constitution {1876), p. 571. In 1 1 the Court 
declared: 
"In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one 
man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we 
know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent in church or state, 
and even to false statement. But the people of this nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the 
probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right 
conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy," 
272 That erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression *272 are to have 
the "breathing space" that they "need ... to survive," .u.,..· A~. A:;.!!..;. ~·'-'""'..:.1-l==.1.>-!.:.J,..J...¥.L..¥.t.~~~ 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in ~lfil'!'M.~..t::'.lfilli~2U...1.!;.!.!L:3!..BU2...JJ...:bG..~:....16.!1..l:,j~~~~.l.r~U. cert. 
denied, illJ.l...S...fi. Judge Edgerton spoke for a unanimous court which affirmed the dismissal of a Congressman's libel suit 
based upon a newspaper article charging him with anti-Semitism in opposing a judicial appointment. He said: 
"Cases which impose liability for erroneous reports of the political conduct of officials reflect the obsolete doctrine 
that the governed must not criticize their governors .... The interest of the public here outweighs the interest of 
appellant or any other individual. The protection of the public requires not merely discussion, but information. 
Political conduct and views which some respectable people approve, and others condemn, are constantly 
imputed to Congressmen. Errors of fact, particularly in regard to a man's mental states and processes, are 
inevitable., .. Whatever is added to the field oflibel is taken from the field offree debate."l..1.fil 
Injury to official reputation affords no more warrant for repressing speech that would otherwise be free than does factual error. 
273 Where judicial officers are involved, this Court has held that concern for the dignity and *273 reputation of the courts does not 
justify the punishment as criminal contempt of criticism of the judge or his decision. ri . This is 
true even though the utterance contains "half-truths" and "misinformation." t:fl.!1.frruilU11J!2Ji.J:l.!!2mHL.~~Lil..:ill.~~;a.i..1Jl.,J;h 
345. Such repression can be justified, if at all, only by a clear and present danger of the obstruction of justice. See also Craig v. 
,UJ,=~..:.t:o:.x.u:s=I-XJU<...x.s..~u..:ir.,· If judges are to be treated as "men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy 
commissioners.I.1il Criticism of their official conduct does not lose its constitutional protection merely because it is effective 
criticism and hence diminishes their official reputations. 
If neither factual error nor defamatory content suffices to remove the constitutional shield from criticism of official conduct, the 
combination of the two elements is no less inadequate. This is the lesson to be drawn from the great controversy over the 
Sedition Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 596, which first crystallized a national awareness of the central meaning of the First Amendment. See 
L~¥hkiiWrsW. 21W-¼PJll#r~,i~~11~1fa?0), at 258 et seq,;i§lorgtt~·JJ.8f4iir·s Fetters (1956), at 426,431, and passi%lbt~Mbtatute made 
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it a crime, punishable by a $5,000 fine and five years in prison, "if any person shall write, print, utter or publish ... any false, 
27 4 scandalous and malicious *27 4 writing or writings against the government of the United States, or either house of the Congress . . 
. , or the President .. , with intentto defame ... or to bring them, or either of them, into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against 
them, or either or any of them, the hatred ofthe good people ofthe United States.'' The Act allowed the defendant the defense of 
truth, and provided that the jury were to be judges both of the law and the facts. Despite these qualifications, the Act was 
vigorously condemned as unconstitutional in an attack joined in by Jefferson and Madison. In the famous Virginia Resolutions of 
1798, the General Assembly of Virginia resolved that it 
"doth particularly protest against the palpable and alarming infractions of the Constitution, in the two late cases of 
the 'Alien and Sedition Acts,' passed at the last session of Congress .... [The Sedition Act] exercises ... a power 
not delegated by the Constitution, but, on the contrary, expressly and positively forbidden by one of the 
amendments thereto-a power which, more than any other, ought to produce universal alarm, because it is 
levelled against the right of freely examining public characters and measures, and of free communication among 
the people thereon, which has ever been justly deemed the only effectual guardian of every other right" 4 Elliot's 
Debates, supra, pp. 553-554. 
Madison prepared the Report in support of the protest. His premise was that the Constitution created a form of government under 
which "The people, not the government, possess the absolute sovereigr)ty." The structure of the government dispersed power in 
reflection of the people's distrust of concentrated power, and of power itself at all levels. This form of government was "altogether 
275 different" from the British form, under which the Crown was sovereign and the people were subjects. "Is *275 it not natural and 
necessary, under such different circumstances," he asked, "that a different degree offreedom in the use of the press should be 
contemplated?" Id., pp. 569-570. Earlier, in a debate in the House of Representatives, Madison had said: "If we advert to the 
nature of Republican Government, we shall find that the censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the 
Government over the people." 4 Annals of Congress, p. 934 (1794). Of the exercise of that power by the press, his Report said: 
"In every state, probably, in the Union, the press has exerted a freedom in canvassing the merits and measures of public men, of 
every description, which has not been confined to the strict limits of the common law. On this footing the freedom of the press has 
stood; on this foundation it yet stands .... " 4 Elliot's Debates, supra, p. 570. The right of free public discussion of the stewardship 
of public officials was thus, in Madison's view, a fundamental principle of the American form of government.Ufil 
276 *276 Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court,llfil the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of 
history. Fines levied in its prosecution were repaid by Act of Congress on the ground that it was unconstitutional. See, e. g., Act of 
July 4, 1840, c. 45, 6 Stat. 802, accompanied by H. R. Rep. No. 86, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. (1840). Calhoun, reporting to the 
Senate on February 4, 1836, assumed that its invalidity was a matter "which no one now doubts." Report with Senate bill No. 122, 
24th Cong., 1stSess., p. 3. Jefferson, as President, pardoned those who had been convicted and sentenced under the Act and 
remitted their fines, stating: "I discharged every person under punishment or prosecution under the sedition law, because I 
considered, and now consider, that law to be a nullity, as absolute and as palpable as if Congress had ordered us to fall down 
and worship a golden image." Letter to Mrs. Adams, July 22, 1804, 4 Jefferson's Works (Washington ed.), pp. 555, 556. The 
invalidity of the Act has also been assumed by J.ustices of this Court. See Holmes, J., dissenting and joined by Brandeis, J., in 
UIIIUl.l.1.!lll....l.Wlo:.i.w~~ILl.ll!:!.:...11:.l>C.¥. ....... .x.t..JoW.:~~; Jackson, J., dissenting in 1/1 t , U 2 0. ; Douglas, 
The Right of the People (1958), p. 47. See also Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed., Carrington, 1927), pp. 899-900; 
Chafee, Free Speech in the United States (1942), pp. 27-28. These views reflect a broad consensus thatthe Act, because of the 
restraint it imposed upon criticism of government and public officials, was inconsistent with the First Amendment. 
There is no force in respondent's argument that the constitutional !imitations implicit in the history of the Sedition Act apply only to 
Congress and not to the States. It is true that the First Amendment was originally addressed only to action by the Federal 
277 Government, and *277 that Jefferson, for one, while denying the power of Congress "to controul the freedom of the press," 
1 49 
What a State may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of 
libeLilil The fear of damage awards under a rule such as that invoked by the Alabama courts here may be markedly more 
inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a criminal statute. See .x...1.lt'.....,..f"""'b"""ic;x,o,g"'-"J..J..!.="-'-"...x.:"-'-'-'""'-'....W>-="-"'-'--""'.W..z-=WA..:aa~ 
90]1923}. Alabama, for example, has a criminal libel law which subjects to prosecution "any person who speaks, writes, or prints 
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of and concerning another any accusation falsely and maliciously importing the commission by such person of a felony, or any 
other indictable offense involving moral turpitude," and which allows as· punishment upon conviction a fine not exceeding $500 
and a prison sentence of six months. Alabama Code, lit 14, § 350. Presumably a person charged with violation of this statute 
enjoys ordinary criminal-law safeguards such as the requirements of an indictment and of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
These safeguards are not available to the defendant in a civil action. The judgment awarded in this case-without the need for 
any proof of actual pecuniary loss-was one thousand times greater than the maximum fine provided by the Alabama criminal 
278 statute, and one hundred times greater than that provided by the Sedition Act *278 And since there is no double-jeopardy 
limitation applicable to civil lawsuits, this is not the only judgment that may be awarded against petitioners for the same 
publication.llfil Whether or not a newspaper can survive a succession of such judgments, the pall offear and timidity imposed 
upon those who would give voice to public criticism is an atmosphere in which the First Amendment freedoms cannot survive. 
Plainly the Alabama law of civil libel is "a form of regulation that creates hazards to protected freedoms markedly greater than 
those that attend reliance upon the criminal law." I . I · 7 ~-
The state rule of !aw is not saved by its allowance of the defense of truth. A defense for erroneous statements honestly made is 
no less essential here than was the requirement of proof of guilty knowledge which, in ~llfil:J..,_!.d!JlUQC!lliWrn.J..Jli.Ji!.,..1:!J..We held 
indispensable to a valid conviction of a bookseller for possessing obscene writings for sale. We said: 
"For if the bookseller is criminally liable without knowledge of the contents, ... he will tend to restrict the books he 
sells to those he has inspected; and thus the State will have imposed a restriction upon the distribution of 
constitutionally protected as well as obscene literature .... And the bookseller's burden would become the public's 
burden, for by restricting him the public's access to reading matter would be restricted .... [H]is timidity in the face 
of his absolute criminal liability, thus would tend to restrict the public's access to forms of the printed word which 
279 the State could not constitutionally *279 suppress directly. The bookseller's self-censorship, compelled by the 
State, would be a censorship affecting the whole public, hardly less virulent for being privately administered. 
Through it, the distribution of all books, both obscene and not obscene, would be impeded." ( 47. 5 
154.) 
A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions-and to do so on pain of libel 
judgments virtually unlimited in amount- leads to a comparable "self-censorship." Allowance of the defense of truth, with the 
burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred.WU Even courts accepting this 
defense as an adequate safeguard have recognized the difficulties of adducing legal proofs that the alleged libel was true in all 
its factual particulars. See, e.g., t ub h ng H , 69 3 , (C th C , 31: see also Noel, Defamation of 
Public Officers and Candidates. 49 Col. L. Rev. 875, 892 (1949). Under such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be 
deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt 
whether it can be proved In court or fear of the expense of having to do so. They tend to make only statements which "steer far 
wider of the unlawful zone." i S t . The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of 
public debate. It is inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a 
280 defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made *280 with "actual ma!lce"-
that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not An oft-cited statement of a like 
rule, which has been adopted by a number of state courts,IW is found in the Kansas case of ........ _ ......... n .......... ............................................ -..  
P 1 {19 8). The State Attorney General, a candidate for re-election and a member of the commission charged with the 
management and control of the state school fund, sued a newspaper publisher for alleged libel in an article purporting to state 
facts relating to his official conduct in connection with a school-fund transaction. The defendant pleaded privilege and the trial 
judge, over the plaintiff's objection, instructed the jury that 
281 "where an article is published and circulated among voters for the sole purpose of giving what the defendant *281 
believes to be truthful information concerning a candidate for public office and for the purpose of enabling such 
voters to cast their ballot more intelligently, and the whole thing is done in good faith and without malice, the article 
is privileged, although the principal matters contained in the article may be untrue in fact and derogatory to the 
character of the plaintiff; and in such a case the burden is on the plaintiff to show actual malice in the publication of 
the article." 
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In answer to a special question, the jury found that the plaintiff had not proved actual malice, and a general verdict was returned 
for the defendant. On appeal the Supreme Court of Kansas, in an opinion by Justice Burch, reasoned as follows (78 K~4.. 
~): 
"It is of the utmost consequence that the people should discuss the character and qualifications of candidates for 
their suffrages. The importance to the state and to society of such discussions is so vast, and the advantages 
derived are so great, that they more than counterbalance the inconvenience of private persons whose conduct 
may be involved, and occasional injury to the reputations of individuals must yield to the public welfare, although 
at times such injury may be great. The public benefit from publicity is so great, and the chance of injury to private 
character so small, that such discussion must be privileged." 
The court thus sustained the trial court's instruction as a correct statement of the law, saying: 
"In such a case the occasion gives rise to a privilege, qualified to this extent any one claiming to be defamed by 
the communication must show actual malice or go remediless, This privilege extends to a great variety of subjects, 
282 and includes matters of *282 public concern, public men, and candidates for office."~-
Such a privilege for criticism of official conduct@ is appropriately analogous to the protection accorded a public official when he 
is sued for libel by a private citizen. In B r e . 3 . this Court held the utterance of a federal official to be 
absolutely privileged if made "within the outer perimeter" of his duties. The States accord the same immunity to statements of their 
highest officers, although some differentiate their lesser officials and qualify the privilege they enjoy.~ Bui all hold that all 
officials are protected unless actual malice can be proved. The reason for the official privilege is said to be that the threat of 
damage suits would otherwise "inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of policies of government" and 
"dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties." Barrv. 
his duty to criticize as it is the official's duty to administer. See ,U"-II..IU.!11..L~===cl.&..tl.L.;;J;..x-1..%.1.~J...L..:"-"~==.I.W.:at..l!:.KJJ.waL.X.t.J.lJJ.l. 
~. quoted supra, p. 270. As Madison said, see supra, p. 275, "the censorial power is in the people over the 
Government, and not in the Government over the people." It would give public servants an unjustified preference over the public 
283 they serve, if critics of official conduct *283 did not have a fair equivalent of the immunity granted to the officials themselves. 
We conclude that such a privilege is required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
m. 
We hold today that the Constitution delimits a State's power to award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials 
against critics of their official conduct Since this is such an action,11.fil the rule requiring proof of actual malice is applicable. While 
Alabama law apparently requires proof of actual malice for an award of punitive damages,l.lll where general damages are 
284 concerned malice is "presumed." Such a presumption is inconsistent *284 with the federal rule. "The power to create 
presumptions is not a means of escape from constitutional restrictions," £&.ll!lJLl!..l:Y.!~Hll~:.lll!...Y,...i2.....k.l~~; "the showing of 
malice required for the forfeiture of the privilege is not presumed but is a matter for proof by the plaintiff .... " 
Mich, 134. 146, 97 N, W. 2d 719, 725 {1959}.llfil Since the trial judge did not instruct the jury to differentiate between general and 
punitive damages, it may be that the verdict was wholly an award of one or the other. But it is impossible to know, in view of the 
general verdict returned. Because of this uncertainty, the judgment must be reversed and the case remanded.~ 
I Ii ; see • 35 
Since respondent may seek a new trial, we deem that considerations of effective judicial administration require us to review the 
285 evidence in the present record to determine *285 whether it could constitutionally support a judgment for respondent. This 
Court's duty is not limited to the elaboration of constitutional principles: we must also in proper cases review the evidence to 
make certain that those principles have been constitutionally applied. This is such a case, particularly since the question is one of 
alleged trespass across "the line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may legitimately be regulated." 
r . In cases where that line must be drawn, the rule is that we "examine for ourselves the 
statements in issue and the circumstances under which they were made to see ... whether they are of a character which the 
principles of the First Amendment, as adopted by the Due Process Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment, protect.".i..P.¥.1.lJu.:.r.t""-'-'.!<1<...;'-' 
Flwrus3El£hlbtim3Jiff&1!:H.S~etalso 009. Inc,. V. Olaoo19:,t3% :U,7$4371; 
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must "make an independent examination ofthe whole record," t.;ff.~fru!..Y...QQ!l1ft.Lkfill:!l1!la...;mUJ.~~~~~ so as to assure 
ourselves that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.!2.21 
1~_86 Applying these standards, we consider that the proof presented to show actual malice lacks the convincing *286 clarity which the 
constitutional standard demands, and hence that it would not constitutionally sustain the judgment for respondent under the 
proper rule of law. The case of the individual petitioners requires little discussion. Even assuming that they could constitutionally 
be found to have authorized the use of their names on the advertisement, there was no evidence whatever that they were aware 
of any erroneous statements or were in any way reckless in that regard. The judgment against them is thus without constitutional 
support. 
As to the Times, we similarly conclude that the facts do not support a finding of actual malice. The statement by the Times' 
Secretary that, apart from the padlocking allegation, he thought the advertisement was "substantially correct," affords no 
constitutional warrant for the Alabama Supreme Court's conclusion that it was a "cavalier ignoring of the falsity of the 
advertisement [from which] the jury could not have but been impressed with the bad faith of The limes, and its maliciousness 
inferable therefrom." The statement does not indicate malice at the time of the publication; even if the advertisement was not 
"substantially correct"-although respondent's own proofs !end to show that it was-that opinion was at least a reasonable one, 
and there was no evidence to impeach the witness' good faith in holding it The Times' failure to retract upon respondent's 
demand. although it later retracted upon the demand of Governor Patterson, is likewise not adequate evidence of malice for 
constitutional purposes. Whether or not a failure to retract may ever constitute such evidence, there are two reasons why it does 
not here. First, the letter written by the Times reflected a reasonable doubt on its part as to whether the advertisement could 
reasonably be taken to refer to respondent at all. Second, it was not a final refusal, since it asked for an explanation on this point 
287 - a request that respondent chose to ignore. Nor does the retraction upon the demand ofthe Governor supply the *287 
necessary proof. It may be doubted that a failure to retract which is not itself evidence of malice can retroactively become such by 
virtue of a retraction subsequently made to another party. But in any event that did not happen here, since the explanation given 
by the Times' Secretary for the distinction drawn between respondent and the Governor was a reasonable one, the good faith of 
which was not impeached. 
Finally, there is evidence that the Times published the advertisement without checking its accuracy against the news stories in 
the Times' own files. The mere presence of the stories in !he files does not, ofcourse, establish thatthe Times "knew" the 
advertisement was false, since the state of mind required for actual malice would have to be brought home to the persons in the 
Times' organization having responsibility for the publication of the advertisement. With respect to the failure of those persons to 
make the check, the record shows that they relied upon their knowledge of the good reputation of many of those whose names 
were listed as sponsors of the advertisement. and upon the letter from A. Philip Randolph, known to them as a responsible 
individual, certifying that the use ofthe names was authorized. There was testimony that the persons handling the advertisement 
saw nothing in it that would render it unacceptable under the Times' policy of rejecting advertisements containing "attacks of a 
288 personal character";llll their failure to reject it on this ground was not unreasonable. We think *288 the evidence against the 
Times supports at most a finding of negligence in failing to discover the misstatements, and is constitutionally insufficient to show 
the recklessness that is required for a finding of actual malice. Cf. I 
8. A e I ): '-'h"""'e ... o.w· ......,.===,............,1,.1,.!1<.=='-'-""...,_........_......., ........ U...,...,__,.,CW<.J~.L..kl<!-l..l<~=~~=u· 
We also think the evidence was constitutionally defective in another respect: it was incapable of supporting the jury's finding that 
the allegedly libelous statements were made "of and concerning" respondent. Respondent relies on the words of the 
advertisement and the testimony of six witnesses to establish a connection between it and himself. Thus, in his brief to this Court, 
he states: 
"The reference to respondent as police commissioner is clear from the ad. In addition, the jury heard the testimony 
of a newspaper editor ... ; a real estate and insurance man ... ; the sales manager of a men's clothing store ... ; a 
food equipment man ... ; a service station operator ... ; and the operator of a truck line for whom respondent had 
formerly worked .... Each of these witnesses stated that he associated the statements with respondent. ... " 
(Citations to record omitted.) 
There was no reference to respondent in the advertisement. either by name or official position. A number of the allegedly libelous 
statements-the charges that the dining hall was padlocked and that Dr. King's home was bombed, his person assaulted, and a 
perjury prosecution instituted against him-<lid not even concern the police; despite the Ingenuity of the arguments which would 
attach this significance to the word "They," it is plain that these statements could not reasonably be read as accusing respondent 
289 of penti!mitish;r~llitv'ml:le~H*l~ ect5 *289 in questionoo~tsltlrtem~s upon which respondent principally reli@§8:!Gfr.i00rring to him 
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are the two allegations that did concern the police or police functions: that "truckloaas of police ... ringed the Alabama State 
College Campus" after the demonstration on the State Capitol steps, and that Dr. King had been "arrested ... seven times." 
These statements were false only in that the police had been "deployed near" the campus but had not actually "ringed" it and had 
/"'·-··\ not gone there in connection with the State Capitol demonstration, and in that Dr. King had been arrested only four times. The 
ruling that these discrepancies between what was true and what was asserted were sufficientto injure respondent's reputation 
may itself raise constitutional problems, but we need not consider them here. Although the statements may be taken as referring 
to the police, they did not on their face make even an oblique reference to respondent as an individual. Support for the asserted 
reference must, therefore, be sought in the testimony of respondent's witnesses. But none of them suggested any basis for !he 
belief that respondent himself was attacked in the advertisement beyond the bare fact that he was in overall charge of the Police 
Department and thus bore official responsibility for police conduct; to the extent that some of the witnesses thought respondent to 
have been charged with ordering or approving the conduct or otherwise being personally involved in it, they based this notion 
not on any statements in the advertisement, and not on any evidence that he had in fact been so involved, but solely on the 
290 unsupported assumption that, because of his official position, he must have been.llfil This reliance on the bare *290 fact of 
respondent's official positionf.£fil was made explicit by the Supreme Court of Alabama. That court, in holding that the trial court 
291 "did not err in overruling the demurrer [of the 11mes] in the aspectthatthe libelous *291 matter was not ofand concerning the 
[plaintiff,]" based its ruling on the proposition that 
"We think it common knowledge that the average person knows that municipal agents, such as police and firemen, 
and others, are under the control and direction of the city governing body, and more particularly under the 
direction and control of a single commissioner. In measuring the performance or deficiencies of such groups, 
praise or criticism is usually attached to the official in complete control of the body." 273 Ala., at 674-675, 144 So. 
2d. at 39. 
This proposition has disquieting implications for criticism of governmental conduct. For good reason, "no court of last resort in this 
country has ever held, or even suggested, that prosecutions for libel on government have any place in the American system of 
292 jurisprudence." C f.i:0 ,, 0 ~ ·c g, n · Cg •. , .... , 5 ,1 ... wt:i • .i.,*292~. The present proposition would 
sidestep this obstacle by transmuting criticism of government, however impersonal it may seem on its face, into personal 
criticism, and hence potential libel, of the officials of whom the government is composed. There is no legal alchemy by which a 
State may thus create the cause of action that would otherwise be denied for a publication which, as respondent himself said of 
the advertisement. "reflects not only on me but on the other Commissioners and the community." Raising as it does the possibility 
that a good-faith critic of government will be penalized for his criticism, the proposition relied on by the Alabama courts strikes at 
the very center of the constitutionally protected area of free expression.Gilll We hold that such a proposition may not 
constitutionally be utilized to establish that an otherwise impersonal attack on governmental operations was a libel of an official 
responsible for those operations. Since it was relied on exclusively here, and there was no other evidence to connect the 
statements with respondent, the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support a finding that the statements referred to 
respondent 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama is reversed and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
293 *293 MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS joins, concurring, 
I concur in reversing this half-million-dollar judgment against the New York Times Company and the four individual defendants. 
In reversing the Court holds that "the Constitution delimits a State's power to award damages for libel in actions brought by public 
officials against critics of their official conduct." Ante, p, 283. I base my vote to reverse on the belief that the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments not merely "delimit" a State's power to award damages to "public officials against critics of their official conduct" but 
completely prohibit a State from exercising such a power. The Court goes on to hold that a State can subject such critics to 
damages if "actual malice" can be proved against them. ''Malice," even as defined by the Court, is an elusive, abstract concept, 
hard to prove and hard to disprove. The requirement that malice be proved provides at best an evanescent protection for the right 
critically to discuss public affairs and certainly does not measure up to the sturdy safeguard embodied in the First Amendment. 
Unlike the Court, therefore, I vote to reverse exclusively on the ground that !he limes and the individual defendants had an 
absolute, unconditional constitutional right to publish in the 11mes advertisement their criticisms of the Montgomery agencies and 
officials. I do not base my vote to reverse on any failure to prove that these individual defendants signed the advertisement or that 
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their criticism of the Police Department was aimed at the plaintiff Sullivan, who was men the Montgomery City Commissioner 
having supervision of the city's police; for present purposes I assume these things were proved. Nor is my reason for reversal the 
size of the half-million-dollar judgment, large as it is. If Alabama has constitutional power to use its civil libel law to impose 
/.-~~4 damages on the press for criticizing the way public officials perform or fail *294 to perform their duties, I know of no provision in 
the Federal Constitution which either expressly or impliedly bars the State from fixing the amount of damages. 
The half-million-dollar verdict does give dramatic proof, however, that state libel laws threaten the very existence of an American 
press virile enough to publish unpopular views on public affairs and bold enough to criticize !he conduct of public officials. The 
factual background of this case emphasizes the imminence and enormity of that threat One of the acute and highly emotional 
issues in this country arises out of efforts of many people, even including some public officials, to continue state-commanded 
segregation of races in the public schools and other public places, despite our several holdings that such a state practice is 
forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment. Montgomery is one of the localities in which widespread hostility to desegregation has 
been manifested. This hostility has sometimes extended itself to persons who favor desegregation, particularly to so-called 
"outside agitators," a term which can be made to fit papers like the limes, which is published in New York. The scarcity of 
testimony to show that Commissioner Sullivan suffered any actual damages at all suggests that these feelings of hostility had at 
least as much to do with rendition of this half-million-dollar verdict as did an appraisal of damages. Viewed realistically, this 
record lends support to an inference that instead of being damaged Commissioner Sullivan's political, social, and financial 
prestige has likely been enhanced by the Times' publication. Moreover, a second half-million-dollar libel verdict against the 
Times based on the same advertisement has already been awarded to another Commissioner. There a jury again gave the full 
amount claimed. There is no reason to believe that there are not more such huge verdicts lurking just around the comer for the 
295 Times or any other newspaper or broadcaster which *295 might dare to criticize public officials. In fact, briefs before us show that 
in Alabama there are now pending eleven libel suits by local and state officials against the Tlmes seeking $5,600,000, and five 
such suits against the Columbia Broadcasting System seeking $1,700,000. Moreover, this technique for harassing and punishing 
a free press-now that it has been shown to be possible-is by no means limited to cases with racial overtones; it can be used in 
other fields where public feelings may make local as well as out-of-state newspapers easy prey for libel verdict seekers. 
In my opinion the Federal Constitution has dealt with this deadly danger to the press in the only way possible without leaving the 
free press open to destruction-by granting the press an absolute immunity for criticism ofthe way public officials do their public 
duty. Compare M tt • U.S. 564. Stopgap measures like those the Court adopts are in my judgment not enough. This 
record certainly does not indicate that any different verdict would have been rendered here whatever the Court had charged the 
jury about "malice," "truth," "good motives," "justifiable ends," or any other legal formulas which in theory would protect the press. 
Nor does the record indicate that any of these legalistic words would have caused the courts below to set aside or to reduce the 
half-million-dollar verdict in any amount 
I agree with the Court that the Fourteenth Amendment made the First applicable to the States.ill This means to me that since the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment a State has no more power than the Federal Government to use a civil libel law or any 
296 other law to impose damages for merely discussing public affairs and criticizing public officials. The power of the United *296 
States to do that is, in my judgment, precisely nil. Such was the general view held when the First Amendment was adopted and 
ever since.0 Congress never has sought to challenge this viewpoint by passing any civil libel law. It did pass the Sedition Act in 
1798,ill which made it a crime-"seditious libel"-to criticize federal officials or the Federal Government. As the Court's opinion 
correctly points out, however, ante, pp. 273-276, that Act came to an ignominious end and by common consent has generally 
been treated as having been a wholly unjustifiable and much to be regretted violation of the First Amendment. Since the First 
Amendment is now made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth, it no more permits the States to impose damages for libel 
than it does the Federal Government. 
We would, I think, more faithfully interpret the First Amendment by holding that at the very least it leaves the people and the press 
free to criticize officials and discuss public affairs with impunity. This Nation of ours elects many of its important officials; so do the 
States, the municipalities, the counties, and even many precincts. These officials are responsible to the people for the way they 
perform their duties. While our Court has held that some kinds of speech and writings, such as "obscenity," Bot , U i 1z 
~ and "fighting words," ap P§ht e. U 8. are not expression within the protection of the 
297 First Amendment,!!l freedom to discuss public affairs and public officials *297 is unquestionably, as the Court today holds, the 
kind of speech the First Amendment was primarily designed to keep within the area offree discussion. To punish the exercise of 
this right to discuss public affairs or to penalize it through libel judgments is to abridge or shut off discussion of the very kind most 
needed. This Nation, I suspect, can live in peace without libel suits based on public discussions of public affairs and public 
off~l\'islitlsH @fMlW Ms\t<Fmllflel!MICan live in freedorJD~lfttoi.t:;u~ple can be made to suffer physically or fioeo~Q()for 
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criticizing their government, its actions, or its officials. "For a representative democracy ceases to exist the moment that the public 
functionaries are by any means absolved from their responsibility to their constituents; and this happens whenever the 
constituent can be restrained in any manner from speaking, writing, or publishing his opinions upon any public measure, or upon 
/"-•. the conduct of those who may advise or execute it"lfil An unconditional right to say what one pleases about public affairs is what I 
consider to be the minimum guarantee of the First Amendment.Ifil 
I regret that the Court has stopped short of this holding indispensable to preserve our free press from destruction. 
MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS joins, concurring in the result 
The Court today announces a constitutional standard which prohibits "a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory 
298 falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with *298 ·actual malice'-that is, with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not" Ante, at 279-280. The Court thus rules that 
the Constitution gives citizens and newspapers a "conditional privilege" immunizing nonmalicious misstatements offact 
regarding the official conduct of a government officer. The impressive array of historyill and precedent marshaled by the Court, 
however, confirms my belief that the Constitution affords greater protection than that provided by the Court's standard to citizen 
and press in exercising the right of public criticism. 
In my view, the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution afford to the citizen and to the press an absolute, 
unconditional privilege to criticize official conduct despite the harm which may flow from excesses and abuses. The prized 
American right "to speak one's mind," cf. . C i about public officials and affairs needs 
"breathing space to survive," P. 37 . The right should not depend upon a probing by the jury 
299 of the motivation1ll of the citizen or press. The theory *299 of our Constitution is that every citizen may speak his mind and every 
newspaper express its view on matters of public concern and may not be barred from speaking or publishing because those in 
control of government think that what is said or written is unwise, unfair, false, or malicious. In a democratic society, one who 
assumes to act for the citizens in an executive, legislative, or judicial capacity must expect that his official acts will be commented 
upon and criticized. Such criticism cannot, in my opinion, be muzzled or deterred by the courts at the instance of public officials 
under the label of libel. 
It has been recognized that "prosecutions for libel on government have [no] place in the American system of jurisprudence." Cit'! 
o C . 5 1 . I fully agree. Government, however, is not an abstraction; it is made 
up of individuals -of governors responsible to the governed. In a democratic society where men are free by ballots to remove 
those in power, any statement critical of governmental action is necessarily "of and concerning" the governors and any statement 
critical of the governors' official conduct is necessarily "of and concerning" the government If the rule that libel on government 
has no place in our Constitution is to have real meaning, then libel on the official conduct of the governors likewise can have no 
place in our Constitution. 
300 We must recognize that we are writing upon a clean slate.ill As the Court notes, although there have been *300 "statements of 
this Court to the effect that the Constitution does not protect libelous publications ... [nJone of the cases sustained the use of libel 
laws to impose sanctions upon expression critical of the official conduct of public officials." Ante, at 268. We should be particularly 
careful, therefore, adequately to protect the liberties which are embodied in the First and Fourteenth Amendments. It may be 
urged that deliberately and maliciously false statements have no conceivable value as free speech. That argument, however, is 
not responsive to the real issue presented by this case, which is whether that freedom of speech which all agree is 
constitutionally protected can be effectively safeguarded by a rule allowing the imposition of liability upon a jury's evaluation of 
the speaker's state of mind. If individual citizens may be held liable in damages for strong words, which a jury finds false and 
maliciously motivated, there can be little doubt that public debate and advocacy will be constrained. And if newspapers, 
publishing advertisements dealing with public issues, thereby risk liability, there can also be little doubt that the ability of minority 
a . The opinion of the Court conclusively demonstrates the 
. 301 chilling effect of the Alabama libel laws on First Amendment freedoms *301 in the area of race relations. The American Colonists 
were not willing, nor should we be, to take the risk that "[m]en who injure and oppress the people under their administration [and] 
provoke them to cry out and complain" will also be empowered to "make that very complaint the foundation for new oppressions 
and prosecutions." The Trial of John Peter Zenger, 17 Howell's St. Tr. 675, 721-722 (1735) (argument of counsel to the jury). To 
impose liability for critical, albeit erroneous or even malicious, comments on official conduct would effectively resurrect "the 
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obsolete doctrine that the govemeu must not criticize their governors." Cf. ~l'...YJjlillsU'.mlill,....l.!:l:Jl.~.ill'!lQ...IJ..:..:~~-'1...J.i3i. 
F. 2d 457.d@.. 
Our national experience teaches that repressions breed hate and "that hate menaces stable government."~ 
74U S 57, 7 ( I .J, g}.WeshouldbeevermindfulofthewisecounselofChiefJusticeHughes: 
"[l]mperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly 
in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to 
the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means, Therein lies the security of 
the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government." e 9 
This is not to say that the Constitution protects defamatory statements directed against the private conduct of a public official or 
private citizen. Freedom of press and of speech insures that government will respond to the will of the people and that changes 
may be obtained by peaceful means. Purely private defamation has little to do with the political ends of a self-governing society. 
302 The imposition of liability for private defamation does not *302 abridge the freedom of public speech or any other freedom 
protected by the First Amendment.ill This, of course, cannot be said ''where public officials are concerned or where public 
matters are involved .... [O]ne main function of the First Amendment is to ensure ample opportunity for the people to determine 
and resolve public issues. Where public matters are involved, the doubts should be resolved in favor offreedom of expression 
rather than against it." Douglas, The Right of the People (1958), p. 41. 
In many jurisdictions, legislators, judges and executive officers are clothed with absolute immunity against liability for defamatory 
words uttered in the discharge of their public duties. See, e.g.,~; i f 7i 
~- Judge Learned Hand ably summarized the policies underlying the rule: 
"It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen upon 
others, or for any other personal motive not connected with the public good, should not escape liability for the 
injuries he may so cause; and, if it were possible in practice to confine such complaints to the guilty, it would be 
monstrous to deny recovery. The justification for doing so is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well 
03 founded until the •303 case has been tried, and that to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the 
burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, 
or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties. Again and again the public interest calls for 
action which may turn outto be founded on a mistake, in the face of which an official may later find himself hard 
put to it to satisfy a jury of his good faith. There must indeed be means of punishing public officers who have been 
truant to their duties; but that is quite another matter from exposing such as have been honestly mistaken to suit by 
anyone who has suffered from their errors. As is so often the case, the answer must be found in a balance 
between the evils inevitable in either alternative. In this instance it has been thought in the end better to leave 
unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than lo subject those who try to do their duty to the constant 
dread of retaliation .... 
"The decisions have, indeed, always imposed as a limitation upon the immunity that the official's act must have 
been within the scope of his powers; and it can be argued that official powers, since they exist only for the public 
good, never cover occasions where the public good is not their aim, and hence that to exercise a power 
dishonestly is necessarily to overstep its bounds. A moment's reflection shows, however, that that cannot be the 
meaning of the limitation without defeating the whole doctrine. What is meant by saying that the officer must be 
acting within his power cannot be more than that the occasion must be such as would have justified the act, if he 
had been using his power for any of the purposes on whose account it was vested in him .... "~ 
177 F, 2d 579, 581. 
304 *304 If the government official should be immune from libel actions so that his ardor to serve the public will not be dampened and 
"fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of policies of government" not be inhibited,~. then the 
citizen and the press should likewise be immune from libel actions for their criticism of official conduct. Their ardor as citizens will 
thus not be dampened and they will be free "to applaud or to criticize the way public employees do their jobs, from the least to the 
most important."™ If liability can attach to political criticism because it damages the reputation of a public official as a public 
official, then no critical citizen can safely utter anything but faint praise about the government or its officials. The vigorous criticism 
by press and citizen of the conduct of the government of the day by the officials of the day will soon yield to silence if officials in 
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control of government agencies, instead of answering criticisms, can resort to frienmy juries to forestall criticism of their official 
conduct.Ifil 
The conclusion that the Constitution affords the citizen and the press an absolute privilege for criticism of official conduct does not 
leave the public official without defenses against unsubstantiated opinions or deliberate misstatements. "Under our system of 
government, counterargument and education are the weapons available to expose these matters, not abridgment .. . of free 
305 speech .... " e rg • 7 U, , . The public *305 official certainly has equal if not greater access than mos! 
private citizens to media of communication. In any event, despite the possibility that some excesses and abuses may go 
unremedied, we must recognize that "the people of this nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability 
of excesses and abuses, [certain] liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of 
the citizens of a democracy."~~-As Mr. Justice Brandeis correctly observed, "sunlight is 
the most powerful of all disinfectants:m 
For these reasons, I strongly believe that the Constitution accords citizens and press an unconditional freedom to criticize official 
conduct. it necessarily follows that in a case such as this, where all agree that the allegedly defamatory statements related to 
official conduct, the judgments for libel cannot constitutionally be sustained. 
t.l Together with No. 40, Abernathy et al. v. Sullivan, also on certiorari to the same court, argued January 7, 1964. 
ill A copy of the advertisement is printed in the Appendix. 
raJ. Respondent did not consider the charge of expelling the students to be applicable to him, since "that responsibility rests with the State 
Department of Education." 
[fil Approximately 394 copies of the edition of the Times containing the advertisement were circulated in Alabama. Of these, about 35 copies were 
distributed in Montgomery County. The total circulation of the Times for that day was approximately 650,000 copies. 
£11 Since we sustain the contentions of all the petitioners under the First Amendment's guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press as applied 
to the State by the Fourteenth Amendment, we do not decide the questions presented by the other claims of violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The individual petitioners contend that the judgment against them offends the Due Process Clause because there was no evidence to 
show that they had published or authorized the publication of the alleged libel, and that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses were 
violated by racial segregation and racial bias in the courtroom. The Times contends that the assumption of jurisdiction over its corporate person by 
the Alabama courts overreaches the territorial limits of the Due Process Clause. The latter claim is foreclosed from our review by the ruling of the 
Alabama courts that the Times entered a general appearance in the action and thus waived its jurisdictional objection; we cannot say that this ruling 
lacks "fair or substantial support" in prior Alabama decisions. See 1 ; compare N. A. A. C. P. v. 
~-
Ifil See American Law Institute, Restatement of Torts, § 593, Comment b ( 1938). 
[fil ~=--lL..ll:U<aS."""'--='""""-.......,""""'' 
[1Ql J.S!ll:'.fil);~V .2QJ!r!lll.Wl!;QBilJU~l.r.3i....DJJ.., 
illl ~ U. s. 4 76. 
LI2J ~. U. s. 415. 
~ See also Mill, On Liberty (Oxford: Blackwell, 1947), at 47: 
" ... [T]o argue sophistically, to suppress facts or arguments, to misstate the elements of the case, or misrepresent the opposite opinion ... all this, 
even to the most aggravated degree, is so continually done in perfect good faith, by persons who are not considered, and in many other respects 
may not deserve to be considered, ignorant or incompetent, that it is rarely possible, on adequate grounds, conscientiously to stamp the 
misrepresentation as morally culpable; and still less could law presume to Interfere with this kind of controversial misconduct." 
ll£ The climate in which public officials operate, especially during a political campaign, has been described by one commentator in the following 
terms: "Charges of gross incompetence, disregard of the public interest, communist sympathies, and the like usually have filled the air; and hints of 
bribery, embezzlement, and other criminal conduct are not infrequent." Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 Col. L Rev. 875 
(1949). 
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For a similar description written 60 years earlier, see Chase, Criticism of Public Officers and Cai ,c1idates for Office, 23 Am. L. Rev. 346 ( 1889). 
llfil The Report on the Virginia Resolutions further stated: 
"[l)t is manifestly impossible to punish !he intent to bring those who administer !he government into disrepute or contempt, without striking at the 
right of freely discussing public characters and measures; ... which, again, is equivalent to a protec!lon of those who administer the government, if 
they should at any time deserve the contempt or hatred of the people, against being exposed to it, by free animadversions on their characters and 
conduct Nor can there be a doubt ... that a government thus in trenched in penal statutes against the just and natural effects of a culpable 
administration, will easily evade the responsibility which is essential to a faithful discharge of its duty. 
"Let it be recollected, lastly, that the right of electing the members of the government constitutes more particularly the essence of a free and 
responsible government. The value and efficacy of this right depends on the knowledge of the comparative merits and demerits of the candidates 
for public trust, and on the equal freedom, consequently, of examining and discussing these merits and demerits of the candidates respectively." 4 
Elliot's Debates, supra, p. 575. 
I1fil The Act expired by ils terms in 1801. 
llfil The Times states that four other libel suits based on the advertisement have been filed against it by others who have served as Montgomery 
City Commissioners and by the Governor of Alabama: that another $500,000 verdict has been awarded in the only one of these cases that has yet 
gone to trial; and !hat the damages sought in the other three total $2,000,000. 
llfil Even a false statement may be deemed to make a valuable contribution to public debate, since it brings about "the clearer perception and 
livelier impression of truth, produced by its coillsion with error." Mill, On Liberty (Oxford: Blackwell,.1947), at 15; see also Milton, Areopagltica, in 
Prose Works (Yale, 1959), Vol. II, at 561. 
The consensus of scholarly opinion apparently favors the rule that is here adopted. E g., 1 Harper and James, Torts,§ 5.26, at 449-450 (1956); 
Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 Col. L. Rev. 875, 891-895, 897, 903 (1949); Ha!len, Fair Comment, 8 Tex. L. Rev, 41; 61 
(1929); Smith, Charges Against Candidates, 18 Mich. L Rev. 1, 115 (1919); Chase, Criticism of Public Officers and Candidates for Office, 23 Am. 
L. Rev. 346, 367-371 (1889); Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (7th ed., Lane, 1903), at 604, 616-628. But see, e.g., American Law Institute, 
Restatement of Torts,§ 598, Comment a (1938) (reversing the position taken in Tentative Draft 13, § 1041 (2) (1936)); Veeder, Freedom of Public 
Discussion, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 413,419 (1910). 
I2.1l The privilege immunizing honest misstatements of fact is often referred to as a "conditional" privilege to distinguish it from the "absolute" 
privilege recognized in judicial, legislative, administrative and executive proceedings. See, e.g., Prosser, Torts (2d ed., 1955), § 95. 
ra.f1 See 1 Harper and James, Torts, § 5.23, at 429-430 (1956): Prosser, Torts (2d ed., 1955), at 612-613; American Law Institute, Restatement of 
Torts (1938), § 591. 
12m We have no occasion here to determine how far down into the lower ranks of government employees the "public official" designation would 
extend for purposes of this rule, or otherwise to specify categories of persons who would or would not be included. Cf. Barr v. Matteo. 360 U.S. 
~-Nor need we here determine the boundaries of !he "official conduct" concept. It is enough for the present case that respondent's 
position as an elected city commissioner clearly made him a public official, and that the allegations in the advertisement concerned what was 
allegedly his official conduct as Commissioner in charge of the Police Department. As to the statements alleging the assaulting of Dr. King and the 
bombing of his home, it is immaterial that they might not be considered to involve respondent's official conduct If he himself had been accused of 
perpetrating the assault and the bombing. Respondent does not claim that the statements charged him personally with these acts; his contention is 
that the advertisement connects him with them only in his official capacity as the Commissioner supervising the police, on the theory that the police 
might be equated with the "They" who did the bombing and assaulting. Thus, if these allegations can be read as referring to respondent at all, they 
must be read as describing his performance of his official duties. 
~ ::!!2J.lfil!Q!!J:ll!Ul§!lJ.OJ1.~!...Y....Q!ll:1~Wi...8!!s!...:WLJl.!!1:.J.~.§!;U~lilJ~.W~ll- Thus, the trial judge here instructed the jury that "mere 
negligence or carelessness is not evidence of actual malice or malice in fact, and does not justify an award of exemplary or punitive damages in an 
action for libel." 
The court refused, however, to give the following instruction which had been requested by the Times: 
"I charge you ... that punitive damages, as the name indicates, are designed to punish the defendant, the New York Times Company, a 
corporation, and the other defendants in this case, ... and I further charge you that such punitive damages may be awarded only in the event that 
you, the jury, are convinced by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the defendant ... was motivated by personal ill will, that is actual intent to 
do the plaintiff harm, or that the defendant. . , was guilty of gross negligence and recklessness and not of just ordinary negligence or carelessness in 
publishing the matter complained of so as to indicate a wanton disregard of plaintiff's rights." 
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The trial court's error in failing to require any finding of actual malice for an award of general du, nag es makes it unnecessary for us to consider the 
sufficiency under the federal standard of the instructions regarding actual malice that were given as to punitive damages. 
Q.fil Accord, ~=..!.zl.w:...=~==.l...2!=!d.l...~=c.:......11.W~..u::.:t...L~~= .:.=!!!.!..!,....!..!..!l:~==~~!l::.:.J....!.l!..==~~~(.\...t.!...>!...1..t..,~=~~ 
ill.ffi. 
~ The Seventh Amendment does not, as respondent contends, preclude such an examination by this Court That Amendment, providing that "no 
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law," is applicable to 
state cases coming here. C. g , Q g , §, ~;cf.~-But its ban on re-
examination of facts does not preclude us from determining whether governing rules of federal law have been properly applied to the facts. "[T]his 
Court will review the finding of facts by a Slate court ... where a conclusion of law as to a Federal right and a finding of fact are so intermingled as 
to make it necessary, in order to pass upon the Federal question, to analyze the facts." · k s. 4 ~- See also Haynes 
V Wi 37 50 5- 6. 
~ The Times has set forth in a booklet i!s "Advertising A~ceptability Standards." Listed among the classes of advertising that the newspaper does 
not accept are advertisements that are "fraudulent or deceptive," that are "ambiguous in wording and ... may mislead," and that contain "attacks of 
a personal character." In replying to respondent's interrogatories before the trial, the Secretary of the Times slated that "as the advertisement made 
no attacks of a personal character upon any individual and otherwise met the advertising acceptability standards promulgated," it had been 
approved for publication. 
I2fil Respondent's own testimony was that "as Commissioner of Public Affairs ii is part of my duty to supervise the Police Department and I certainly 
feel like it (a statement] is associated with me when it describes police activities." He thought that "by virtue of being Police Commissioner and 
Commissioner of Public Affairs," he was charged with "any activity on the part of the Police Department." "When it describes police action, certainly I 
feel it reflects on me as an individual." He added that "It is my feeling that it reflects not only on me but on the other Commissioners and the 
community." 
Grover C. Hall testified that to him the third paragraph of the advertisement called to mind "the City government-the Commissioners," and that 
"now that you ask it I would naturally think a little more about the police Commissioner because his responsibility is exciusively with the 
constabulary." It was "the phrase about starvation" that led to the association; "the other didn't hit me with any particular force." 
Arnold D. Blackwell testified that the third paragraph was associated in his mind with "the Police Commissioner and the police force. The people on 
the police force." If he had believed the statement about the padlocking of the dining hall, he would have thought "that the people on our police 
force or the heads of our police force were acting without their jurisdiction and would not be competent for the position." "I would assume that the 
Commissioner had ordered the police force to do that and therefore it would be his responsibility." 
Harry W. Kaminsky associated the statement about "truckloads of police" with respondent "because he is the Police Commissioner." He thought !hat 
the reference to arrests in the sixth paragraph "implicates !he Police Department, I think, or the authorities that would do that-arrest folks for 
speeding and loitering and such as that." Asked whether he would associate with respondent a newspaper report that the police had "beat 
somebody up or assaulted them on the streets of Montgomery," he replied: "I still say he is the Police Commissioner and those men are working 
directly under him and therefore I would think that he would have something to do with it." In general, he said,"! look at Mr. Sullivan when I see the 
Police Department." 
H. M. Price, Sr., testified that he associated the first sentence of the third paragraph with respondent because: "I would just automatically consider 
that the Police Commissioner in Montgomery would have to put his approval on those kind of things as an individual." 
William M. Parker, Jr., testified that he associated the statements in the two paragraph with "the Commissioners of the City of Montgomery," and 
since respondent "was the Police Commissioner," he "thought of him first." He told the examining counsel: "I think if you were the Police 
Commissioner I would have thought it was speaking of you." 
Horace W. White, respondent's former employer, testified that the statement about "!ruck-loads of police" made him think of respondent "as being 
the head of the Police Department." Asked whether he read the statement as charging respondent himself with ringing the campus or having 
shotguns and tear-gas, he replied: "Well, I thought of his department being charged with ii, yes, sir. He is the head of the Police Department as I 
understand it." He further said that the reason he would have been unwilling to re-employ respondent if he had believed the advertisement was 
"the fact that he allowed the Police Department to do the things that the paper say he did." 
ram Insofar as the proposition means only that the statements about police conduct libeled respondent by implicitly criticizing his ability to run the 
Police Department, recovery is also precluded in this case by the doctrine of fair comment. See American Law Institute, Restatement of Torts 
( 1938), § 607. Since the Fourteenth Amendment requires recognition of the conditional privilege for honest misstatements of fact, it follows that a 
defense of fair comment must be afforded for honest expression of opinion based upon privileged, as well as true, statements of fact. Both 
defenses are of course defeasible if the public official proves actual malice, as was not done here. 
ra} See, e. g., 1 Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries (1803), 297-299 (editor's appendix). St. George Tucker, a distinguished Virginia jurist, took part 
in the Annapolis Convention of 1786, sat on both state and federal courts, and was widely known for his writings on judicial and constitutional 
subjects. 
Dennis Irish, etal vs Jeffrey Hall, etal Docket No. 44794 305 of 590 
https://scholar.google.corn/scholar_case?case;::1018352777i703896207&q=376+U.S,+254&hl:::en&as_sdt=200003 17/18 
11/18/2016 Ner ',rk Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US 254 - Supreme Court" ~~1- Google Scholar 
Ql Act of July 14, 1798, 1 Stat. 596. 
Ifil 1 Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries (1803), 297 (editor's appendix); cf. Brant, Seditious Libel: Myth and Reality, 39 N. Y. U. L. Rev. i. 
(fil Cf. Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government (1948). 
ill I fully agree with the Court that the attack upon the validity of the Sedition Act of 1798, 1 Stal. 596, "has carried the day in the court of history," 
ante, at 276, and !hat the Act would today be declared unconstitutional. It should be pointed out, however, that the Sedition Act proscribed writings 
which were "false, scandalous and malicious." (Emphasis added.) For prosecutions under the Sedition Act charging malice, see, e.g., Trial of 
Matthew Lyon (1798), in Wharton, State Trials of the United States (1849), p. 333: Trial of Thomas Cooper (1800), in id., at 659; Trial of Anthony 
Haswell (1800), in id., a! 684; Trial of James Thompson Callender (1800), in id., at 688. 
~ The requirement of proving actual malice or reckless disregard may, in the mind of the jury, add little to !he requirement of proving falsity, a 
requirement which the Court recognizes not to be an adequate safeguard. The thought suggested by Mr. Justice Jackson in ~
is relevant here: "[A]s a matter of either practice or philosophy I do not see how we can separate an issue as to what 
is believed from considerations as to what is believable. The most convincing proof that one believes his statements is to show that they have been 
true in his experience. Likewise, that one knowingly falsified is best proved by showing that what he said happened never did happen." See note 4, 
Infra . 
.Ql It was not until """",.,..~'-1-"..,__'-"'-,...........,.c..ll..J...,.,--"""-decided in 1925, that it was intimated that the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Firs! 
Amendment was applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment. Other intimations followed. See~ 
~;~-In 1931 Chief Justice Hughes speaking for the Court in 'l declared: 
"It has been determined that the conception of liberty under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embraces the right of free 
speech." Thus we deal with a constitutional principle enunciated less than four decades ago, and consider for the first time the application of that 
principle to issues arising in libel cases brought by state officials. 
f.il In most cases, as in the case at bar, there will be little difficulty in distinguishing defamatory speech relating to private conduct from !hat relsting 
to official conduct. I recognize, of course, that there will be a gray area. The difficulties of applying a public-private standard are, however, certainly 
of a different genre from those attending the differentiation between a malicious and nonmalicious state of mind. If the constitutional standard is to 
be shaped by a concept of malice, the speaker takes the risk not only that the jury will inaccurately determine his state of mind but also that the jury 
will fail properly to apply the constitutional standard set by the elusive concept of malice. See note 2, supra. 
lfil MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurring in r. o observed that: "The effective funct:oning of a free government like ours 
depends largely on the force of an informed public opinion. This calls for the widest possible understanding of the quality of government service 
rendered by all elective or appointed public officials or employees. Such an informed understanding depends, of course, on the freedom people 
have to applaud or to criticize !he way public employees do their jobs, from the least to the most important" 
(fil See notes 2, 4, supra. 
Ul See Freund, The Supreme Court of the United States ( i 949), p. 61. 
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475 U.S. 167 (1986) 
PHILADELPHIA NEWSPAPERS, INC., ET AL. 
V. 
HEPPS ET AL 
No,84-1491, 
Supreme Court of United States. 
Argued December 3, 1985 
Decided April 21, 1986 
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
768 *768 David H. Marion argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Samuel E. Klein and Kerry L. Adams. 
Ronald H. Surkin argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was Edwin P. Rome.CT 
Daniel J. Popeo filed a brieffor the American Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging affirmance. 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
freedoms of speech and press protected by the First Amendment." =~...:t,.J~=..l.L=la.1'..IW.w...::L.Uaw.!JL.llt.l.:,t.f>.lt.J..:ou..i'-1.il..lt.l.~ 
Gertz, the Court held that a private figure who brings a suit for defamation cannot recover without some showing that the media 
defendant was at fault in publishing the statements at issue. Id., at 347. Here, we hold that, at least where a newspaper publishes 
769 speech of public *769 concern, a private-figure plaintiff cannot recover damages without also showing that the statements at 
issue are false. 
Maurice S. Hepps is the principal stockholder of General Programming, Inc. (GPI), a corporation that franchises a chain of stores 
- known at the relevant time as "Thrifty" stores - selling beer, soft drinks. and snacks. Mr. Hepps, GPI, and a number of its 
franchisees are the appellees here.ill Appellant Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., owns the Philadelphia Inquirer (Inquirer). The 
Inquirer published a series of articles, authored by appellants William Ecenbarger and William Lambert, containing the 
statements at issue here. The general theme of the five articles, which appeared in the Inquirer between May 1975 and May 
1976, was that appellees had links to organized crime and used some of those links to influence the State's governmental 
processes, both legislative and administrative. The articles discussed a state legislator, described as "a Pittsburgh Democrat and 
convicted felon," App. A60, whose actions displayed "a clear pattern of interference in state government by [the legislator] on 
behalf of Hepps and Thrifty," id., at A62-A63. The stories reported that federal "investigators have found connections between 
Thrifty and underworld figures," id., at A65; that "the Thrifty Beverage beer chain ... had connections ... with organized crime," 
id., at A80; and that Thrifty had "won a series of competitive advantages through rulings by the State Liquor Control Board," id., at 
A65. A grand jury was said to be investigating the "alleged relationship between the Thrifty chain and known Mafia figures," and" 
[w]hether the chain received special treatment from the [state Governor's] administration and the Liquor Control Board." Id., at 
A68. 
770 *770 Appellees brought suit for defamation against appellants in a Pennsylvania state court. Consistent with ~ 
Pennsylvania requires a private figure who brings a suit for defamation to bear the burden of proving negligence or malice by the 
defendant in publishing the statements at issue. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.§ 8344 (1982). As to falsity, Pennsylvania follows the common 
law's presumption that an individual's reputation is a good one. Statements defaming that person are therefore presumptively 
false, although a publisher who bears the burden of proving the truth of the statements has an absolute defense. See 506 Pa. 
304, 313-314, 485 A. 2d 374, 379 (1984 ). See also 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.§ 8343(b)(1) (1982) (defendant has the burden of proving 
the truth of a defamatory statement). Cf.~ (common law presumes injury to reputation from publication of 
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defamatory statements). See generally Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Ge~., and 
Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 Va. L. Rev. 1349, 1352-1357 (1975) (describing common-law scheme of defamation law). 
The parties first raised the issue of burden of proof as to falsity before trial, but the trial court reserved its ruling on the matter. 
Appellee Hepps testified at length that the statements at issue were false, Tr. 2221-2290, and he extensively cross-examined the 
author of the stories as to the veracity of the statements at issue. After all the evidence had been presented by both sides, the trial 
court concluded that Pennsylvania's statute giving the defendant the burden of proving the truth of the statements violated the 
Federal Constitution. Id., at 3589. The trial court therefore instructed the jury that the plaintiffs bore the burden of proving falsity. 
Id., at 3848. 
During the trial, appellants took advantage of Pennsylvania's "shield law" on a number of occasions. That law allows employees 
of the media to refuse to divulge their sources. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat§ 5942(a) (1982) ("No person ... employed by any 
771 newspaper of general circulation ... or any *771 radio or television station, or any magazine of general circulation, ... shall be 
required to disclose the source of any information procured or obtained by such person, in any legal proceeding, trial or 
investigation before any government unit"). See also 506 Pa., at 327, 485 A. 2d, at 387 ("This statute has been interpreted 
broadly"). Appellees requested an instruction stating that the jury could draw a negative inference from appellants' assertions of 
the shield law; appellants requested an instruction that the jury could not draw any inferences from those exercises of the shield 
law's privilege. The trial judge declined to give either instruction. Tr. 3806-3808. The jury ruled for appellants and therefore 
awarded no damages to appellees. 
Pursuant to Pennsylvania statute, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.§ 722(7) (1982), the appeliees here brought an appeal directly to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. That court viewed Gertz as simply requiring the plaintiff to show fault in actions for defamation. It 
concluded that a showing of fault did not require a showing of falsity, held that to place the burden of showing truth on the 
defendant did not unconstitutionally inhibit free debate, and remanded the case for a new trial.~ 506 Pa., at 318-329, 485 A. 2d, 
at 382-387. We noted probable jurisdiction,,""" , "u, .2, , ~. hand now reverse. 
II 
In v the Court 0determin[ed] for the first time the extent to which the 
772 constitutional protections for speech and press limit a State's power to award damages in a libel action brought by a *772 public 
official against critics of his official conduct." Id., at 256. The State's trial court in that case believed the statements tended to injure 
the plaintiff's reputation or bring him into public contempt, id., at 267, and were therefore libelous per se, id., at 262. The trial court 
therefore instructed the jury that it could presume falsity, malice, and some damage to reputation, as long as it found that the 
defendant had published the statements and that the statements concerned the plaintiff. /bid. The trial court also instructed the 
jury that an award of punitive damages required "malice" or "actual malice." Id., at 262, 267. The jury found for the plaintiff and 
made an award of damages that did not distinguish between compensatory and punitive damages. Id., at 262. The Alabama 
Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the trial court in all respects. Id., at 263. 
This Court reversed, holding that "libel can claim no talis-manic immunity from constitutional limitations." Id., at 269. Against the 
"background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks," the Court noted that" 
[a]uthoritative interpretations of the First Amendment guarantees have consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test 
of truth -whether administered by judges, juries, or administrative officials- and especially one that puts the burden of proving 
truth on the speaker." Id., at 270-271. Freedoms of expression require" 'breathing space,'" id., at 272 (quoting~ 
371 u, s, 415,433 (1963)): 
"A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions - and to do so on 
pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount- leads to ... 'self-censorship.' ... Under such a rule, would-
be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and 
· 773 even though it is in fact true, because of doubt *773 whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of 
having to do so." U 9. 
The Court therefore held that the Constitution 
"prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct 
DennislffisW.~fi#lhW~Jl'HtM~tatement was maoocWJni~ot.intj4Tialice' - that is, with knowledge that it 'NJtl'llf~~cPr 
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with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not" Id., at 279-280. 
That showing must be made with "convincing clarity," id., at 285-286, or, in a later formulation, by "clear and convincing proof," 
~-The standards of New York Times apply not only when a public official sues a newspaper, but also when 
a "public figure" sues a magazine or news service. See · P o Bu 8 S 1 1 - 6 1 
~; id., at 170 (opinion ofBla.ck, J.); id., at 172 (opinion ofBRENNAN, J.). See also~ 
I 
A decade after New York Times, the Court examined the constitutional limits on defamation suits by private-figure plaintiffs 
against media defendants.~- The Court concluded that the danger of self-censorship was a valid, but not the 
exclusive, concern in suits for defamation: "The need to avoid self-censorship by the news media is ... , not the only societal 
value at issue ... [or] this Court would have embraced long ago the view that publishers and broadcasters enjoy an 
unconditional and indefeasible immunity from liability for defamation."~- See also~ 
7 9 . Any analysis must also take into account the "legitimate state interest underlying the law of 
libel ~n] the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood."~- See also 
774 8. § (1 6} (discussing *774 the "appropriate accommodation between the public's Interest 
in an uninhibited press and its equally compelling need for judicial redress of libelous utterances"). in light of that interest, and in 
light of the fact that private figures have lesser access to media channels useful for counteracting false statements and have not 
voluntarily placed themselves in the public eye,~, the Court held that the Constitution "allows the States to 
impose liability on the publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood on a less demanding showing than that required by New 
York Times,"~: "[S]o long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the 
appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual." Id., al 
347. Nonetheless, even when private figures are involved, the constitutional requirement of fault supersedes the common law's 
presumptions as to fault and damages. In addition, the Court in Gertz expressly held that, although a showing of simple fault 
sufficed to allow recovery for actual damages, even a private-figure plaintiff was required to show actual malice in order to 
recover presumed or punitive damages. Id., at 348-350. 
The Court most recently considered the constitutional limits on suits for defamation in Qlo!DJ~WW!.~U£t£...:~il!J.rulJ'.IlQ~ 
=="-'-"'....,_,-""'-..,_,_.....,'-'-"'.._7.:-,,;,._.,_1~=---·· In sharp contrast to New York Times, Dun & Bradstreet involved not only a private-figure 
plaintiff, but also speech of purely private concern.~- A plurality of the Court in Dun & Bradstreet was 
convinced that, in a case with such a configuration of speech and plaintiff, the showing of actual malice needed to recover 
punitive damages under either New York Times or Gertz was unnecessary: 
"In light of the reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters of public concern, we hold that the state 
775 interest pn preserving private reputation] adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive *775 damages -
even absent a showing of 'actual malice.'" 2 t O (footnote omitted). 
See also id., at 764 (BURGER, C. J., concurring in judgment); id., at 774 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment). 
One can discern in these decisions two forces that may reshape the common-law landscape to conform to the First Amendment. 
The first is whether the plaintiff is a public official or figure, or is instead a private figure. The second is whether the speech at 
issue is of public concern. When the speech is of public concern and the plaintiff is a public official or public figure, the 
Constitution clearly requires the plaintiff to surmount a much higher barrier before recovering damages from a media defendant 
than is raised by the common law. When the speech is of public concern but the plaintiff is a private figure, as in Gertz, the 
Constitution still supplants the standards of the common law, but the constitutional requirements are, in at least some of their 
range, less forbidding than when the plaintiff is a public figure and the speech is of public concern. When the speech is of 
exclusively private concern and the plaintiff is a private figure, as in Dun & Bradstreet, the constitutional requirements do not 
necessarily force any change in at least some of the features of the common-law landscape. 
Our opinions to date have chiefly treated the necessary showings of fault rather than of falsity. Nonetheless, as one might expect 
given the language of the Court in New York Times, see supra, at 772-773, a public-figure plaintiff must show the falsity of the 
statements atissue in order to prevail in a suit for defamation. See am n v. o s· a, 37> 64. t196 } (reading New 
York Times for the proposition that "a public official [is] allowed the civil [defamation] remedy only if he establishes that the 
utterance was false"}. See also e p v 6 ( ) ("[T]he plaintiff must focus on the editorial process 
and prove a false publication attended by some degree of culpability"). 
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776 *776 Here, as in Gertz, the plaintift 1s a private figure and the newspaper articles are of public concern. In Gertz, as in New York 
Times, the common-law rule was superseded by a constitutional rule. We believe that the common law's rule on falsity- !ha! the 
defendant must bear the burden of proving truth - must similarly fall here to a constitutional requirement that the plaintiff bear the 
/~"",, burden of showing falsity, as well as fault, before recovering damages. 
There will always be instances when the factfinding process will be unable to resolve conclusively whether the speech is true or 
false; it is in those cases that the burden of proof is dispositive. Under a rule forcing the plaintiff to bear the burden of showing 
falsity, there will be some cases in which plaintiffs cannot meet their burden despite the fact that the speech is in fact false. The 
plaintiff's suit will fail despite the fact that, in some abstract sense, the suit is meritorious. Similarly, under an alternative rule 
placing the burden of showing truth on defendants, there would be some cases in which defendants could not bear their burden 
despite the fact that the speech is in fact true. Those suits would succeed despite the fact that, in some abstract sense, those suits 
are unmeritorious. Under either rule, then, the outcome of the suit will sometimes be at variance with the outcome that we would 
desire if all speech were either demonstrably true or demonstrably false. 
This dilemma stems from the fact that the allocation of the burden of proof will determine liability for some speech that is true and 
some that is false, but all of such speech is unknowablytrue or false. Because the burden of proof is the deciding factor only 
when the evidence is ambiguous, we cannot know how much of the speech affected by the allocation of the burden of proof is 
true and how much is false. In a case presenting a configuration of speech and plaintiff like the one we face here, and where the 
scales are in such an uncertain balance, we believe that the Constitution requires us to tip them in favor of protecting true 
777 speech. To ensure that true speech on matters of public concern is not deterred, *777 we hold that the common-law presumption 
that defamatory speech is false cannot stand when a plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant for speech of public 
concern. 
In the context of governmental restriction of speech, it has long been established that the government cannot limit speech 
protected by the First Amendment without bearing the burden of showing that its restriction is justified. See~ 
v / f {content-based restriction); I N k 
Bellotti, 435 U. S, 765. 786 (1978) (speaker-based restriction); Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., ante, at 47-54 (secondary-
effects restriction). See also U S (striking down the precondition that a taxpayer sign a loyalty 
oath before receiving certain tax benefits). It is not immediately apparent from the text of the First Amendment, which by its terms 
applies only to governmental action, that a similar result should obtain here: a suit by a private party is obviously quite different 
from the government's direct enforcement of its own laws. Nonetheless, the need to encourage debate on public issues that 
concerned the Court in the governmental-restriction cases is of concern in a similar manner in this case involving a private suit 
for damages: placement by state law of the burden of proving truth upon media defendants who publish speech of public concern 
deters such speech because of the fear that liability will unjustifiably result. See ty w )'.l rl< , 3 9; ~ 
~ ("Truth may not be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions where discussion of public affairs is concerned"). 
Because such a "chilling" effect would be antithetical to the First Amendment's protection of true speech on matters of public 
concern, we believe that a private-figure plaintiff must bear the burden of showing that the speech at issue is false before 
recovering damages for defamation from a media defendant. To do otherwise could "only result in a deterrence of speech which 
the Constitution makes free."~-
778 *778 We recognize that requiring the plaintiff to show falsity will insulate from liability some speech that is false, but unprovably 
so. Nonetheless, the Court's previous decisions on the restrictions that the First Amendment places upon the common law of 
defamation firmly support our conclusion here with respect to the allocation of the burden of proof. In attempting to resolve related 
issues in the defamation context, the Court has affirmed that "[Qhe First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in 
order to protect speech that matters."~-Here the speech concerns the legitimacy of the political process, 
and therefore clearly "matters." See 4 U 7 8- (speech of public concern is at the core of the First 
Amendment's protections). To provide" 'breathing space,'" New York Times, supra. at 272 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S •• 
at 433), for true speech on matters of public concern, the Court has been willing to insulate even demonstrably false speech from 
liability, and has imposed additional requirements offault upon the plaintiff in a suit for defamation. See, e.g., ~~ 9 
at 75; ~- We therefore do not break new ground here in insulating speech that is not even demonstrably false. 
We note that our decision adds only marginally to the burdens that the plaintiff must already bear as a result of our earlier 
decisions in the law of defamation. The plaintiff must show fault. A jury is obviously more likely to accept a plaintiffs contention 
that the defendant was at fault in publishing the statements at issue if convinced that the relevant statements were false. As a 
practical matter, then, evidence offered by plaintiffs on the publisher's fault in adequately investigating the truth of the published 
st~ffi/M1iWsW,iij1gAAeJtm~¥y¥1~P,'el9/3SS evidence of thE,J~~[tt>(it9.f,ilvftllflatters asserted. See Keeton, Defamati0'3ffi16f 5ooedom of the 
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Press, 54 Texas L. Rev. 1221, 1231:i (1976). See also Franklin & Busse!, The Plaintm:, Burden in Defamation: Awareness and 
Falsity, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 825, 856-857 (1984). 
*779 We recognize that the plaintiff's burden in this case is weightier because of Pennsylvania's "shield" law, which allows 
employees of the media to refuse to divulge their sources. See supra, at 770-771 .ill But we do not have before us the question of 
the permissible reach of such laws. Indeed, we do not even know the precise reach of Pennsylvania's statute. The trial judge 
refused to give any instructions to the jury as to whether it could, or should, draw an inference adverse to the defendant from the 
defendant's decision to use the shield law rather than to present affirmative evidence of the truthfulness of some of the sources. 
See supra, at 771. That decision of the trial judge was not addressed by Pennsylvania's highest court. nor was it appealed to this 
Court.ill In the situation before us, we are unconvinced that the State's shield law requires a different constitutional standard than 
would prevail in the absence of such a law. 
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
ft is so ordered. 
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins, concurring. 
780 I believe that where allegedly defamatory speech is of public concern, the First Amendment requires that the plaintiff, *780 
whether public official, public figure, or private individual, prove the statements at issue to be false, and thus join the Court's 
opinion. Cf. ·a 4 S . I write separately only to note that, while the Court reserves the 
question whether the rule it announces applies to nonmedia defendants, ante, at 779, n. 4, I adhere to my view that such a 
distinction is "irreconcilable with the fundamental First Amendment principle that ·[t}he inherent worth of ... speech in terms of its 
capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of the source, whether corporation, association, union, or 
4 (quoting 
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE WHITE, and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting. 
The issue the Court resolves today will make a difference in only one category of cases - those in which a private individual can 
prove that he was libeled by a defendant who was at least negligent. For unless such a plaintiff can overcome the burden 
imposed by 0 h, In .. 1 U S (1 }, he cannot recover regardless of how the burden of proof on 
the issue of truth or falsity is allocated. By definition, therefore, the only litigants - and the only publishers -who will benefit 
from today's decision are those who act negligently or maliciously. 
The Court, after acknowledging the need to" ·accommodat[e] ... the law of defamation and the freedoms of speech and press 
protected by the First Amendment,'" ante, at 768 (quoting v / ), decides to override "the 
781 common-law presumption" retained by several Stateslli that "defamatory speech is false" because of *781 the need "[t]o ensure 
that true speech on matters of public concern is not deterred." Ante, at 776-777. I do not agree that our precedents require a 
private individual to bear the risk that a defamatory statement- uttered either with a mind toward assassinating his good name 
or with careless indifference to that possibility- cannot be proven false. By attaching no weight to the State's interest in 
protecting the private individual's good name, the Court has reached a pernicious result 
The state interest in preventing and redressing injuries to reputation is obviously important. As Justice Stewart eloquently 
reminded us in his concurrence in 19 6 : 
"The right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no 
more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being - a concept at the root of 
any decent system of ordered liberty. The protection of private personality, like the protection of life itself, is left: 
primarily to the individual States under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. But this does not mean that the right is 
entitled to any less recognition by this Court as a basic of our constitutional system. 
" ... The First and Fourteenth Amendments have not stripped private citizens of all means of redress for injuries 
782 *782 inflicted upon them by careless liars. The destruction that defamatory falsehood can bring is, to be sure, often 
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beyond the capacity of the 1aw to redeem. Yet, imperfect though it is, an actio11 for damages is the only hope for 
vindication or redress the law gives to a man whose reputation has been falsely dishonored. 
"Moreover, the preventive effect of liability for defamation serves an important public purpose. For the rights and 
values of private personality far transcend mere personal interests. Surely ifthe 1950's taught us anything, they 
taught us that the poisonous atmosphere of the easy lie can infect and degrade a whole society."@ 
While deliberate or inadvertent libels vilify private person-ages, they contribute little to the marketplace of ideas. In assaying the 
First Amendment side of the balance, it helps to remember that the perpetrator of the libel suffers from its failure to demonstrate 
the truth ofits accusation only if the "private-figure" plaintiff first establishes thatthe publisher is at "fault,"~ - i.e., 
either that it published its libel with "actual malice" in the New York Times sense ("with knowledge that it was false or with 
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not," New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 316 U.S. 254, 279-280 (1964)), or that it 
published with that degree of careless indifference characteristic of negligence. Far from being totally in the dark about "how 
783 much *783 of the speech affected by the allocation of the burden of proof is true and how much is false," ante, at 776, the 
antecedent fault determination makes irresistible the inference that a significant portion of this speech is beyond the 
constitutional pale.rn This observation is almost tautologically true with regard to libels published wi!h "actual malice." For that 
standard to be met. the publisher must come close to willfully blinding itself to the falsity of its utterance.Iil The observation is also 
784 valid, albeit to a lesser extent, with respect to *784 defamations uttered with "fault."ffil Thus, while the public's interest in an 
785 uninhibited press is at its nadir when the publisher is at fault or worse, society's "equally compelling" need *785 for judicial 
redress of libelous utterances is at its zenith. n 4 7 . 
To appreciate the thrust of the Court's holding, we must assume that a private-figure libel plaintiff can prove that a story about him 
was published with "actual malice" -that is, without the publisher caring in the slightest whether it was false or not. Indeed, in 
order to comprehend the full ramifications of today's decision, we should assume that the publisher knew that it would be 
impossible for a court to verify or discredit the story and that it was published for no other purpose than to destroy the reputation 
of the plaintiff. Even if the plaintiff has overwhelming proof of malice - in both the common-law sense and as the term was used 
in V. rk f · - the Court today seems to believe that the character assassin has a constitutional license to 
defame.Ifil 
In my opinion deliberate, malicious character assassination is not protected by the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. That Amendment does require the target of a defamatory statement to prove that his assailant was at fault, and I 
agree that it provides a constitutional shield for truthful statements. I simply do not understand, however, why a character 
assassin should be given an absolute license to defame by means of statements that can be neither verified nor disproved. The 
danger of deliberate defamation by reference to unprovable facts is not a merely speculative or hypothetical concern. lack of 
knowledge about third parties, the loss of critical records, an uncertain recollection about events that occurred long ago, perhaps 
786 during a period of special stress, the absence of eyewitnesses - a host offactors *786 - may make it impossible for an 
honorable person to disprove malicious gossip about his past conduct, his relatives, his friends, or his business associates. 
The danger of which I speak can be illustrated within the confines of this very case. Appellants published a series offive articles 
proclaiming that "Federal authorities ... have found connections between Thrifty and underworld figures," App. A65; that"Federal 
agents have evidence of direct financial involvement in Thrifty by [Joseph] Scalleat," a "leader of organized crime in northeastern 
Pennsylvania," id., at A72; and that "the Thrifty Beverage beer chain ... had connections itself with organized crime," id., at A80. 
ill The defamatory character of these statements is undisputed. Yet the factual basis for the one specific allegation contained in 
them is based on an admitted relationship between appellees and a third party. The truth or falsity of that statement depends on 
the character and conduct of that third party- a matter which the jury may well have resolved against the plaintiffs on the ground 
that they could not disprove the allegation on which they bore the burden of proof.llll 
Despite the obvious blueprint for character assassination provided by the decision today, the Court's analytical approach - by 
attaching little or no weightto the strong state interest in redressing injury to private reputation - provides a wholly unwarranted 
protection for malicious gossip. As I understand the Court's opinion, its counterintuitive result is derived from a straightforward 
syllogism. The major premise seems to be that "the First Amendment's protection of true speech on matters of public concern," 
787 ante, at 777, is *787 tantamountto a command that no rule of law can stand if it will exclude any true speech from the public 
domain. The minor premise is that although "we cannot know how much of the speech affected by the allocation of!he burden of 
proof is true and how much is false," ante, at 776, at least some unverifiable gossip is true. From these premises it necessarily 
follS>e'X~i!~~M~ ~YJrv~~~WJ1JYffli1f~~aqissemination of S!ffot~lJtm~i,r¥g~ld contravene the First Amendment. Acc~~~igpJ~~·a private-
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figure plaintiff must bear the burden of showing that the speech at issue is false beton~ recovering damages for defamation from a 
media defendant." Ante, at 777. 
The Court's result is plausible however, only because it grossly undervalues the strong state interest in redressing injuries to 
private reputations. The error lies in its initial premise, with its mistaken belief that doubt regarding the veracity of a defamatory 
statement must invariably be resolved in favor of constitutional protection of the statement and against vindication of the 
reputation of the private individual. To support its premise, the Court relies exclusively on our precedents requiring the 
government to bear the burden of proving that a restriction of speech is Justified. See ante, at 777-778. Whether such restrictions 
appear in the form of legislation burdening the speech of particular speakers or of particular points of view, or of common-law 
actions punishing seditious libel, the Court is doubtlessly correct that the government or its agents must at a minimum shoulder 
the burden of proving that the speech is false and must do so with sufficient reliability that we can be confident that true speech is 
not suppressed. It was to achieve this reliability that the Court, in , 7 S, ( ), 
incorporated into the First Amendment the !hen-emergent common-law "privilege for [good-faith] criticism of official conduct." Id., 
at 282. See id., at 282, n. 21. Because "erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and [because] it must be protected if the 
788 freedoms of expression *788 are to have the 'breathing space' that they ·need ... to survive, .A e n, 3 § 415, 
~·" id., at 271-272, this privilege is defeasible only if the defamatory statement "was made with 'actual malice' -that is, 
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not," id., at 279-280. "Allowance of the 
defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant," was found wanting because it did not "mean that only false 
speech [would] be deterred" - doubts regarding whether truth "can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so" 
would force good-faith critics of official conduct to" 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone,'" id., at 279 (quoting~ 
~).Ifil 
Even assuming that attacks on the reputation of a public figure should be presumed to be true, however, a different calculus is 
appropriate when a defamatory statement disparages the reputation of a private individual.llill In that case, the overriding 
concern for reliable protection of truthful statements must make room for "[t]he legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel" 
- "the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood." -"'-"Cl-. ........ .J.>U:i:.=.L.C.J:.or.u::u.a..=.u...t...,_,.,..,.,_. 
S .• at 341. A public official, of course, has no "less interest in protecting his reputation than an individual in private life." 
89 R M ( ) ( p *789~. But private persons are "more vulnerable to 
injury" and "more deserving of recovery" - more vulnerable because they lack "access to the channels of effective 
communication ... to counteractfalse statements"; more deserving because they have "relinquished no part of [their] good 
name[s]" by "thrust[ing] themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the 
issues involved." 4 
Recognition of the "strong and legitimate [state] interest in compensating private individuals for injury to reputation," id., at 348-
349, exposes the untenability of the Court's methodology: the burden of proof in "private-figure" libel suits simply cannot be 
determined by reference to our precedents having the reputations of "public figures" in mind. In libel cases brought by the latter 
category of plaintiffs, 
"we view an erroneous verdict for the plaintiff as most serious. Not only does it mulct the defendant for an innocent 
misstatement., . but the possibility of such error ... would create a strong impetus toward selfcensorship, which 
the First Amendment cannot tolerate." /:iQ~QQJ'.QQ!IlJ{.Jf_Wt:Q!l~'lffl..~&Jil..J:L.JMJ!QJl.QQ.llllJfil!QillliliiliNElJ:i...lJ. 
In libel suits brought by private individuals, in contrast, "the state interest in compensating injury to the reputation of private 
of cases involve "speech that matters." Id., at 341. But "[t]he extension of the New York Times test'' to every item of public interest 
"would abridge this legitimate state interest to a degree that we find unacceptable." Id., at 346.Llli Accordingly, in~ 
790 Welch. Inc., this *790 Court rejected the Rosenbloom plurality's assumption that the risk of error must invariably be borne by the 
libel plaintiff, regardless of his or her status, as long as the defamatory statement touches "matters of public or general concern," 
o b $ • . Geriz thus forecloses the Court's unacknowledged reliance on the discredited 
analysis of the Rosenbloom plurality; where private-figure libel plaintiffs are involved, the First Amendment does not "requir[e] us 
to tip [the scales] in favor of protecting true speech" merely because that speech addresses "matters of public concern." Ante, at 
776. See~. See also 77me i n (refusing to "reinstate the doctrine 
advanced in the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom" in the guise of protection for inaccurate reporting on "public controversies" or 
on judicial proceedings). 
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In my view. as long as publishers are protected by the requirement that the plaintiff 1 ,c1s the burden of proving fault, there can be 
little, if any, basis for a concern that a significant amount of true speech will be deterred unless the private person victimized by a 
malicious (ibel can also carry the burden of proving falsity. The Court's decision trades on the good names of private individuals 
with littie First Amendment coin to show for it 
I respectfully dissent. 
tl Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et aL by John G. Koe/ti, James C. Goodale, Burt Neubome, 
Jack D. Novick, Stefan Presser, Bruce W. Sanford, W. Terry Maguire, R. Bruce Rich, Robert D. Sack, and Alice Neff Lucan; for the American 
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by David M. Silberman and Lawrence Gold; for Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 
et al. by Bernard G. Segal, Jerome J. Sheslac/,, Carl A. Solano, Elihu A. Greenhouse, and Lawrence Gunnels; and for Print and Broadcast Media 
et al. by E Barrett Prettyman, Jr., Den Paul, Franklin G. Burt, Steven M. Kamp, John H. McElhaney, Richard M. Schmidt, Jr., Peter G. Banta, 
Stuart F. Pierson, Neil L Shapiro, Wilford W. Kirton, Jr., David M. Olive, Theodore Sherbow, Robert Haydock, Jr., Peter Michael Meloy, W. Joel 
Blass, William w. Ogden, Eric D. Lanphere, Michael A. Gross, Conrad M. Shumedine, W11/iam A. Niese, Norton L. Armour, H. Hugh Stevens, Jr., 
Thomas T. Cobb, Michael Minnis, James L. Kaley, J. Laurent Scharff, Alexander Wellford, Donald B. Holbrook, Edward P. Devis, Jr., P. Cameron 
De Vore, Gregg D. Thomas, Jack M. Weiss, Rutledge C. Clement, Jr., and George K. Rehdert. 
Ul Appellants list nine entities as appe!lees in the proceedings in this Court; Maurice S. Hepps; General Programming, Inc.; A. David Fried, Inc.; 
Brookhaven Beverage Distributors, Inc.; Busy Bee Beverage Co.; ALMIK, Inc.; Lackawanna Beverage Distributors; N. F. 0., Inc.; and Elemar, Inc. 
Brief for Appellants ii. 
!ll The state courts that have considered this issue since Gertz have reached differing conclusions. Compare, e. g .• ~
4 1 3 1 2 (defendant must bear burden of showing truth), cert. denied, 459 ~ and Memphis 
69 (same), with 1 (plaintiff must 
bear burden of showing falsity), cert denied,~ and w.i,u.ui.:,,:i.i..:.....t==CL..1.=-==..:,::i"""'-i.....,=~.1u:1.--1A~.u:.:.:..u..:u.:u (same). 
Ul Pennsylvania is not alone in !his choice. See, e.g., Ala. Code§ 12-21-142 (1977); Cal. Const, Art. I,§ 2(b); N. Y. Civ. Rights Law§ 79-h 
(McKinney 1976). 
fi1 We also have no occasion to consider the quantity of proof of falsity that a private-figure plaintiff must present to recover damages. Nor need we 
consider what standards would apply if the plaintiff sues a nonmedia defendant, see 1 or If 
a Slate were to provide a plaintiff with the opportunity to obtain a judgment that declared the speech at issue to be false but did not give rise to 
liability for damages. 
!ll "There is no doubt about the historical fact that the interest in one's good name was considered an important interest requiring legal protection 
more than a thousand years ago; and that so far as Anglo-Saxon history is concerned this Interest became a legally protected interest 
comparatively soon after the interest in bodily integrity was given legal protection." L Eldridge, The Law of Defamation§ 53, pp. 293-294 (1978). 
concurring in judgment); id., at 793, n. 16 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting} ("[TJhe individual's interest in reputation is certainly at the core of notions of 
human dignity"); ~ua..L.L~tli:l.!.Ll~1!A..Jl.l!li:c>..:1.~.x.a..x....1Uo.l.:...i,c:..L..u.1A.1.::u. 
Ul "But there is no constituti~nel value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society's 
interest in ·uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate on public issues. N ~ /{ Tmo . S D:'. Q, 376 U.S. [254,] 270 [(1964)]. They belong 
to that category of utterances which · are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any 
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.' v · e 1 U. S. 
~-" w. 4 
fi1 "Our cases, however, have furnished meaningful guidance for the further definition of a reckless publication. In N I( s. D , the 
plaintiff did not satisfy his burden because the record failed to show that the publisher was aware of the likelihood that he was circulating false 
information. In 7 .. , the opinion emphasized the necessity for a showing that a false publication 
was made with a 'high degree of awareness of ... probable falsity.' 3 9 • S,. I . Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion i ~ 
-"'--"l:...:ie:a...i.=i_...,:.,,:3-'(-'-"' ........ ), stated that evidence of either deliberate falsification or reckless publication · despite the publisher's awareness of 
probable falsity' was essential to recovery by public officials in defamation actions. These cases are clear that reckless conduct is not measured by 
whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to 
permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows 
reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice." 
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See ~!1.. . .=.v~=......,;"""-""""--=....,,c....x.....,_.1.:.:.:..,,,_......,.L»IJ.....,.....,w..:""'-=LLIL1.1Ugl ("What the New Yori\ , 1mes rule ultimately protects is defamatory 
falsehood"). 
[fil It is presumably for this reason that the Court believes that its "decision adds only marginally to lhe burdens that the plaintiff must already bear 
as a result of our earlier decisions in the law of defamation." Ante, at 778. See Ibid, ("As a practical matter, then, evidence offered by plaintiffs on Iha 
publisher's fault in adequately investigating the truth of the published statements will generally encompass evidence of the falsity of the matters 
asserted" (citations omitted)). 
Although I am inclined to agree with the preceding observation, I do not agree Iha! it supports the result reached by the Court today. That allocation 
of the burden of proof is inconsequential in many cases provides no answer to cases in which it is determinative. See infra, al 785-787. Moreover, 
the Court's belief, however sincere, that its decision will not significantly impair the state interest in redressing injury to reputation is not itself 
sufficient to justify overriding state law. See / . 
I note that the Court makes no claim that its decision to impose on private-figure libel plaintiffs the burden of proving falsity is necessary to prevent 
jury confusion. See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts§ 116, pp. 839-840 (5th ed. 1984) ("[T]here 
is no inconsistency in assuming falsity until defendant publisher proves otherwise and requiring !he plaintiff to prove negligence or recklessness with 
respect to the truth or falsity of the imputation"). See also 506 Pa. 304, 325, n. 13, 485 A. 2d 374, 385, n. 13 (1984) ("In a rather circuitous 
argument, [appellants] contend that falsity is inextricably bound up with proof of fault. [Appellants] assert that to prove fault the plaintiff in fact must 
demonstrate the falsity of the matter. While in some instances the plaintiff may elect to establish the patent error in the material to demonstrate the 
lack of due care in ascertaining its truth, it does not necessarily follow that negligence of the defendant can only be shown by proving that the 
material is false. A plaintiff can demonstrate negligence in the manner in which the material was gathered, regardless of its truth or falsity. In such 
instance the presumption of falsity will prevail unless the defendant elects to establish the truth of the material and thereby insulate itself from liability. 
Where it is necessary to prove falsity to establish the negligence of the defendant. it is then the burden of the plaintiff to do so .. , . That proposition 
will not, of course, hold lrue in all cases. Where negligence can be established without a demonstration of the falsity of the material, there is no 
additional obligation upon the plaintiff to prove the falsity of the material"). 
Ifil This license would gain immeasurable strength if courts take up the suggestion of commentators in the Court's camp that the nonfalsifiable 
nature of a libel should entitle the defendant to summary judgment. See Franklin & Busse!, The Plaintiffs Burden in Defamation: Awareness and 
Falsity, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 825,865 (1984) ("If the plaintiffs suit is based upon a statement that is not susceptible to being proved false, for 
example, the court should deny any discovery and dismiss the complaint"). 
[Zl The parties agree that "the thrust of the challenged publications was that the Thrifty chain was connected with underworld figures and organized 
crime. It was that proposition that was required to be proven false." Brieffor Appellants 36. 
lfil Al trial. the individual plaintiff simply denied knowledge of Joseph Scal!eat's employment with Beer Sales Consultants and of BSC's employment 
by three Thrifty stores, See Testimony of Maurice Hepps, Tr. 2185-2186, 2200. 
!fil The New York Tim&.s Co. v. Sufivan privilege was subsequently extended to "public figures." See 
1 
f1Ql If the issue were properly before us, I would be inclined to the view that public figures should not bear the burden of disproving the veracity of 
accusations made against them with "actual malice," as the New York Times Court used that term. The contrary remarks in cases such as~ 
'sl n , 6 , { }, were not necessary to the decisions in those cases, and they do not persuade me that the constitutional value 
in truthful statements requires any more protection of defamatory utterances whose truth may not be ascertained than is provided by the New York 
Times test. 
ll1l See ~ ("Plainly many deserving plaintiffs, including some intentionally subjected to injury, will be unable to surmount !he barrier 
of the New York Times test"). 
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Dennis Irish and Wanda Irish 
1N THE D!STRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TUE 
STATE OF IDAHO, TN AND FOR Tiffi COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS IRISH and WANDA IRISH, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiff, 
V, 
JEFFREY R. HALL and DONA F. HALL, 
husband and wife, 
Defendant. 
NO. CV-2015-5814 
TRIAL BRIEF • PLAINTIFF 
Plaintiffs DENNIS llUSH AND WANDA IRISH, submit this Trial Brief in the above~ 
captioned case. 
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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On May 28, 2012, at approximately 12:00 a.m., Defcndant.s' truck and boat trailer were 
towtld off a public easement due to it being illegally parked. Later that same morning, the 
Defendants called Plaintiff Wanda lrish at her private residence approximately nine times 
within one hour. During I.hose cans, Defendants repeatedly called Plaintiff Wanda Irish obscene 
and offensive names. 
Since the towing incident, Defendants continue to demand an apology and payment of 
$200 (the cost of the towing) from Plaintiff Wanda Irish. Defendants have also sent Plaintiff 
Wanda Irish dozens of harassing emails and have called Plaintiff repeatedly, oflen severaJ times 
s day demanding an apology and payment PlainliffWandu Irish spends approximately fifteen 
hours per w~k dealing with frivolous and unnecessary in-person and telephonic requests fmm 
Defendants. 
From June 2012 lhralugh August 2012, Defendants accused Ms. lrish h of"lying" in 
front of third parties. Specifically, .Defendants posted signs on their vehic]es !ll'ld on public 
mills stating .. Mayor Irish Lied" and "Mayor Tri~h T ,ies." Plaintiffe • Trial Exhibit 1. 
In May 2013, Defendants made false statements to tho police and initiated a baseless 
claim against Plaintiff Dennis Irish for disturbing the peace. The initial claim was that Mr. Irish 
was stalking Defendant Dona 'Hall. The charge was later reduced to disturbing the peace. 
However. the baseless claims were not prosecuted and the case wa..,; fully and completely 
dismissed. 
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Defendant Dona Hall has submitted numerous public record requests with the purpose 
of harassing Plaintiff Wanda Irish. For instance, Ml-I. Hall made several requests seeking 
information concerning Plaintiffs' private business and the location of security cameras located 
on Plaintiffs' private property. These requests did not seek infonm1tion relating to the conduct 
or administration of the City of Harrison obtainable under the Idaho Public Records Act, J.C. § 
74-101 et seq., and were made for an improper and harassing purpose. 
On May 10, 2015, Defendant Jeffery Hall physicaHy pactd outside of Plaintiff Wanda 
Trish's office waiting for her to be alone and then entered her office to yell at her alleging that 
she has been running secrel meetings. 
On May 7, 2015 and May 29, 2015, Defendants yeHed, threatened, ordered, Plaintiff's, 
Plaintiffs' family members, and City employees to leave or be removed from the public parking 
casement located on the Defendant's property. The subject parking easement is open to 
everyone; Plaintiffs, their family, City empfoyees. and the public have the right to access lht:, 
casement. 
On May 7, 2015, Defendant Jeffery Han posted a picture of Plaintiffs' boat to social 
media with a false and malfofous comment stating that Plaintiff Wanda Irish "can do anything 
because she thinks she [is] a King." 
On May 11, 2015, Defondants proclaimed to third parties that PlainliffWanda Jrish is 
''running a corrupt busjness" and has "corrupted the load cily government by favoring her 
family members.)) 
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Defendants have made verbal threat~ agwnst Plaintiffs in front ofthlrd parties, making 
statements to Plaintiff Wanda Trish such as "Wanda, get the fuck off my pruperty" and continue 
to do so. Delendants cunsumtly follow, harass, and taunt Plaintiffs engaging in behavior such 
as photographing the: Plaintiffs while on the deck (lf their private home and photographing 
Plaintiff Dennis Irish while he i~ providing volunteer work for the City. 
On Junt, 3, 201 s. Defendant Jeffery Hall yelled, threatened, and ordered a city 
employee off of the public casement, which is available for use by the public. Defendant 
maliciously stated "that bitch is at it again," referencing .Plaintiff Wanda Trish. 
On June 4. 201 S. Counsel for Plaintiffs sent Defendants a cease and desist letter 
warning and notifying Defendants to cease engaging in said unlawful conduct. See Plaintfff,;,' 
1'rial Exhibit 3. Since that time Defendants have repeatedly driven their vehicles past 
Plaintiffs' residence in a menacing and intimidating manner, such as by driving in an 
unnaturally slow fashion and honking their horn without any basis or reason to do so. 
On July 3, 2015 until July 12, 2015, Defendants changed their business's public Wi-Fi 
access name to "Mayor Wanda Trish Terrorist." On July 7, 201 S, Counsel for Plaintiff.-; sent 
Dctbndants another warning to cease slanderous statemtmls against Plaintiffs. See Plaintiffs· 
Trial Exhibit 4. On July 9, 2015, Defendants changed their business's Wi-Fi access name lo 
Hshc really is a Terrorist.'' Plaintiff's 1'rlol Exhibit 5. 
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Defendants have made additional false and malicious statements against Plaintiffs and 
continue to do so. Defendants changed their home W.iwFi access name to "Dennis and Wanda 
lrish stocking [sic] u.2". Plaintiffe' 1'rial Exhibit 6. 
On 1uly 4. 2015, Defendant Dona Han delivered a letter to the host for I.he City nf 
Harrison ca.mpg.round. Ms. Han told the campground host that I.he information contained in the 
letter were the "sorts of things that the Mayor was doing," and l:lSked if they "wanted to work 
for someone like Mayor lrish'r' Defendant Donna Hall also stated that Plaintiffs were going to 
"twee us dovm" (referring to Plaintiffs). Among other things, the letter provided by Defendant 
DONNA HALL state$ "Wand.a and Dennis Lbave been] spying on conversations" and spying 
"on aU people employees and meetings when the mayor is not in city haU .. m (sic) they have 
several hidden audio vi~e<, cameras hidden everywhere ... I believe this was Wanda's idea to 
spy on meetings she is not supposed to attend etc ... Dennis installed all of the equipment," and 
states ''This is not false information." Plaintiffe ' 1'rlal Exhibit 7. 
On July 20, 2015, at approximately 10:30 p.m., a pick up truck! owned by Defendanes 
son-in-law, was parked with its Hghl-; shining into Plai.ntifrs residence while Plaintiff Wanda 
lrish was outside with her dogs. Although Ms. Irish was nut able to get a good look, a person 
inside the pick up truck, which she believed to be Defendant Jc:ftbry HaU, aUowed the truck's 
car alarm to sound and lights to fll:lSh for approximately fifteen minutes while Plaintiff 
remained ouuiide. Once Ms. Irish went back inside her residence, the person inside the pick up 
truck turned off the lights and a1mm. 
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On or about August 6, 2015, Defendants changed their home Wi-Fi access name 
again to "Move Irish," further evidencing the vindictive w1d malicious intent behind 
Defendants· actions. Plaintiffe' Trial Exhibit 8. 
IL LEGAL ANALYSIS 
Idaho has adopt.cd and long recogni:li:ld "the almost wli:versal. rule" that some 
communications are delamatmy per se, ''that is, actionable without allegation and proof of special 
damages." Barlow v. Int'/ Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881, 890 (Idaho 1974). Statements or 
commwtlcations "which impute 'conduct e<mstituting a criminal offense chargeable by indictment 
or by infonnalion at either common law or by statute and of such kind as Lo involve infamous 
punishment (death or imp.dooruncnt) or moral turpitude conveying the idea of major social 
disgrace,"' id., those "which '(ascribe) to another conduct, characteristics or a condition 
incompatible with the proper conduct of his lawful business, trade, (or) profession," id. (alterations 
origiruu), assert that a person lacks "basic virtues,, such as truthfulness, Dwyer v. Libert, 30 
Idaho at 576, 167 P. 651, 652 (1917). or engages in "any immoral or viciou~ practices.'' 
Jenness v. Co·Operatlve Publishing Co., 36 ldaho 697,213 P. 351,353 (1923). 
In order to determine whether statements arc defamatory per se, the Court must first 
determine whether the statements alleged are .. plain and unambiguous.,, See Weeks v. M-P 
Publications, 95 Idaho 634, 6.36 (1973). If the Court detennines that they are, .it is then for the 
Court Lo determine as a matter of law whether the statements constitute libel per se. ld. On the 
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other hand, if the statements employ language that is not plain and unambiguous. whether the 
statements are libel per se 0 .is a question of fact for Uie trier of fact." Id (citation omitted). 
Under either scenario, the jury is lo award an amount they determine "as being just and 
proper in view ot' rul the circumstances of the case/' Int'/ Han,e.<,ter Co., 95 Tdaho at 897. 
Defamation per se entitles "the defamed person. . . to su.bstanlfal damages without proving actual 
damages." Id at 896. 
B. Uef&mBtfoo of Publil'l Qfflelal 
The status of the plaintiff is one of two threshold criteria that trigger the appiication of the 
constitutional privilege. As such. determining the plaintiff's status is the initial step 1n the 
analysis of any defamation case. The "public official" designation applies to policy making 
otlicers, "those among the hierarchy of governmental employees whu have, or appew:- to the 
public to have, substantial responsibility for ur control over the conduct of governmental 
affairs.'* Rosenblall v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 84, 85 S.Ct. 669 (l 966). ff the d~famed person is a 
public official then, in addition to the other elemenL'i of a defamation claim, the plaintiff must 
show by clear and convincing evidence of malice: ''that the utterance was false and that it was 
mad~ with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of whether it was false or true." 
Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 84, 86 S.CL 669; Steele v. Spokesman-Review, 138 Idaho 249, 251-52 
(2002). 
As noted by the ldaho Supreme Court in Clark, this "actual malice'' standard 
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is not defined as an evil intent or a m,1tive arising from spite. Jn a dcfumation 
action, actual ma.Hee is knowledge of falsity nr reckless disregw-d of truth. Mere 
negligence is insufficient; lhe plaintiff must demonstrate that "the author in fact 
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication or acted with a high 
degree of awarem:iss t1f ... probable falsity." The standard of actual malice is a 
subjective one. However, although actual malice is a subjective standard, self-
interested denials of actual. malice from the defendant can be rebutted with other 
evidence. This Court focuses on whether there is suflicienl evidence of 
purposeful avoidance of the truth. 
Clark v. The Spokl:!:mum Review, 144 Idaho 427,431 (2007). 
Defendants communicated information concerning Plaintiffs to third parties by ( 1) 
making verbal threats towards Plaintiffs in front of others; (2) ordering the PfainU ff.-, removed 
from the public parking easement located on Dcfondanl's property (which the public has the 
right to access); (3) proclaiming to several third parties that Plaintiff Wanda Irish is "running a 
corrupt business" and has "corrupted the local city government by fo.vmfog Plaintiffs family 
members"; ( 4) accusing Plaintiff Wanda Irish of "lying"; posting pictures to social media and 
adding comments that the PJainlHT"can do anything because she thinks she [is] a King"; 
calling PlainWTa "bitch"; (5) accusing Plaintiff Dennis Tri~h of stalking Defendant Dona Hall; 
(6) accusing Plaintiffs of spying, hiding surveillance equipment, and disseminating written 
information with shmde1ous mid false information; (7) by changing the name of their business's 
Wi~Fj network name to "Mayor Wanda Irish Terrorist" and "she really is a Terrorist"; (8) and 
by changing their home Wi-Fi network name "Dennis and Wanda Irish are stocking [sic] u2." 
The communicated information was defumatory and subjected Plaintiffs to public 
contempt. ridicule, or disgrace. The defamatory communications from Defendants toward 
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Plaintiffs has harmed Plaintiffs reputation and caused mental anguish. Defendants have acted 
with actual malice, knowledge of falsehood, and/or with reckless disregard for the truth by 
communicating the defamatory statements about the Plaintiffs. Defendants• statements that 
Plaintiff Wanda Irish is a terrorist are defamatory per so, were made in bad faith, with malice, 
and/or with disregard of the truth or falsity of the statement. 
An accord and satisfaction is generally defined as .. a method of discharging a contract 
or cause of action1 twjhcrcby the parties agree to give and accept something in settlement of the 
claim or demand of the one against the other, and perform such agreement. the 'accord' being 
the agreement and the 'satisfaction' its execution or pc:dbnnance." S1rn1her v. Strother, 136 
Idaho 864, 867 (2009) (quoting Fairchild v. Mathews, 91 Idaho I. 4 (1966)); see also Conklin 
v. Patterson1 85 Idaho 331,338 (1963) (recognizing that aprimafacie case of accord and 
satisfaction is sho'W11 when a creditor offers lo accept something other than the original 
performance stated in the agreement, and the debtor gives that performance); l Am.Jur.2d 
Accord & Satiefaction § l (1994) . 
.. Tn esta.Mish u:n accord and satisfilA':tion the parties accepting a new or different 
obligation must do so knowingly and intcntio:na.Jly; .. however, an accord and satisfaction may 
be implied from the auem:lant circumstances. Harris v. Wildcat Corp., 97 ldaho 884, 8~6 
(1976). Since an accord and satisfaction .is a substituted contract, lhe essentials of a valid 
contract must be present, including: proper ~u.bject matter, competent parties, a meeting of the 
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minds, and com;ideralion. 1 
entered into a valid accord and satisfaction. 
not 
is no accord and satisfaction. There is no 
contract. This claim does 
was not plead in their 
apply. Finally, Defendant's claim for an accord and satisfaction 
DATED this ___ day of November, 2016. 
LUKINS & ANNIS, P.S. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2016, 1 caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing hy the method indicated below, and addressed to all 
counsel of record as follows: 
Mr. Erik P. Smith 
Amanda Findlay 
BRIT< P. SMITIIPC 
311-B Coeur d'Alene Avenue 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
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MISCHBLLE R. FULGHAM. ISB #4623 
LUKINS & ANNIS. P.S. 
60) B. Fmnt Str~ Suite 502 
Coeur d'Alene. m &3814-5155 
T: 208-667~0511 
F: 201-664-4125 
mfulahwnmlluld.ns.oom 
Attomevs for Plaintiff 
Dmmis Irish and Wanda Irish 
To:12084461188 
1N THE DISTRICT COURT OF Tim FIRST JUDICIAL DlSTRJCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAH01 IN AND FOR. THE COUNTY OF.KOOTENAI 
DENNIS IRISH and WANDA TRISH, 
husband and wife. 
NO. cv .. 201s .. ss14 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
PLAINTIFFS' SUPLEMENTAL 
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
JEFPRBY E. HALL and DONA F. HALL, 
lnmband and wife, 
Pimntiffs DENNIS mJSH end WANDA IRISH hereby requests that this Court imtmct 
tlw jury in acoordanco wkh the follo'Wing proposed suppla:nmmljmy ~mu. 
Ill 
Ill 
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INSTRUCTION _NO. 
Pedaral law defines "Terrorist actNH.y" n folloWs: 
~H) "Terrorist aetMty" datlned 
The term "terrorist actMV meums any adivity which Is unlawful under the iaws of the piece where 
it is oommitted (or which, If It had been committed In the United States, would be unlawful 1.mdG11r 
the lawe of the United States or any State) and which invmws any of the following: 
(I) The hlghjacking or eat>otage of any conveyance (including an airemft, vessel. or vehlde). 
(H) The seizing or dmning, and threatening to km, Injure. or oominue m demin, another lndivldual 
In order to compel a third person (including a governmental organization) to do or abstain from 
doing any ad aa an e:itplldt or Implicit oonditkm for the release m the individual Hized or detained. 
(HI) A violent attack upon an lntematlonaUy protected person (as defined In section 1118(b)(4) of 
Tile 18) or upon the liberty of such a p61'80n. 
(NJ An a11SISinatton. 
M The use of any-
(1) blotogical agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device, or 
(b) explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere personal 
monetary gain). with Intent to endanger, dlrectiy or lndlll!Ctly, the safety of one or more lndlvichJala 
or to caus~ substantial damage to property. 
(Vi) A thraat. attempt. er oonspirecy to do any of the foregoing. 
Citatation: 8 u.s.c.A. § 1182, § 1182. Inadmissible aliens, Khan v. Holder, United Statea 
Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. September 09, 2009 584 F.3d 773 2009 WL 2e11222 
07-72588. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
Definitions of Terrorism in U.S. Code 
18 U.S.C. § 2331 define1 11lntemattonaf t1m:1rlsm11 and 11domestic termri1m11 for purposes of Chapter 
1138 or the u.s. Code, entitled •1rerrorism." 
1
•fntemdonal terrortem• means 1.:Uviti• with the foHow!ng three chameteristlcs: 
111 Involve violent 1da or sets dangerous to human lifG that violate federal or ttate law; 
111 Appear to be intended (i) to intimidm or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence ihe 
polay of a government by intimidation or ooerdon; or (Ui) to affect the conduct of e 
govemment by massdesmJCUon, 88$8ss!nat10n. or lddnapplngi and 
111 Occur primarily outside the temtorlal Jurildlotion of the U.S., or vans0&nd nation1I 
bo1.mdarie1 in temm of the maans by which they are aooompliohed, the persons they 
appear intended to intimidate or ooeree, or the loeala In whleh their perpetralora operate or 
seek asylum.* 
111 Involve acta dangercua to human Hfe that violate federal or state law: 
1$ Appear intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a avmen population; (il) to Influence the policy of 
a government by intimidation or coereion: or (Hi) ta sffed the conduct of a government by 
mass desb'uotion, ~selnatlon. or kidnapping: and 
11 Occur primarily within the temtorlal jul11dldion of the U.S. 
11 u.s.c. t 2332b definu the term "federal crime of terrorism" 11 an offense that 
11 11 calculated to imiuence « affect the oond!Jd of government by intimidation or ooereton, or 
to mmllate against govemmem conduct and 
11 11 a vlolaUon of en• of eeveral lilted mtutoa. inducting § 930(c) (relating to killing or 
attempted killing during an attack on a federal faclltty wtth a dangerous weapon); and § 
1114 (rallting to killing or attempted killing m afficers and employees cl the U.S.), 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
Adjective: Unlawfully using violence md intimidation, especially against civilimm, m the pu.t'SU!t 
of political rums. 
Orlgm: Lite 18th centmy: .from Frendl tsrroiste, from Lmin terror (sec terror). Tire wmd was 
originally applied to supporters of the F:reru:h R.evolm:io~ who advocated repression and violence 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
FederaU law defines "Terro111t actJvity" as follows: 
The term ierrorist activlV means any activity which Is unlawful under the laws of the place WMl'il 
it is eommittw (or which, If It had been committed rn the United States, would be unlawfw under 
the laws of the United Stmes or any State) and which involves any Df the following: 
(I) The hfghJaol<ing or sabotage of any conveyance Qncluding an aimraft, ve1sel1 er vehide). 
(II) ThG Hizlng or detaining, Md thre~ning to kill, injure, or continue to d&18in. another indlvidu1I 
in order to <Xlmpel a third person (including a gwemmentai orgcmizeticn) to do or abstain from 
doing any ad as an explicit or Implicit condition for the release of the indlvldual $81zed or detained. 
(IH) A violent attack upon an intematlonmly protected l]erson (as defined in section 1116(b)(4) of 
Titie 18) or upon the liberty of such a peraon. 
(IV) An assassination. 
M The use of any-
(1) biological ;gent. chemical agent. or nuctear weapon or device, or 
(b) explosiw1 firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere personal 
me:111etary gain). With intent to endanger, dlreetiy or indirectly, the safety of OM or more individuals 
· or to ~use substantial damage to property. 
~IJ A threat, attempt. or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing. 
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To: 12084461188 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Definitions ofTerrorlsm in U.S. Code 
"fntarnatlonai te1TOrism11 means a~wities with the foHowmg three charaotarletloe: 
'* Involve vlolem acts or ads dangerous to human life that violate federal or state lawi 
~ Appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a cMlmn population: (II) to influence th«. 
poley of a govemment by lntlmlddon or coercion; or (Iii) to affect the oonduat of a 
gowmm1nt by mus d•lffltlctlon, ann~natlon, or kidn1ppln;; and 
it OCWr primarily outside the mrrttorial Jmiedlmion of the U.S •• or transcend national 
boundaries In terms of the means by whioo they are aecomptished, the persons they 
appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the Socaie in which their perpetrators operate or 
seek asylum.* 
1 Involve 1d'S dangerous to human life that violste federal or ltate law; 
11 Appear intended (I) to lnUmldate or coerce a cMlian popuratton: (Ii) to influence the pallcy of 
a government by Intimidation or ccarcfc:>n; or (H~ to affect th11 conduct of a govemment by 
maes demudian, snalSlnatioo. or lddnapptng; and 
111 
~r pilmarily within the temtorial jurisdiction of tht U.S. 
18 u.s.c. § 2332b deflna tho tetm *'ftderaf crimt cf terrorism"' ae an offense that . 
111 Is c::alcul~ to influenO!i or affect the ccndud: of government by intimidation or coercion, or 
to retaliate against government conduct; and 
!II Is I vlalan of one of several listed etatutes, including § 930(0) (relating to l<illlng or 
~ttempted killing dunn; an attlok on a federal feolfity with a dangerous weapon); and § 
1114 (rlJatfng to killing or attempted kilting of offletrG and employen cf th1 U.S.). 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
The Oxford Dictionary deftnes ''Terrorist'' as follows: 
pumit of political m.ms. 
Adjective: Unlawfully umng violence mld intimidation, especially agaiMt civilians: in the pursuit 
of political aims. 
Origin: Late 19& ~: ftom French terroiste, from Latin rerror (see terror). The word was 
originally appliod to supportm of the French Revoluti~ who advocated repression rum violence 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that cm the 2,6 day ofNovembcr. 2016, I caused to be served a 
ne and oo.rreet copy of the foregoing by the method lndi~ below, and addressed to all 
counsel of reoord as follows: 
Mr. Erik P. Smith 
ERIKP. SMITH PC 
311 ·B Coeur d'Alene Avenue 
Coewd'Aiene, ID 83814 
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Frurn:cr1k P. S~ith 12087659110 
ERIK P. SMITH, Attorney at Law 
ERIK P. SMITH, P.C. 
311-B Coeur d'Alene Avenue 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Tel. (208) 667-2000 
Fax (208) 765-9110 
I.S.B.N. 5008 
Attorney for Defendants 
11/30/2016 11 :27 #382 P.002/005 
.;TAI t Cf 1..tvKJ } 
t~rY (,f lq)}fEN/IJ SS 
flED: 
2016 DEC - I PH 12: 3~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT Of THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS IRISH, et al, 
Plaintiffs. 
vs. 
JEFFREY HALL, et, al, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV 15-5814 
ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
DIRECTED VERDICT 
This matter coming for trial commencing November 28, 2016, the 
Plaintiffs, DENNIS IRISH, et a&, present with their counsel, Mischalle R. Fulgham, 
and the Defendants, JEFFREY HALL, et, al, also present with their counsel, Erik 
P. Smith. At the close of Plaintiffs' case, the Court received the Defendants' 
Motion pursuant to I.R.C.P. 50 and taking it under consideration. Thereafter the 
Court placed its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record, NOW 
THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
The Defendants' Motion for Directed Verdict shall be granted. 
DATED this / s ,-day of~ , 2016. 
norable Cynthia KC 
Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of November, 2016, a true copy of 
the foregoing was: 
I] mailed postage prepaid to: 
[ ] inter-office: 
[X J faxad to: 
Mischelle R. Fulgham 
Lukins & Annis 
601 E. Front Street. Ste 303 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Fax: 509-363-2478 
Erik P. Smith 
Attorney at Law 
607 lakeside Avenue 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Fax: 765-911 O 
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Fron:Erik P. S~ith 12087659110 11/? ~016 11:27 
~TAltU.'-
COUNTY Of 
FUD: 
1382 P.004/005 
ERIK P. SMITH, Attorney at Law 
ERIK P. SMITH, P.C. 
2016 OEC - I Pt112: 31+ 
311~8 Coeur d'Alene Avenue 
Coeur d'Alene. Idaho 83814 
Tel. (208) 667M2000 
Fax(208)765-9110 
I.S.B.N. 5008 
Attorney for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS IRISH, et al, 
Plain tiffs, 
vs. 
JEFFREY HALL, et, al, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV 15~5814 
JUDGMENT 
JUDGMENT IS HEREBY ENTERED as follows: 
Plaintiffs' Complaint and all claims therein shall be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
I ~t' DATED this __ day of 
JUDGMENT 
Dennis Irish, etal vs Jeffrey Hall, etal 
-~ ,2016. 
Docket No. 44794 
norable Cynthia 
Judge 
yer 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 
the foregoing was: 
day of November, 2016, a true copy of 
[ J mailed postage prepaid to: 
[] inter-office: 
[X ] faxed to: 
MischeUe R. Fulgham 
Lukins & Annis 
601 E. Front Street, Ste 303 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Fax: 509-363-2478 
Erik P. Smith 
Attorney at Law 
607 lakeside Avenue 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Fax: 765-9110 
JUDGMENT 
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ERIK P. SMITH, Attorney at Law 
ERIK P. SMITH, P.C. 
311-B Coeur d'Alene Avenue 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Tel (208) 667-2000 
Fax(208)765-9110 
ISBN 5008 
Attorney for Defendants 
STATE Of IOAH~ 1ss C0UHtY 0F''t\OOTEN.\IJ · 
FILED: 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN ANO FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS IRISH and WANDA IRISH, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JEFFREY HALL and DONA HALL, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
Case No. CV 154 5814 
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY 
FEES AND COSTS 
1. That I am an attorney at law, authorized to practice in the State of Idaho, 
and the attorney of record, ERIK P. SMITH, in this action on behalf of the 
Defendants, JEFFREY HALL and DONA HALL, and make this memorandum 
pursuant to Rule 54, l.R.C.P. 
2. That attached hereto and incorporated by reference as though fully set 
forth herein is Exhibit "A", a true and correct copy of the actual attorney fees 
and costs related to this action, prepared for Defendants in connection with the 
above matter. To the best of my knowledge and belief they are correct and the 
costs and fees are in compliance with I.R.C.P. 54(d)(4). 
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS -1 
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3. Rule 54(e)(3). Factors to consider. In the event the Court grants 
attorney fees to a party or parties in a civil action it shall consider the following 
factors in determining the amount of such fees: 
(A) The time and labor required. The time and labor required in 
the above-entitled matter was increased by a lack of pre-trial 
discovery by both sides. 
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions. The factual and 
legal questions raised in the above-entitled matter covered 
several years and raised unique Constitutional questions. 
(C) The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and 
the experience and ability of the attorney in the particular 
field of law. The level of skill required to litigate the above-
entitled matter was above-average. I have been in private 
practice for over twenty years. I believe I possess above-
average legal abilities. 
(D) The prevailing charges for like work. Prevailing charges for 
like work ranges between $200.00 per hour to $300.00 per hour. 
(E) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. The fee agreement in 
this case was for an hourly rate of $250.00 for Erik P. Smith, 
and $150.00 for an Associate Attorney. 
(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the 
circumstances of the case. A Trial was scheduled and 
occurred. 
(G) The amount involved and the results obtained. The 
Defendants were successful on their claims by IRCP 50 Motion 
for Directed Verdict The Motion for Directed Verdict was 
prepared and researched prior to Trial. The Motion prevented a 
much longer Trial. 
(H) The undesirability of the case. The Defendants' case was not 
undesirable, 
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(I) The nature and length of the professional relationship with 
the client. l have a prior attorney-client relationship with the 
Defendants for several years. 
(J) Awards in similar cases. Unknown. 
(K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research 
(Computer Assisted Legal Research), if the court finds it 
was reasonably necessary in preparing a party's case. No 
costs sought. 
(l) Any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the 
particular case. Preparation of the legal research was done by 
an Associate Attorney. 
3. My ordinary billing rate to the client is the sum of $250.00 per hour, which I 
believe to be reasonable in light of my experience at the Bar, the length of the 
relation with this client, the prevailing fees in the Bar, the factual complexity of the 
issues, the amount involved and the novelty and difficulty of the Constitutional 
questions involved in this matter. 
4. That the items contained therein, including the time spent and costs 
incurred, are correct and been necessarily incurred in the presentation of 
Defendants' claims, and are set forth to comply with I.R.C.P. 54. 
5. As the Attorney for the Defendants, I am better informed as to the items 
charged in this Memorandum of Costs than the Defendants; the following items 
of costs and fees in this action are correct, and that said costs and fees have 
been necessarily incurred in this action: 
That as reflected in the Exhibit "A," the attorney's fees in the amount 
of $17,225.00 and costs in the amount of $136.00, for a total of 
$17,361.00, has been incurred by Defendants, and this fee is 
reasonable and is in compliance with I.R.C.P. 54. 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
I, ERIK P. SMITH, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state that: 
1. have subscribed to the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS; 
2. I know the contents thereof; and 
3. The matters set forth therein are true to the best of my personal 
knowledge, information and belief. 
DATED this / ;}5 day of December, 2016. 
Attorney for Defendants 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, the undersigned Notary Public 
for the State of Idaho this 0 day of December, 2016. 
Notary Public for Ida 
Residing at: ~4-~o I 
Bond expires: Io/ "L- / &..O l.P 
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CERTIFICATE Of MAiUNG 
I hereby certify that on the / day of December, 2016, a true copy of 
the foregoing was: 
[ ] mailed postage prepaid to: 
[ ] inter-office: 
[X ] faxed to: 
MischeHe R. Fulgham 
Lukins & Annis 
601 E. Front Street, Ste 303 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Fax: 509-363-2478 
Fax: 208/664-4125 
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Erik P. Smith, P.C. 
311-B Coeur d'Alene Avenue 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
208-667-2000 
Jeff Hall 
PO Box 232 
Harrison, ID 83833 
Hall, Jeff 
Erik P. Smith, P.C. 
Balance 
Invoice# 
Invoice Date 
Payment Terms 
Due Date 
$17,361.00 
00338 
December i 2, 2016 
For services rendered between August 01, 20"15 and December 12, 2016 
Time Entries 
Date EE Ac1rv1ty Description Rate Hours Lme Total 
08/2712015 EPS Professlonal Document recolva and mview Summons and 250.00 030 75.00 Services Complain!. 
08/2812015 EPS Professional Telephone calls from and to client mgarding 250.00 0.75 187.50 Services Complaint 
08/31/2015 EPS Professional Email to clients. 250.00 0.10 25.00 SeNices 
09101/2015 EPS Professional Consult with clients; email !o client. 250.00 0.20 50.00 Services 
09/02/2015 EPS Professional Document preparation Notice of Appearance: fax to 250.00 0.25 62.50 Services attorney. 
09/10/2015 EPS Professional Research defamation: document preparation 250.00 2.50 62500 Services Answer and A1firmallon Oofonses. 
09/i4/2015 EPS Professional Telephone calls from and to attorney Brennan 250.00 0.10 25.00 Services regarding Answer 
09/15/2015 EPS Professional Document preparation email to clients; email from 250.00 0.10 25.00 Services and to client; calendaring. 
09/16/2015 EPS Professional Text lrom and to client; calendaring. 250.00 0.10 25.00 Services 
09/17/2015 EPS Professional Additional research; revisions to Answer; email to 250.00 1.00 25000 Services client. 
09/18/2015 EPS Professional Telephone call from attorney Brennan. 250 00 0.10 25.00 Services 
09/2212015 EPS Professional Document receive and review client's Answers. 250.00 0.20 50.00 SeNices 
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09i23/20i EPS Prorossional Consult with client 250.00 1.50 375.00 
Servk:os 
09/28/2015 EPS Professional Document receive and review email from o!ien!: 250.00 0.20 50.00 Services email to clients; email from and to altomey. 
Telephone call to client; document receive and 
09/29/2015 EPS Professional review Notice o! Intent; omai! copy lo clients; 250.00 0.75 187.50 Services '"""1-'''v,;Q lo auomey Fulgham; email to clients; 
calendaring. 
---
0/01/2015 EPS Professional Document receive and review various PRR and 250.00 0.20 50.00 Services emails and client. 
Consult with client regarding Answer; document 
10/02/2015 EPS Professional preparalion and email letter 10 clienl; research 250.00 1.75 431.50 Services Counterclaim; documem receive and review emails 
and lelter from Donna. 
10/05/2015 EPS Professional Document receive and review Nolice o! Scheduling 250.00 0.10 25.00 Services Conference; calendaring; copy emailed to clients. 
10/06/2015 EPS Prolessional Document preparation Scheduling lorm: filing with 250.00 0.10 25.00 Services Clerk; lax to attorney. 
Document receive and review Pre-Trial Order; 
11/16/2015 EPS Professional document receive and review regarding Notice of 250.00 0.20 50.00 Services Pre-Trial Conference and Trial; copy lo client; 
calendaring. 
09/07/2016 EPS Professional Telephone call to client 250.00 0.10 25.00 Services 
09/21/2016 EPS Professional Telephone call to attorney Fulgham. 250.00 0.10 25.00 Services 
09/22/2016 EPS Professional Telephone call to attorney Fulgham, 250.00 0.10 25.00 Services 
09/23/2016 EPS Professional Email to client. 250.00 0.10 25.00 Services 
09/2612016 EPS Professional Telephone call from client. 250.00 0.30 75.00 Services 
10/0612016 EPS Protesslonat Review !ile; document memo to file. 250.00 0.25 62.50 Services 
Professional A\lomey Amanda Findlay - Attend PTC with Judge 
10/13/2016 EPS Services - Attorney Myers. 150.00 0.75 112.50 Amanda Findlay 
10/17/2016 EPS Professional Email to client regarding Trial 250.00 0.10 25.00 Services 
10/20120113 EPS Professional Telephone call to client. 250.00 0.40 100.00 Services 
Professional Emails !o and from client; document receive and 10/27/2016 EPS Services review client's documenl; review /He; tolophone call 250.00 1.00 250.00 lo cl!enl; telephone cal! lo attorney. 
10/29/2016 EPS Professional Telephone call to attorney. 250.00 0.10 25.00 Services 
10/31/2016 EPS Professlonal Document preparation and email letters to c!ienls, 250.00 0.30 75.00 Services 
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11/01/2016 EPS Professional Email from attorney Fulgham 250,00 0.10 25.00 Services 
Professional 
11/07/2016 EPS Services Email to clients. 250,00 0.10 25.00 
11 /0712016 EPS Prolessiona! Research and document preparation Jury 250.00 2.00 500.00 Services !nstmcHons, 
11/08/2016 EPS Professional Emails to and from client; calendaring; telephone 250.00 0.50 12500 Services call from clients regarding Trial preparation. 
11/09/2016 EPS Professional Telephone call to Witness; emails to and from 250.00 0.25 62.50 Services clients. 
Telephone call from client; document receive and 
11/10/2016 EPS Professional review list of witnesses; docurmmt receive and 250.00 0.30 75.00 Services review another list of witnesses; ema!l !o clients 
regarding witnesses. 
Professional Document receive and review various emails from 
11/11i20f6 EPS Services clients; email to clients: document receive and 250.00 0.25 62.50 
review emails from clients. 
11/14/2016 AEF Professional Research S!atute of !imitations, elements o! pfc, 150.00 1.50 225.00 Services malice and slander per se, 
11/14/2016 EPS Professional Document preparation Exhibit List and Witness 250.00 1.25 312.50 Services List. 
11/14/2016 EPS Professional Consult with client; document revision to Exhibit 250,00 1.50 375.00 Services and Witness Usts. 
Professional Research cases regarding public figures and 
1 i/15/2016 AEF Services • Attorney 
malice, and discussion with altomey Smith. 150.00 4.00 600,00 
Amanda Findlay 
Professional Document receive and review Plainl!fl's Witness 
11115/2016 EPS Services and Exhibits; telephone call to ai!omey; email lo 250.00 0.20 50.00 
clients, 
Professional Research defamation; research attorney foes; 
11116/2016 EPS Services review file; consult attorney Findlay; research jury 250.00 1.00 250,00 ins!ructicns. 
Professional Research Trial Brief and preparation ol 
11/H!120H3 AEF Services - Attorney Supplemental Jury Instructions. 150,00 5.00 750.00 
Amanda Findlay 
i 1/18/2016 EPS Professional Consult with clients. 250.00 3.00 750.00 Services 
Document preparation Trial Brief; research email 
issues: document preparation Amended Witness 
1i /21/2016 EPS Professional List; document preparation regarding Subpoenas: 250.00 3.50 875.00 Services filing with Clerk; email regarding service; research 
regarding Barlow; research witness on-line; 
telephone calls to and from witness. 
Professional Research questions of opinion, the First 
11/22/2016 AEF Services • Attorney Amendment, punitive damages, and discussion 150.00 3.00 450.00 
Amanda Findlay with attorney Smith. 
Professional Supplemental Jury Instructions, research Kootenai 
11/2312016 AEF Services - Attorney County defamation case, and Pm-Trial Motions, 150.00 3.00 450.00 
Amanda Findlay 
Dennis Irish, etal vs Jeffrey Hall, etal Docket No. 44794 346 of 590 
,v~v-,U punitive ~M•. --.,-- review 
11/23/201 EPS Professional preparation; consult with clients; telephone call Services lrom witnesses; document receive and review 
Brief; document receive and rovicw Juror Lis!. 
1112712016 EPS Professional Trial Preparation; consult with clients. 
Services 
Professional Prepare for Trial; attend morning session of Trial; 
i i /29/2016 EPS Services research Motion: attend afternoon session of Trial; 
consult with client in preparation for next day. 
Professional Telephone call from witness; Trial v·vv~· -.-~ ... 11/29/2016 EPS Services attend Trial. 
Professional Document preparation Order Granting Motion for 
11/30/2011:l EPS Services Direct Verdict and document preparation Judgment 
Document receive and review executed Order and 
Judgmert!; document receive and review email !mm 
12/01/2016 EPS Professional attorney; copy to clients; document receive and Services review email from Judge: copy to clients; lelephone 
call from client regarding effect of Judgment and 
Post-Judgment Motions. 
12/05/2016 EPS Professional Document preparation Affidavit regarding Servicss Attorney's fees: email to client. 
Professional Email lo clients; telephone call lo client; document 12/12,2016 EPS Services preparation Memorandum of Aliorney's Fees and Cosls. 
Expenses 
Date EE Activity Description 
09/02/20i5 EPS Professional Filing fee Kootenai Counly Courthouse· Answer Services 
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·-
250.00 6.00 1,500.00 
250.00 8.00 2,000.00 
250.00 11.00 2,750.00 
250.00 3.00 750.00 
250.00 0.50 125.00 
250.00 0.75 187.50 
250.0() 0.50 125.00 
250.00 1.50 37500 
lotals: 75.80 $17,225.00 
Cost Quantity Line Total 
136.00 1.0 136.00 
Expense To!al: $136.0!l 
Time Entry Sub-Total: 
expense Sub-Total: 
Sub-Total: 
Total: 
Amount Paid: 
17,225.00 
136.00 
17,361.00 
17,361.00 
0.00 
$17,361.00 
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M.ISCHELLE R. FULGHAM. !SB #4623 
LUKINS & ANNIS. P.S. 
601 E. Front Street. Suite 303 
Coeur d' Ahme. iD 83814-5155 
T: 208·667-0517 
F: 208-664-4125 
.mfu1liliam(@.lukins.com 
Attornevs for Plaintiff 
Dennis Irish and Wanda Irish 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL D!STR!CT OF TlIE 
STATE OF IDAHO, JN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS 1R1SH and WANDA 1R!SH, 
husband and wifo, 
NO. CV-2015-5814 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM 01" 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
JEFFREY E. HALL and DONA F. HALL. 
husband and wife, 
Defendant. 
1bc above-named Plaintiffs, Dennis Irish and Wanda Irish. husband and wife, by and 
through their attorney ofrecord, MischeUe R. Fulgham, and the law finn of Lukins & Annis, 
PS, hereby object to Defendants~ Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs. As a matter of 
Jaw, Defendants are not entitled to ::iubmit any claim for attorney fees or costs. Defendants 
failed to cite any statutory or contractual authority for their claim, and no such statutory or 
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contractual authority exists under 1daho law. l.R.C.P. 54; I.C. §12-121, State v. Daicel Chem. 
Jndus., Ltd, 141 Idaho 102, 109, 106 PJd 428,435 (2005); and Clark v. The Spokesman-
Review, 144 Idaho 427, 163 P.3d 216 (2007). Defendants' motion must be denied. It is 
respectfully requested that this Court so order. 
DEFAMATION EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED AT TRIAL 
Plaintiffs properly brought this defamation action against the Defendants. Defendants 
admittedly posted signs on Defendants' vehicles, which vehicles where driven all around the 
small town of Harrison, ldaho, where Pla~tiff Wanda lrish serves as Mayor of Harrison, and 
has been re-elected for two ternis. The Defendants' ·published signs slated "Mayor Irish lied" 
and also stated 1'The Mayor Lies." See admitted Plaintiff's Admitted Exhibit 1 attached thereto 
, lo the Declaration ~f Mischelle R. Fulgham in Support of Plaintiffs' Objection to 
Defendants' Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs. 
Defendant Jeff Hall also made defamatory statements in front of a group of eight to ten 
government officiahi, ca.Hing the Mayor ''a liar". stating the Mayor "is lying again"; and 
accusing the Mayor of illegal conduct, wmouncing. "Oh, I see you are having secret meetings 
again". See the trial trunscripl in CV-15-5814, pg:r;. 24-34, attached as Exhibit B lo the 
Declaration of Mischelle R. Fulgham in Support of Plaintiffs ' Objection to Defendants' 
Memorandum ~f AUorney Fees and Co.,·t:.. 
Finally, and most egregiously, throughout the busy summer tourist season, Defendants 
intentionally and maliciously broadcast to thousands of W 11 ;1 users located on Lake Coeur 
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d'Alene and throughout the City ofllarrison's downtown area, the defamatory statement that 
"Mayor Wanda Irish Terrorist" and "She really is a terrorist.'' See admitted trial Exhibits 
attached thereto as~ to the Declaration ofMi,1;chelle R. Fulgham in Support of 
Plaint~p.r; 1 Objection to Defendants 1 Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Cost. 
Defendant Jeff IlaH fully admitted making and publishing these "Terrorist'' statements 
by using Defendants' Wlfl beacon. See true and correct copies of excerpts of the trial 
transcript in CV-1 .5-5814 attached m; E;d,.ibit D to the Declaration of Mischelle R. Fulgham in 
Support of Plainti.ffe' Objection to Defendants · Memorandum of .Attorney Fees and Cost, 
During the jury trial on November 28 and 29, 2016, the evidence showed that Defondanl Jeff 
HaH knew full weH that his statements about the Plaintiff Wanda Irish were wrong, In regards 
to the Defendants' W 1Fl broadcast, publishing "Mayor Wanda Irish Tcnorist" and "She really 
is a Terrorist," lhe UJ1di~puted trial testimony showed that HaH specifically and e:xpress1y 
admitted to Plaintiff Wanda Irish that "Yes; I shouldn't have done it, it was childish, and let's -
- I'H apologize, let move on." See trail transcript page 51 allached thereto a.,· ExhihU D to the 
Declaration of Mischelle R. Fulgham in Support of Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' 
Memorandum o,f Attorney Fees and Cm'ils. Afier making these admissions that "Yes; I 
shouldn't have done it. it was childish. and let's - - I'll apologize. let move on/' IIrul then 
requested that Mrs. Irish drop her defamation case against him. See lrans·cripl, page 51, 
attached thereto a.i; Exhibit D to the Declaration of Mischelle R. Fulgham in Support of 
Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Cost. 
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At the conclusion of the Plaintiffs' case-in-chief ut trial, the Plaintiffs Wanda and 
Dennis Irish had proved all of the necessary elements of their defamation case, specifically that 
the Defondant: 
(1) Communicated infonnatfon concerning the plaintiff to others; 
(2) That the information was defwnatory; and 
(3) That the plaintiff was damaged because of the communication. 
See Gough v. Trihime-.lournal Co., 73 Idaho 173, 177, 249 P.2d 192, 194 (1952). 
As a fourth (4) element, because Mrs. Irish serves as the Mayor of Harrison, and is 
therefore a public official, the Irishcs also testified to and showed the falsity of Jeff Hall's 
state~ents. See Philadelphia New:;paperJ'., lnc. v. Hepp.,·, 475 US. 767, 775-76, 106 S.CI. 
15581 1563-.. 64, 89 L.Ed.2d 783, 791-92 (1986). 
Plaintiffs' Supp1emenlal Proposed Jury Instructions, pages 3-5 auached thereto as 
&l!ilziLf. to the Declaration of Mischel/e R. Fulgham in Support of Plaintifft' Objection to 
Deji.rnd,rnJ.,·' Memorandum <?f AUamey Fee.,· and Costs, set out the statutory and legal definition 
of a terrorist, as "A person who wies unlawful violence and intimidatic:m, especiaUy against 
civilians, in the pursuit of political aims." See~ to Fulgham Declaration. 
Federal Jaw set out at 8 U.S.C.A. § u82, define~ "Terrorist activity" as foHows: 
(m) "Terrorist 1etivity" defined 
The term "terrorist activity" means any activity which is unlawful under the laws of 
the pl12ee where it is committed (or which, if it had been committed in the United 
States, would be unlawful under the laws of the United States or any State) and 
which Involves any of the following: 
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(I) The high jacking or sabotage of any conveyance (inch.1ding an aircraft, vessel, or 
vehicle). 
(II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain, 
another individual In order to compel a third person (including a governmental 
organization) to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition 
for the release of the individual seized or detained. 
(ill) A violent attack upon an internationally protected person (as defined in section 
1116(b){4) of Title 18) or upon the liberty of such a person. 
OV) An assassination. 
(V) The use of any--
(1) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device, or 
(b) explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere 
persona! monetary gain), with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of 
one or more individuals or to cause $Ubstantial damage to property. 
(Vi) A threat. attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing. 
See 8 u.S.C.A. § 1182, § 1182. Inadmissible aliens, Khan v. Holder, United States 
Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. September 09, 2009 584 F.3d 773 2009 WL 
2871222 07-72586 . 
Additional definitions <.Jf "Terrorism" are contained throughout the U.S. Code, including the 
definition of"Domestic terrorism'\ set out at 18 U.S.C. § 2331. 
"Domestic terrorism " means activities with the following three 
characteristics: 
11 Involve acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state law; 
11 Appear intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the 
policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a 
government by mass destruction, assassination. or kidnapping; and 
11 Occur primarily within the territorial Jurisdiction of the U.S. 
Defendant's published statements that Mrs. Irish WW:! a "terrorist" and that "she really is a 
terrorist" were untrue and contrary to the legal and dictionary definitions of "Terrorist". Mrs. 
Trish absolutely does not fit the legal or statutory definition of terrorist See attached thereto as 
PLAINTlFFS' OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' 
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Exhibit F to the Declaration of Mischelle R. Fulgham in Support of P/aint{ffe ' Objection to 
Defendants' Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs, pages 3-5 of Plaintiffs' Supplement.al 
Jury Instruction, Nor docs Mrs. lrish fit the more general Oxford dictionary definition of 
terrorist., "A person who uses threats of violence or physical harm for political gain.'' See 
Exhibit F. 
Additionally. it was slander per se for Defendants to publish statements that Mrs. Irish 
"Hes'', "is a liar", "runs a corrupt City government", His having secret meetings at City HaH 
again'\ is a "terrorist" and that "she really is a terrorist ". On their face, Defendant Jeff Hall's 
statements tmlawfully impugn Mrs. Irish's character, harm her reputation for honesty, aJlege 
unlawful open meeting violations in violation ofidaho Code§ 74-2081 and a11ege criminal 
offenses in violation of federal ru1ti-tcrrorist statutes 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182 and 18 U.S.C. § 2331. 
Pefamatory utterances regarding an individual are slanderous per se, that is, actionable without 
1Under T.C. § 74d208, dvil fines and penalties would apply if Mrs. Irish was "having secret 
meetings at City HalP', including (1) Ifan action, o:r any deliberation or decision.making that 
leads io an action, occurs at any meeting which fails to comply with the provisions of this 
chapter, !:!Uth action :-;hall be null and void, (2) Any member of the governing body governed by 
the provisions of this chapter, who conducts orpw-tidpates in a meeling which violates the 
provisions of this act shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed two hundred fifty dollars 
($250), (3) Any member of a governing body who knowingly violates the provisions of this 
chapter shall he subject to a civil penalty not to exceed one thousand five hundred dollars 
($1,500), and (4) Any member ofa governing body who knowingly violates any provision of 
this chapter and who has previously admitted to committing or has been previously determined 
to have committed a violation pursuant to subsection (3) ofthls section within the twelve (12) 
months preceding this subsequent violation shall be subject to a civil penally not to exceed two 
thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500). 
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alle¥ation and proof of special damagos, if they foll into one of four categories, which include 
utterances imputing conduct constituting a criminal offense. Barlow v. International llarvester 
Co. 95 !daho 881 522 P.2d 1102 11354, 11342 (1974). 
fjnally, because Wanda Irish is a pubHc figure, the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 2$4, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d686 (1964), standard applied, and both Mr. e.nd Mrs. Irish 
proved the Defendant Jeff Hall acted with malice., knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of 
truth, by clear and convincing evidence. Steele v. The Spoke,im<:m Review, 118 Jdaho at 252, 61 
P.3d at 609; Bandeltn v. Pietsch, 98 Idaho 537, 339, 563 P.2d 395, 397 (1977). Because 
Plaintiffs testified without contradiction that Defendant Jeff Hall's defamalory statements were 
made to other peopie, that Oefendwit Jeff Hall's statements were false, that Plaintiffs were 
damaged by the Defendants' statements, and because Defendant Jeff Hall himself admitted his 
statements were wrong., that he puhHsl1ed "Mayor Trish Terrorist'' and "She really is a terrorist" 
because of the alleged prior government action of towing his car, and because Defendant Hall 
admitted that ho should not have published the "terrorist" WIFT broadcast, the final required 
element of that "Defendant Jeff Hall acted with malice, knowledge of falsity or reckless 
disregard of truth" was proven by clear and convincing evidence at trial. Based upon this 
unc:ontroverted and admitted evidence, a jury could have found clear and convincing proof that 
Defendant Jeff Hall acted with "malice, knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth" 
when he made the false, defa.rnalory, slanderous per se, and damaging statementi; about the 
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Plaintiff Wanda Irish. Based upon the undisputed testimony at trial, Plaintiffs were entitled to 
damages from the Defendants for defamation and slander per $e. 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
At lhe close of Plaintiffs' case in chief, the Court denied Plaintiffs' motion to reopen; 
granted Defendants' motion for directed verdict; took the case away from the jury; and ordered 
the dismissal of Plaintiffs' entire action. 
On December 13 2016, Defendants filed a Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs, 
seeking $17,361.00 from Plaintiffs for the defamation trial. 
On December 23, 2016, Plaintiffs timely filed this Objection. Pursuant to :such 
Objection, no statutory o:r contractual basis exists for Defendants' claim. Plaintiffs are entitled 
to an order denying Defendants' motion for costs and tees. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
NO LEGAL AUTHORITY EXISTS OR WAS CITED BY DEFENDANTS. 
Although the Defondants are prevaiHng parties, Defendants are not, as a matter of 
clearly established law, entitled to claim attorney fees and costs. See l.R.C.P. 54; l.C. § 12-
121; and Clarkv. The Spokesman-Review, 144 Idaho 427, 163 P.3d 216 (2007). Defendants' 
attorney foe motion is deficient on its face and must be denied because Defendants failed to 
provide" or cite to, any statutory or contractual authority for an award of costs or foes. Clark v. 
The Spokesman-Review, 144 ldaho at 433, citing State v. Daicel Chem. Indus., Ltd, 141 Idaho 
102, 109, 106 P.3d 428,435 (2005) (holding a party must point to a statute or contractual 
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provision authorizing an award of attorney fees.) No such statutory or contractual authority 
exists and Dctcndants' Motion fails. 
TIDS ACTION WAS NOT UNRRASONABLE OR FRIVOLOUS. 
Under J.C. § 12-121, this action wa!) not brought or pursued unreasonably or 
frivolously. 1:or years, Plaintiffs suffered from Defendants' harassment, false criminal claims, 
abuse of process, slander per se and defamation. Whenever Plaintitls asked Defendants to 
cease their reprehensible conduct, the Defendants doubled down and made it worse for 
Plaintiffs. Eventually, Plaintiffs could take it no more. They reasonably and justifiably 
brought I.his slander per se and defamation aclion against Defend!mls. Thereafter, Plaintiffs 
proved each element of slander per se and defamation at trial. During the trial, Judge Meyers 
stated on the record that she herself would have also sued the Defendant Jeff Hall ifho had said 
these things and done these things to her. Judge Meyers stated, "I think the conduct as T have 
heard it is reprehensible. it's childish, ifs harassment, it's ridiculous. If 1 were the lrishes, J. 
would be terribly, terribly upset. I would certainly consider filing a lawsuit." See Trial 
Transcript, 11/20/16, CV-20155814, page 113, Ins. 19-23 attached thereto as Exhibit F to the 
Dedaralion <l Misc he lie R. Fulgham in Support of Plaimijfi·' Objection lo Defendants' 
Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs. "And, Mr. Hall, I'm just - - this is shameful 
behavior. It really is." Page 114, Ins. 14-15, attached thereto as Exhi.bit G to the Declaration of 
Mischelle R. Fulgham in Support of Plaintiffe ' Objection to Defendants' Memorandum of 
Attorney Fees and Costs Thus, because Plaintiffs proved each and every element of their 
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defamation claim, and because the I.rial court Judge slated she would also have brought such a 
case against the Defendant JeffHaJI, it fo11ows that Plaintiffs' case was not frivolous or 
unreasonable as required for a fee award under IC§ 12-121. 
DEFENDANTS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH TRCP S4(d)(4). 
Defendant's Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs is defective and fails to comply 
with I.R.C.P. 54(d)(4). Defendants failed to identify both of the attorneys completing the legal 
work sought for payment therein. Defendants failed to identify tho education, tho skill, the 
admis::1ion/Hcerrning dale, and the experience of each attorney for whom payment is sought. 
Defendants failed to justify the associate attorney billing rate, and failed to describe the level of 
experience for similar associate billing rates. Without such necessary and mandatory 
information, the associate attorney fees as submitted by Defendants do not comply with 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(4). The Defendants' requested attorney fees do not appear reasonable and 
should not be awarded. 
Next, Defendants' Memorandum is defective because it docs not fully or adequately 
tle!lcribe the auomey's activity for which payment is sought Just vaguely stating 11Profossfonal 
Services" as the billed activity f:dty eight (58) times does not satisfy the necessary 
requirements for a properly submitted attorney fee cfaim under Rule 54. 
AdditionalJy, the work descriptions provided by Defendants are inadequate and fail to 
indicate what actual legal work was being provided. On 8/31/2015 and 9/0l/15, Defendants' 
obscure and cryptic descriptions are "Rmail to client", "Consult with clients", and "email to 
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c:fomt''. No further or more exact description is provided. No legal or factual issue is 
mentioned for the emails or consultation. Defendants completely failed to describe whether 
their work was reasonable for this case, and whether that work was even on or related to this 
case. The Defendants' date and time entries appear to chronologically re1ate to a completely 
different and separate case between tho City of Harrison, Plaintiff and the Halls, Defendant, in 
Kootenai County Caso.No. CV-2013-0001066. The dates of Mr. Smith's numerous telephone 
calls to "attorney" and to "client'' without any description of the facts or Jegal issues discussed, 
may be related to the simultaneously pending easement case being litigated between the Mayor 
on behalf of the City of Harrison and the Hans on behalf of their business, the Gateway Marina, 
Submitting lime spent on annther case, although it involves the same parties, is not proper 
under I.R.C.P. 54 and such time entries must be rejected as no evidence exists showing the 
work was for this case. 
The Defendants' submittal for 9/15 and 9/ l 6 attempts to seek a claim for attorney fees 
for administrative work of "cruendaring11 • No claim or recovery for administrative work of 
calendaring sh~u1d be aHowed. 
The following Defendant entries arc lacking in specificity and must be rejected. It is 
unclear if these entries are even related to this case ( or the other case Defendants have with the 
City of Harrison) and it's unclear what facts, issues. or documents were at issue. 
9/23/2015 "Consult with dient" 
9/07/2016 "Telephone caU to client" 
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9/23/2016 "Email to client" 
9/28/2016 "Telephone call from client" 
10/06/2016 "Review file, document preparation memo to file)! 
10/20/2016 "Telephone call to client" 
10/29/2016 "Telephone can to auorney" 
10/J 1/2016 "Document preparation and emai I letters to clients" 
11/07/2016 "Email to clients" 
11118/2016 "Consult with cHenb," 
All of the above fee submittals are deficient. Seeking payment for "Telephone calls to 
attorney", docs not evidence that such work was reasonable, necessary, or even related to this 
case. Who wa~ called and why? No claim for any .such work should be considered because 
this is not an adequate description under Rule 54. 
Defendants' fee submiual for 10/01/2016 is likewise deficient. Seeking payment for 
"various PRR" is not an adequate description of work under IRCP 54. No claim for any such 
work should be considered. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs properly brought this defamation and slander-per-se case against Defendants. 
Plaintiffs properly pursued this defamation and slander-per-se case against Defendants. At 
trial, .Plaintiffs established each required clement of their defamation and slander-per-se claims. 
The Court even commented how il agreed with the Plaintiffs' actions in bringing this lawsuit 
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against Defendant Jeff Hall, stating that Your Honor would also consider filing such a lawsuit 
against the Defendant Jeff Hall based on lhe facts presented. 
It is undisputed that Plaintiff Wanda Trish was not involved in the towing of 
Defendants' vehicle :from the City's public easement. Nor was Mayor Irish involved in any 
other unlawful government conduct. Y ct, the Defendants still relentlessly targeted her and 
broadcast that she was a liar, that she was corrupt, that she was holding secret government 
meetings (which is a viofation ofl.C. § 74-208 ), and that she was a Terrorist (which is in 
violation of 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182 and 18 U.S.C. ~ 2331 ). Under all of the governing statutory 
terms, legal definitions. and even under the common dictionary definitions of "Terrorist'\ none 
of the Defendants' statements, WIFI broadcasts, or written publications as against the Plaintiff 
meet the required definitions. None of the Defendants statements, WWT broadcasts, or written 
publications is true. The evidentiary record before this Court and the jury fully demonstrated 
that Defendants made false statements knowingly, recklessly, and maliciously (admittedly in 
retaliation for Defendants' car being towed off the City of Harrison's public easement). Thus, 
Plaintiffs did not bring or pursue their defamation and slander-per-se claims against 
Defendants unreasonably or frivolously under I.C. § 12-121. 
Next, Defendants' Memorandum is fatally defective on its face. No legal authority 
exists, and none was cited by Defendants, for any attorney fee claim. Repeating "Professional 
Services" fifty eight (58) times is not a sufficient description of services under Rule 54. Failing 
to identify the education, skm, and experience of the attorney seeking payment necessitates the 
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denial of all such fee claims. Submitting vague and cryptic claims for work done in the 
easement case of The City of Harrison, Plaintijf v. The Gateway Marina, Defendant, in 
Kootenai County Case No. CV- 2013-0001066 is improper and violates Rule 54. Thus, 
Defendants' attorney fee claims must be dtmied as lacking any legal authority, as lacking 
adequate descriptions, and as lacking personal information about the attorney perfonning the 
work. 
It is respectfully requested (hat the Court enter an Order Denying Defendants' Attorney 
Fee and Cost claim. 
DAT.ED this 23rd day of December, 2016. 
LU 
By 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 23rd day of December, 2016, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy or the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed 10 an 
counsel of record as follows: 
Erik P. Smith 
Amanda Findlay 
I!RIK P. SMITH PC 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
311-B Coeur d'Alene Avenue 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
TeJeropy : (208) 765-9110 
Email 
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"EC-23-2016 10:03 From: 
MlSCHELLE R. FULGHAM. ISB #4623 
LUKINS & ANNIS. P.S. 
601 E. Front Street. Suite 303 
Coeur d'Alene. ID 83814-5155 
T: 208m667-0517 
F: 509-363-2478 
mfuh?ham(@.lukins.oom 
Attornevs for Plaintiff 
Dennis Irish and Wanda Irish 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF Tiffi 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THU COUNTY or,· KOOTENAI 
DENNIS HUSH and WANDA IRISH, 
husband and wife, 
NO. CV-2015-5814 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
JEFFREY E. HALL and DONA F. HALL, 
husband and wife, 
DECLARATION OF MTSCHRLLF. R 
FULGHAM IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAlNTlFl•S, OBJECTION TO 
DEFENDANTS• MEMORANDUM OF 
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Defendant. 
I. MISCHELLE R. FULGHAM, hereby make the following declaration: 
1. I run over the age of 18, have personal knowledge of, and am competent to 
testify with regard to the matters contained herein. 
2. My law firm and I represent Plaintiffs DENNIS IRISH and WANDA OOSH. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit A are true and correct copies of Plaintiffs' admitted 
trial Exhibit No. 1 ;;howing Defendants' signs on Defendants' vehicles. The Defendants' 
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published photographic statements include, ''Mayor Wanda Irish is a liar" and also the 
published statement, "The Mayor lies." 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit Bare true and correct copies of the trial transcript in 
CV·lS-5814. wherein Plaintiff testified about Defendant Jeff Hall's statements that she "is a 
Har;" and "fa lying again;" testimony that Defendant Jeff Han said to eight or ten people, '40h, T 
see you are having secret meetings again;" and testimony that Defendant Jeff Hall accused 
Plaintiff of favoring family members, and stating that the Mayor is corrupt becau!le she favors 
her family members. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit Care true and correct copies of admitted trial 
Exhibits 3 and 5 showing Defendants1 broadcast W!F1 beacon. Defendants' published WlH 
beacon broadcast states "Mayor Wanda Irish Terrorist" and "She really is a terrorist." 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit D are true and correct copies of excerpts of the trial 
transcript in CV-15-58 t 4 wherein Defendant Jeff Han specificaHy and expressly admitted to 
Plaintiff Wanda Irish that he had posted "Wanda Irish Terrorist" on his WlF! beacon. Plaintiff 
Wanda Irish testified as foJlows: 
A: Jeff H aH came into City Hall and approached me and wanted to settle the 
case out of court. He did not want to go to trial. He said that he did say that I 
was a terrorist, based on things that had gone on previously, and it stemmed 
back from the car being towed. 
Q: So he admitted -
A: He admitted. 
Q: --that he said <1Wanda Irish terrorist" on his wi-fi beacon. 
A: Ye~; 11! shouldn't have done it, It was childish, and let's - T'JI apologi~e, 
let's move on." 
Trial Transcript, CVv./ 5-5814, p. 51, Ins. 14·25. 
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and he should not have posted those statements about her. His actions were childish and 
immature. 
7, Attached hereto as Exhibit E are true and correct copies of excerpts of the trial 
transcript where Hall requested that MTS. Trish drop her defamation case against him because he 
had apologized. 
8. Attached hereto as Exhibit Fa.re true and correct copies of Plaintiffs' 
Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions, pgs. 3-5. Al Page 5, Plaintiffs' Supplemental 
Proposed Jury Instruction states: 
The Oxford Dictionary defines "Terrorist" as foUows: 
Noun: A person who uses unlawful violence and mtinµdation. especially against 
civilians, in the pll1'8uit of political aims. 
Adjective: Unlawfully using violence and intimidation. especially against 
civilfons, in t · of politicaJ aims. 
Origin: Late 1 from French terroisle, from Latin terror (see terror). 
1he word was originally applied to supporters of the French Revolution. who 
advocated repression and violence in pursuit of the principles of democracy and 
inequality. 
At Page J of the Plaintiffs' Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions, Plaintiff states: 
Federal law deflnes "Terrorist activity" as follows: 
(iii) "Terrorist activity" defined 
The term "terrorist activity" means any activity which is unlawful under the laws of 
the place where it is committed (or which, if It had been committed in the United 
States, would be unlawful under the laws of the United States or any State) and 
which involves any of the following: 
(I) The high jacking or sabotage of any conveyance (inciudlng an aircraft, vessel, or 
vehicle). 
(IJ) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain, 
another individual in order to compel a third person (inciudlng a governmental 
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organization) to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition 
for the release of the individual eeized or detained. 
(Hi) A violent attack upon an internationally protected person (as defined in section 
1118(b)(4) of Title 18) or upon the liberty of such a person. 
OV) An assassination. 
(V) The use of any--
(a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device, or 
(b) explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere 
personal monetary gain), with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of 
one or more lndivlduals or to cause substantial damage to property. 
(VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing. 
Citation: 8 u.S.C.A. § 1182, § 1182. Inadmissible aliens, Khan v. Holder, United 
States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit September 09, 2009 584 F.3d 773 2009 
Wl 2871222 07-72586. 
At Page 4 or PfainlHTs' Supplement Proposed Jury Instructions, Plaintiff st.'ltcs: 
Dermitions of Terrorism in U.S. Code 
18 U.S.C. § 2331 define& "international terrorism" and *'domestic terrorism" fer purposes of 
Chapter 1138 of the U.S. Code, entitled ''Terr,:,rlsm. 11 
"fnternath:mal terrorism .. means activities with the following three characteristics: 
11 involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state law; 
.. Appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the 
policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a 
government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and 
.. Occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S., or transcend national 
boundaries ln terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they 
appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locate In which their perpetrators operate or 
seek asylum.* 
"Domestic terrorism" means activities with the following three characteristics: 
1\1 Involve acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state law; 
" Appear intended (i) to Intimidate or coerce a civU!an population: (ii) to influence the poticy of 
a government by intimidation or coercion; or (Hi) to affect the conducb::,f a government by 
mass destruction, as&asslnatiort or kidnapping; and 
" Occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. 
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18 U.S.C. § 2332b deflnes the tenn "federal crime of terrorism" as an offense that: 
" Is calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or 
to retaliate against government conduct; and 
~ Is a violation of one of several listed statutes, Including § 930(c) (relating to killing or 
attempted killing during an attack on a federal facility with a dangerous weapon); and § 
1114 (relating to killing or attempted killing of officers end employees of the U.S.). 
9. Attached hereto as Exhibit G arc true and correct copies of excerpts of the trial 
transcript in CV-15~5814 wherein Judge Meyers stated: 
Having said this, I th.ink the conduct as I have heard it is reprehensible. It's 
childish, it's harassment, it's ridiculous. If I were the Irishes, I would be 
terribly, terribly upset. T would certainly con~ider filing a lawsuit H's 
untenable. 
*** 
And., Mr. Hall, I'm just - - this is shameful behavior. 1t really is. 
Trial Transcript, CV-15-5814. p. 113. Ins. 1.9-23 andp. J 14, lm. 14-15. 
I hereby declare w,der penalty of perjury of the laws of the State <>f Jdaho lhal ihe 
foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief 
Dased on the facts and the law, Defendants' Memorandum for Costs and Attorney Fees 
lacks merit, lacks any supporting legal authority, and must be denied. 
EXECUTED Lhis 22nd day of December, 2016, at Spokane, WA. 
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1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 23rd day of December, 2016, l caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of lhe foregoing by the melhod indicated below, and addressed to all 
counsel of record as follows: 
Mr. Erik P. Smith 
.Amanda Findlay 
ERIK P. SMITH PC 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Ovemighl Mail 
311-B Coeur d'Alene Avenue 
Coeur d'Alene, 1D 83 814 
D 
D 
D 
181 
D 
Tclccopy (!'AX): (208) 765-9110 
Email 
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A. Eight or ten. Eight to tan paople. 
Q. All right. And where w0re you while this 
meeting was going on? 
A. Outside, in another room. 
Q. At City Hall? 
A. At City Hall, yes. 
Q. All right. And I want you to tell the jury 
about Jeff Hall's actions and statements as you were 
outside the conference room at City Hall. 
A. He comes into City Hall -- he's outside of 
the City Hall building, and when the meeting was over, 
he comes in and said, Oh, I see you're having secret 
meetings again. 
Q, 
A. 
liar. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
What do you say? 
I said, No> I'm not. And he called me a 
What did he say? 
He said, You're lying again. 
And your response? 
I said, I was not in the meeting, and would 
you please leave. 
Q. Why would it be a problem for a city 
official, a mayor, to be accused of having a secret 
meeting? 
A. It I s illegal. 
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Q. What do you mean, it's illegal? Why can't 
you do that? 
A. It's Idaho Code. We have open meeting 
laws, and all meetings are for the public. 
Q. Who was present when Jeff Hall said, You're 
having secret meetings, You're lying again? 
A. The city clerk, Becky Napierala. 
Q. Who else was present.? 
A. The city treasurer. 
Q. Were any of the Idaho Parks officials in 
the p:toximity? 
A. Yes, they were leaving the building, 
Q. Okay. So describe where you are, w-here 
Jeff is, and where these other government officials are 
coming and going and how close you are as he's saying 
you*re a liar and you're having secret meetings. 
A. I'm probably ten feet from Jeff Hall, and 
I'm back in back, where the treasurer sits. 
Q. Does he say it in front of these other 
people? 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. And did you say anything t6 him in response 
to that in front of the other ten government officials 
coming through? 
A, I just said, Please leave; I'm not lying: I 
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wasn't in the meeting. 
Q. Okay. May 7th, 2015. Please describe to 
the jury the boat incident involving your brother and 
your boat. 
A. My brother and his wife came over to 
Harrison for a week, and they brought their trailer and 
said they wanted to stay at the campground. So I 
agreed to let them use our boat, and they parked the 
boat at the campground site where we have the boat 
storag~, boat moorage, I guess. 
Q, So you need to describe this to the jury. 
Where is the campground and where is the boat dock for 
the campground? 
A. Okay. There's a marina, then there's the 
campground, and then off to the right of the campground 
is the boat dock. There's about six of them for the 
campers to use when they stay in Harrison or are camped 
at the campground. 
Q. 
dock? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Can the public use the campground boat 
No. 
You have to be a campground guest. 
Yes. 
Q. And who paid for your brother's campground 
registration fee? 
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A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q, 
fo:r him? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
My broth.er. 
Did you give him a city discount? 
No, we don't have discounts. 
Did you do any sort of family favoritism 
No. 
So he paid the full price. 
Yes. 
Q. What happened with your boat at the boat 
launch for the campground users? 
A. Well, Jeff Hall said -- I did not see him 
down there without hearsay, but he did post on --
MR. SMITH: Objecti6n. I think she's 
leading into hears~y, by her own words. 
Q. BY MISS FULGHAM: What did you observe --
THE COURT: Hold on. 
Well, I consider the question -- I'll 
sustain the obj~ction, and go ahead with that question. 
Q. BY MISS FULGHAM: Okay. And I'll rephrase 
it. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Desc~ibe what you observed in regards to 
Jeff Hall's complaints about your brother using your 
boat; your personal knowledge, what you know, not any 
other statement. 
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A. I did not see anything down at the dock. 
Q. When were you involved? 
A. I was involved at City Hall. 
Q. And what was said to you at City Hall about 
the boat incident at City Hall? 
A. Jeff Hall came into City Hall and was 
saying that it was illegal for my boat to be down at 
the dock and something should he done about it. 
Q. And what did you say? 
A. I said it was fine, he had paid his fee, 
and he was going to be using my boat for a week. 
Q. Any other statements or name calling from 
the defendant, Jeff Hall, regarding you at this time? 
A. There she goes, She thinks she's king 
again. 
MR. SMITH: Objection. That was not 
reBponsive. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
MR. SMITH: Objection for lack of 
foundation. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
MR. SMITH: If I may, one more, not to be 
disrespectful .. but she said "at this time," meaning at 
that City Hall meeting. 
MISS FULGHAM: You can cross-examine. 
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THE COURT: I think that Mrs. Irish's 
response was responsive, and so I'm overruling the 
objection. Thank you. 
MR. SMITH: Okay. 
Q. BY MISS FULGHAM: So let's go through this 
slowly, because I know you're worried about hearsay 
obj ec.tions. 
A. r just thought I'd 
Q. I know, and that's just part of the issue 
when you're publicizing statements of other people. 
The statements you just dascribed, There 
she goes, She thinks she's king, what did that have to 
do or where was that in context relating to your boat 
in Jeff Hall's criticism of you letting your brother 
use it? 
A. Well, he didn't want my boat down there. 
Q. Right. Anything about your family members 
or any criticism that you had to address regarding your 
brother using the campground and paying full price? 
A. Oh, yes. My brother will not come to 
Harrison and be subject to -- or my father, as a matter 
of fact, to Jeff and Dona Hall. 
Q. Anything -- any other statements, any other 
claims regarding your family members and this boat 
incident and your actions in terms of allowing your 
Dennis Irish, etal vs Jeffrey Hall, etal Docket NcJ:?94794 378 of 590 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
brother to stay there? 
A, No, 
Q. Is there anything else you can remember? 
A. 
Q. 
remember? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
No. 
Ia there a document that would help you 
Yes. 
What document would help you remember? 
The document of the timeline of what --
The complaint? 
The complaint, yes. 
Your sworn verified complaint? 
A. Yes. 
MISS FULGHAM: Can I show her her 
complaint, Your Honor, with her sworn signature to help 
her remember? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
Q. 
May 7th. 
4. 
BY MISS FULGHAM: So we were talking about 
You can take a look at your complaint, page 
I have a question. Have you ever favored 
your family members as mayor? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you been accused by the defendant of 
favoring your family members? 
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A. '/es. 
Q. And how did he accuse you of that? 
A. On social media. 
Q. You need to tell me what he said to you. 
A. Okay. She can do anything because she 
thinks she's king. 
MR. SMITH: Objection. This witness hasn't 
laid a foundation for that answer. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm going to overrule 
that. 
MR. SMITH: I also would not want the 
witness to read from a document. She was refreshing 
her memory. Now she's reading from a document. 
THE COURT: Right. Do follow the refreshed 
recollection rules. She can refresh her recollection, 
and then she needs to put it down and testify from 
memory. 
MISS FULGHAM: Okay. 
Q. BY MISS FULGHAM: Next I want to ask you 
about the statements defendant made against you in 
regards to the gravel incident. Do you recall that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you recall when that occurred? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When was that? 
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A. Around June, July. June, July. 
Q. June or July? 
A. Yeah. I don't know. I can't remember the 
exact dates. 
Q. Do you want to take a look at your sworn 
complaint to refxesh the date? The dates may become 
important, so I want you to be accurate. 
A. I'm not sure. My dates are ... 
Q. That's okay. It's over a year ago. We 
were on page 4. 
A, Yes, that was the same comment when he told 
me to get the fuck off his property. 
Q. All right. And what had you come down 
thece to take a look at? Why were you an, quote, his 
property? Or were you on his.property? 
A, I was on the easement. 
Q. Okay. And why were you there on the 
easement? 
A. To see what was going on with the gravel 
issue. 
Q. And how ... 
And then the deputies were there? 
A. Right, e~actly. 
Q. Next I want to talk about the criminal case 
against your husband. Do you recall there being a 
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criminal case? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. What do you recall you and your husband 
doing in response to. that? 
A. We had to go to criminal court, and based 
on Dennis pleaded not guilty in the case, then he had a 
date and we met with the deputy prosecuting attorney. 
Q. And what happened after you met with the 
deputy prosecuting attorney at the court case? 
A. She dropped the case. 
Q. Did you observe her talking to you ... 
Well, did she talk to you? 
A. I was in the room, and she talked to 
Dennis. 
Q. Okay. And did Dennis tell her everything 
that had occurred? 
A, Yes. 
Q, And after she had this conversation with 
Dennis, how long did that last approximately? 
A. About ten minutes. 
Q. And after this ten-minute conversation with 
Dennis directly, she dropped the case. 
A. She dropped the case. 
Q. And the judge dismissed the case. 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Had you requested that Jeff Hall and Dona 
Hall atop pursuing that criminal case against your 
husband? 
No. A. 
Q. 
drop it? 
You hadn't asked them to dismiss it or to 
A, No. 
Q. Why not? 
A. Well, it was with the State of Idaho 
because Jeff had called, Jeff Hall had called the 
deputy, and so I did not see any reason. 
Q. To go to them directly. 
A. To go to them directly. 
Q. You didn 1 t communicate with them directly 
about it at all, 
No, I did not. 
Why not? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
I just am not that type of person. 
To go to them directly about it. 
No. 
Q. It was in a criminal case, and you had the 
defendant there. 
A. Right. 
MISS FULGHAM: Could the witness be handed 
Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 2. 
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A. 
Q. 
Around between July 3rd and July 12th. 
THE COURT: What year? 
THE WITNESS: 2015. 
BY MISS FULGHAM! So it was last summer? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How do you know these beacons were posted 
by the defendant, Jeff Hall? What did he tell you? 
A. I didn't discuss them with Jeff Hall. 
Q. Shortly before this case went to trial, 
what did Jeff Hall tell you about these beacon 
postings? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
It was a couple weeks ago. 
What did he say? 
Jeff Hall came into City Hall and 
approached me and wanted to settle the case out of 
court. He did not want to go to trial, He said he did 
say that I was a terrorist, based on things that had 
gone on previously, and it stemmed back from the car 
being towed. 
Q. So he admitted 
A. He admitted. 
Q. that he said "Wanda Irish terrorist" on 
his wi-fi beacon. 
A. Yes; I shouldn't have done it, It was 
childish, and let's == I'll apologi~e, let•s move on. 
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A. 
Q. 
A. 
Around between July 3rd and July 12th. 
THE COURT: What year? 
THE WITNESS: 2015. 
BY MISS FULGHAM: So it was last summer? 
Yes. 
Q. How do you know these beacons were posted 
by the defendant, Jeff Hall? What did he tell you? 
A. I didn't discuss them with Jeff Hall. 
Q. Shortly before this case went ta trial, 
what did Jeff Hall tell you about these beacon 
postings? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
It was a couple weeks ago. 
What did he say? 
Jeff Hall came into City Hall and 
approached me and wanted to settle the case out of 
court. He did not want to go to trial. He said he did 
say that I was a terrorist, based on things that had 
gone on previously, and it stemmed back from the car 
being towed. 
Q. So he admitted 
A. He admitted. 
Q. that he said "Wanda Irish terrorist" on 
his wi-fi beacon. 
A. Yes; I shouldn't have done it, It was 
childish, and let's -- I'll apologize, let's move on. 
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Q. So he said, I admit I did it, It was 
childish, I shouldn't have done it. 
A. That's correct. 
MR. SMITH: I'll object to counsel's 
repeating the witness's statements. It's been asked 
and answered is basically the objection. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q. BY MISS FULGHAM: So he didn I t ... 
Was there any denial, That's not my beacon, 
That 1 s not what I wrote, anything like that? 
A. No. 
MISS FULGHAM: I'm going to ask that the 
witness be shown Plaintiff's Exhibits 4 and 5. 
THE COURT: Will you pass me back the other 
exhibits, and I'll pass them to the clerk, please. 
Are you done with them, Miss Fulgham? 
MISS FULGHAM: I might go back to one of 
them. Can we keep the Exhibit Number 3? 
THE COURT: Let me just mark that it's been 
admitted. 
MISS FULGHAM: Oh, I'm sorry. It's been 
admitted. Do you want me to stop in the middle and do 
that once it's ruled upon? 
THE COURT: I think that's a good idea. 
Yes, please. 
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INSTRUCTION .NO. 
P'ederal law deflnea ££Terrorist 1ctlvlty., as follows: 
The term "terrorist activity" means any activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place where 
It Is committed (or which, if it had been committed In the United States, would be 1.mlawful under 
the laws of the United States or any State) and which involves any of the following: 
(I) The hlghjacking or sabotage of any conveyance (inciuding an aircraft, vessel, or vehicle). 
(U) The seiZing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or ccmtlm.1e to detain, another individual 
In cm:fer to compel a third person (Including a governmental organization) to do or abstain from 
doing any 1ct as an explicit or implicit condition for the reteaae of the individual seized or detained. 
(HI) A violent attack upon an intemationally pmtecied person (as defined In section 1116(b)(4) of 
Title 18) or upon the liberty of such a pel'IOn. 
(IV) An assassination. 
(V) The use of any-
(a) biological agent, ohemioal agent, or nuolear weapon or device, or 
.(b) explosive, flraarm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere personal 
monetary gain). with Intent to endanger, dlrectly or lndiN~ly I the 11fety of one or more individual, 
or to cause substantial damage to property. 
(VI) A threat. attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing. 
Citatation: 8 u.s.C.A. § 1182, § 1182. Inadmissible aliens, Khan v- Holder, United States 
Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. September 09, 2009 584 F.3d rra 2009 WL 2871222 
07-72586. 
PLAINTIFF~r PROPOSED SUPPLEMENT AL JURY 
IN"STRUCTIONS: 3 
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INSTRUCTION NO, 
Defimtioos of Terrorism in U.S. Code 
To: 12084461188 
18 U.S.C. § 2331 defines 11lntematlonal terrorism" and "domestic terrorism" for purposes of Chapter 
1138 ofthe U.S. Code, entitled 11'errorlsm." 
.. involve violent aots or acts dangerou1 to humllln Jif& that violate federal or i.tate !~w; 
.. Appear to be Intended (I) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; {ii) to influence the 
policy of a govt!mmtilnt by Intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the oondUd of a 
government by mass destruooon, sssassinaticm, or kidnapping; and 
.. Occur primarily outside the territorial Jurisdiction of 1he U.S., or transcend national 
bo1.mdaries In terms of the means by which they am accomplished, the persons they 
appear intended to intimidate ar ooeroe, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or 
seek asylum.* 
"' Involve acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state law: 
11 Appear intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a dVlllan population; CB) to Influence the policy of 
a government by intimidation or coercion; or (ill) to affect the conduct of a government by 
mass destruction, assasstnaUon. or Sdthiapp!ng; and 
.. Ol?Cur prtmartly within thB terntorlal Jurisdiction of the U.S. 
18 U.S.C. § 2332b deflnes the ~ffl'I "federal crime of t'errorism*' as an offense that 
"' Is oatmllated 10 influence or net the com;.iuct of government by intimidation or ooerdcn, or 
to retaflate against govemment conduct; and 
11 Is a violation of one of several listed statutes, inclucllng § 930(c) (relettng to kllllng or 
attempted kimng during an attaek on a federal faclilty with a dangerous weapon); and § 
1114 (relating to kllllng or attempted kllllng of officers and employees ofthe U.S.}. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
The Oxford Dictionary defines ''Terrorist" as follows: 
No~ A person who uses unlawful violence and intimidation, especially against civilians, in the 
pumtlt of political aims. 
Adjective: Unlawfully using violence and intimidation. especially against civiliao.s, in the pursuit 
originally applied to supporters of the French Revolution, who advocated repression and violence 
.in pmsuit of the principles of demoonwy and inequality. 
PLAINTIFFS' PRO:PQSED SUPPLEMENTAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS: S 
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holding a secret meeting, as I recall, the testimony 
was that Mr. Hall came into City Hall and said, Oh, are 
you holding secret meetings? 
Wall, a question isn't a statement. It 
certainly has an implication, but a question isn't a 
statement. There was a response that, no, sh~ was not 
holding secret meetings, that she wasn't involved in 
the meeting, and then there is also the statement, 
"You're lying." 
Again, and I don't think it would be 
surprising by now, I think that those are statements of 
opinion. I don't think they are actionable defamation. 
I do think they're a closer call than the others, but I 
don't think they rise to that level. 
And for these reasons that I have given, I 
am going to grant the motion for directed verdict on 
the defamation claims with respect to Wanda Irish's 
lawsuit for defamation. 
Having said this, I think the conduct as I 
have heard it is reprehensible. It's childish, it's 
harassment, it's ridiculous. If I were the Irishes, I 
would be terribly, terribly upset. I would certainly 
consider filing a lawsuit, It's untenable. And what 
strikes me as being so very sad about this case is that 
we have this tiny little gem of a town on the shores of 
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Lake Coeur d'Alene, and both of you couples represent 
that town. Here we have the mayor and her husband, who 
are the leaders, leader and husband, of the town, who 
I'm sure has the interest of the town and its citizens 
very close to her heart. Here we have people who have 
a business that serves the people of the community and 
tourists who come into the community. To me, you folks 
should be working together. I'm surprised that you're 
not friends. · And, granted, I only see what I see in 
court, having spent a day with you, but it is 
heartbreaking to me that you are at such loggerheads 
that things could rall apart to the point that there is 
all of this name calling. 
And, Mr .. Hall, I'm just -- this is shamaful. 
behavior. It really is. 
Now, with respect to Mr. Irish, the claim 
for defamation centers primarily, primarily on the 
criminal action, but also on the statement "Dennis and 
Wanda stocking 02." I've already addressed that. Mr. 
Irish certainly has less of a burden than a public 
figure has, but he still has to prove that the 
communicated information is a statement of fact, that 
it's not a statement of opinion. I don't think it's 
anything more than a ~tatement of opinion. I think it 
ia an exaggeration, I think it's hyperbole, and I don't 
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ERIK P. SMITH, Attorney at Law 
ERIK P. SMITH, P.C. 
311-B Coeur d'Alene Avenue 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Tel. (208) 667-2000 
Fax(208)765-9110 
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Attorney for Defendants 
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STATt. Of 
~lY 
flEO: 
#635 P.002/006 
2011 JAN IO AM ~ 1 3S 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE Of IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS !RISH and WANDA !RISH, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JEFFREY E. HALL and DONA F. HALL, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
) Case No: CV 15-5814 
) 
) 
) 
) MOTION TO STRIKE A PORTION OF 
) PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO 
) DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF 
)ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______________ ) 
COMES NOW, the above-named Defendants, JEFFREY HALL AND 
OONA HALL, by and through their attorney of record, Erik P. Smith, and 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d), 54(e), and 12(f) move this Court for an Order striking 
certain portions of Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Memorandum of Attorney 
Fees and Costs. 
1. The Defendants move to strike all but the first sentence of the 
Plaintiffs' Objection, filed on or about December 23, 2016. 
2. Plaintiffs' Objection improperly states that, "as a matter of law, 
Defendants are not entitled to submit any claim for attorney fees or 
MOTION TO STRIKE • l 
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costs." I.R.C.P. 54(e) makes it clear that "in any civil action the court 
may award reasonable attorney fees, including paralegal fees, to the 
prevailing party." Under l.R.C.P. 54(d), costs are also allowed as a 
matter of right to the prevailing party if a Memorandum of Costs is 
submitted. Since a Memorandum of Costs was properly submitted, 
Defendants are entitled to request reasonable costs and attorney fees 
as the prevailing party. 
3. Plaintiffs' Objection also improperly argues and submits Impermissible 
evidence that "defamation evidence [was] established at trial." This 
accusation does not address simply whether a prevailing party should 
be awarded attorney fees. When the judge decides a question for 
directed verdict, "the question is not whether there is literally no 
evidence supporting the party against whom the motion is made, but 
whether there is substantial evidence upon which the jury could 
properly find a verdict for that party." Mann v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 95 
Idaho 732, 736 (1974). 
4. Plaintiffs' Objection also improperly argues that "no legal authority 
exists or was cited by Defendants [and] Defendants failed to comply 
with IRCP 54(d)(4)." As stated above and in the Defendants' 
Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs, legal authority exists, was 
cited to, and complied with (I.R.C.P. 54(d) and (e)}. 
MOTION TO STRIKE - 2 
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5. Now, subsequent to Plaintiffs' Objection, the Defendants may file a 
Motion and Memorandum seeking the award of attorney fees and 
costs. 
6. The Plaintiff should have merely filed an objection to the 
Memorandum. The remaining argument and alleged evidence is 
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, and scandalous in the face of the 
Court's directed verdict and should be stricken pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
12(f). 
DATED this day of January, 2017. 
ERIK P. S 1TH, 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the __ day of January, 2017, a true copy of the 
foregoing was; 
{ J mailed postage prepaid to: 
[ ] inter-office: 
[] faxed to: 
Mische!le R. Fulgham 
601 E. Front Street. Suite 502 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Fax: 664-4125 
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MISCHELLE R. FULGHAM. lSB #4623 
LUKINS & ANNIS. P.S. 
601 E. Front S~ct. Suite 303 
Coeur d'Alene. ID 83814-5155 
T: 208-667-0517 
F: 509-363-2478 
mfuli;rham(a'llukins.com 
Attomevs for Plaintiff 
Dennis Irish and Wanda Irish 
TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS IRISH and WANDA IRISH, 
husband and wife, 
NO. CV-2015-5814 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MOTION TO DISALLOW ATTORNEYS' 
FEES AND COSTS 
JEFFREY E. HALL and DONA F. HALL. 
husband and wife, 
Defendant. 
Plaintiffs, Dennis Irish and Wanda Irish, respectfully request this Honorable Court to 
disallow the Defendants' claimed attorney fees and costs as requested in Defendants' 
Memorandum of A Uorney Fees and Cos IN. 
Oral argument is requested. 
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DATED this 10th day of January, 2017. 
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LUKINS & ANNIS. P.S. 
Dy 
LLER.1-U 
ISB #4623 
A ttomeys for Plaintiff 
Dennis Irish and Wanda Irish 
CERTIFICATE OF SERV 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1ot11 day of January, 2017, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to a.U counsel 
of record as follows: 
Mr. Erik P. Smith 
Amanda Findlay 
ERTK P. SMITH PC 
311-B Coeur d'Alene A venue 
Coeur d'Alene, 1D 83814 
D 
0 
D 
181 
D 
U.S.Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Telccopy (l·AX): (208) 765-9110 
Email 
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LUKINS & ANNIS. P.S. 
601 E. Front Avenue. Suite 303 
Coeur d'Alene. ID 83814-5155 
Telephone: (208) 667-0517 
Facsimile: (509) 363-2478 
mfulgham@lukins.com 
Attomevs for Appellants 
Dennis Irish and Wanda Irish 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS IRISH and WANDA IRISH, 
husband and wife, 
Appellants, 
v. 
JEFFREY HALL and DONA HALL, 
husband and wife, 
Respondents. 
NO. CV-2015-5814 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Category: L (4) 
Fee: $129.00 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENTS JEFFREY HALL AND DONA HALL, 
HUSBAND AND WIFE AND THEIR ATTORNEY OF RECORD, ERIK P. SMITH, 
AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. Parties: 
a. The Appellants to this action are: DENNIS IRISH and WANDA IRISH, 
husband and wife. Appellants are represented by Mischelle R. Fulgham, 
NOTICE OF APPEAL: 1 
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LUKINS & ANNIS, P.S., 601 Suite 303, Coeur d'Alene, 
83814-51 mfulgham@lukins.com. 
b. The above-named Appellants appeal against following party characterized as 
Respondent here: JEFFREY HALL and 
Respondents are represented by Erik P. Smith, Smith, P .C., 311 Coeur 
d'Alene Ave., Couer d'Alene, Idaho, 83814, epslaw2009@gmail.com. 
2. Designation of Appeal. The above-named Appellants appeal to the Idaho 
Supreme Court from the Judgment entered by the District Court on December 1, 2015, the 
Honorable Cynthia K.C. Meyer presiding, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." 
Therein, the District Court granted Respondents' Motion for a Directed Verdict, took the case 
away from the sitting jury, and dismissed all of Plaintiffs' claims. 
3. Jurisdiction: The above-named Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho 
Supreme Court. The Judgment described in paragraph 2 above is appealable under Idaho 
Appellate Rules, including but not limited to Idaho Appellate Rules 1 l(a)(l) and (5),. 
4. Issues: The issues on appeal shall include, but not be limited to, the following: 
a. Did the District Court error under I.R.C.P. SO(a) in taking the case away from 
the jury and granting a directed verdict by determining that that Respondents' 
published, and WIFI broadcast statements, that "Mayor Wanda Irish is a liar", 
that "the Mayor lies", that the Mayor runs a corrupt government, that Mayor 
Wanda Irish conducts "secret government meetings" in violation of Idaho's 
NOTICE OF APPEAL: 2 
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public meeting laws, that" Mayor Wanda Irish Terrorist," and "She really is a 
Terrorist" were all statements capable of only one meeting? 
b. Did the District Comi error by talcing the case away from the jury and 
determining that all the evidence presented was not susceptible of any finding of 
a defamatory meaning? 
c. Did the District Court error in refusing to draw all reasonable inferences for the 
non-moving party? 
d. Did the District Court error in refusing to grant Appellants' Motion to Reopen to 
allow additional evidence from an additional witness regarding the widespread 
publication of, and the public reaction to, the Respondents' defamatory 
statements published against Appellant Wanda Irish? 
e. Did the District Court error in ruling that the Respondents' statements were not 
statements of facts, were figurative hyperbolic language, were incapable of 
being proved true or false, and were therefore protected First Amendment free 
speech? 
f. Did the District Court error in failing to fully disclose all details of prior 
contact, communications, knowledge and familiarity with the Respondents? 
5. Record. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
6. Transcript. Appellants request the preparation of the following portions of the 
Reporter's Transcript in both hard copy and electric format: 
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a. The Entire Trial Transcript; 
b. Vior Dire Transcript; and 
c. Opening Statement Transcript. 
included in the 
clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Idaho Appellate Rule 
28: 
FILED/ DOCUMENT 
ENTERED 
1. 8/14/15 Verified Complaint for Iniunctive Relief 
2. 8/14/15 Summons to Dona F. Hall 
3. 8/14/15 Summons to Jeffrey E. Hall 
4. 8/24/15 Affidavit of Service 
5. 9/02/15 Notice of Appearance 
6. 9/28/15 Three Day Notice of Intent to Take Default 
7. 10/02/15 Answer to Complaint and Affirmative Defenses 
8. 10/05/15 Scheduling Order 
9. 10/05/15 Notice of Hearing 
10 11/10/15 Notice vacating Hearing 
11 11/10/15 Scheduling Form 
12 11/13/15 Notice of Pre-Trial Conference and Trial 
13 10/07/16 Notice of Appearance 
14 10/31/16 Notice of Change of Address of Plaintiff's Counsel 
15 11/14/16 Defendants' List of Witnesses 
16 11/14/16 Defendants' List of Exhibits 
17 11/15/16 Plaintiffs' List of Witnesses 
18 11/15/16 Plaintiffs' List of Exhibits 
19 11/21/16 Defendants' Amendment to List of Witnesses 
20 11/21/16 Subpoena - Bob Pool 
21 11/21/16 Subpoena - Mark Wag:ner 
22 11/21/16 Subpoena - Don Britton 
23 11/21/16 Subpoena - Joe Cornell 
24 11/21/16 Trial Brief 
25 11/21/16 Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury Instructions 
26 11/21/16 Defendants' Sunolemental Prooosed Jury Instructions 
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27 11/23/16 Trial Brief Plaintiff 
28 11/27/16 Plaintiffs' Suoo]emental Proposed Jury Instructions 
29 12/01/16 Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict 
30 12/01/16 Judgment 
31 12/13/16 Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs 
32 12/23/16 Plaintiffs Objection to Defendants' Memorandum of Attorney Fees 
and Costs 
33 12/23/16 Declaration of Mischelle R. Fulgham in Support of Plaintiff's 
Objection to Defendants' Memorandum of Attornev Fees and Costs 
34 1/10/16 Motion to Strike a Portion of Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' 
Memorandum of Attornev Fees and Costs 
35 1/10/16 Order Striking a Portion of Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' 
Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs 
36 1/10/16 Motion to Disallow Attorneys' Fees and Costs 
8. Certification. Mischelle R. Fulgham, attorney for Appellants, hereby certifies: 
a. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the court reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out 
below: 
Diane Bolan, P.O. Box 9000 Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-9000; 
b. That financial arrangements have been made with Court Reporter Diane Bolan 
for the estimated fee for the preparation of the Reporter's Transcript; and 
payment of the estimated fee. 
c. That the estimated fee for the preparation of the Clerk's Record has been paid. 
d. That the Appellants filing fee has been paid; and 
e. That the service has been made on all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Idaho Appellate Rule 20. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL: 5 
f!Mn\,M 1MMJ!btal vs Jeffrey Hall, etal Docket No. 44794 409 of 590 
DATED 
LUKINS & ANNIS, P.S. 
By 
LER.FULGI 
Attorn'eys for Appellants 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of January, 2017, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to all counsel 
ofrecord as follows: 
Erik P. Smith 
Attorney at Law 
311-B Coeur d'Alene A venue 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
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}ss 
ERIK P. SMITH, Attorney at Law 
ERIK P. SMITH, P.C. 
311-.B Coeur d'Alene Avenue 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Tei. (208) 667 .. 2000 
2016 or.r. ... 1 PH 12: 34 
CLERK OlSfAICT COURl 
Fax (208) 755 .. 9110 
ts.a.N. sooa 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF iDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY Of KOOTENAI 
DENNIS IRISH. et ai, 
Plair-.tlffs, 
vs. 
JEFFREY HALL., et* al, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV 16-5814 
JUDGMENT 
JUDGMENT IS HEREBY ENTERED as follows: 
Plaintiffs' Complaint and all cra.1ms therein shall be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
DATED this ,-..- day of JJ)~ , 2016. 
JUDGMENT 
Dennis Irish, etal vs Jeffrey Hall, etal Docket No. 44794 
12-01- 1 16 12: 35 FROM-Koo' ·; Dist Court 208-446-1188 T-4 73 P0002/0004 F-260 
.,, Frni,.:Erik P. S1ith 12087659110 11/30/20. 11:27 1382 P.005/005 
CERTIFICATE f MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 
the foregoing wae: 
[ J malled postage prepaid to: 
[] inter .. offiee: 
[X l faxed to: 
MileheHe R. Fulgham 
Lukins & Anni$ 
601 E. Front Streat. Ste 303 
Coeurd'Alene, 1D83814 
Fax: 509-363-2478 
EnkP. Smith 
Attorney ~t Law 
607 lakeside Avenue 
Coeur d'Alene. ro 83814 
Fax: 765-9110 
JUDGMENT 
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day of November, 2016, a true copy of 
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12-01-' 16 12: 35 FROM-Koo· 
, "'f roa;'t r i k P. Smith 
~; Dist Court 208-446-1188 T-473 P0003/0004 F-260 
12087659110 11/30/Wh 1:U fJ!ja; r.uu.::rnu-1 
ERIK P. SMITH, Attorney at Law 
ERIK P. SMITH, P.C. 
311-B Coeur d'Alene Avenue 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Tel. (208) 867-2000 
Wl60F.C - f PH 12: :,~ 
OLER!< Ol8TR1CT COURl' 
fm~ 
Fax (208) 765w911 o 
I.S.B.N. 6008 
8N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THI! FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT Of THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THI! COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS §RISH, et al, 
Plaintiff&, 
vs. 
CASE NO. CV 16-6814 
ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
DIRECTED VERDICT 
JEFFREY HALL, et. 11, 
Defendants. 
Thie matter oomlng for trial oommencing Nov•mber 28, 2016, the 
Plaintiff1, DENNIS IRISH, at al, prer.;ent with their oounsel, Misohelle R. Fulgham, 
and the Defendants. JEFFREY HALL, et. al. afso present with their 001.ulsel, Erik 
P. Smith. At the close of Plaintiffs' case, the Court rnceivad the Defendants' 
Motion pursuant to I.R.C.P. 50 and taking It 1.mder consideration. Thereafter the 
Court pfaoed lts findings of fact and com::iluslona of law on the record. NOW 
THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
The Defendants' Motion for Dlre~ted Verdict thall be gr1mted. 
,.. . /J . 
DATEDthls /• dayof_~-~-----•2016. 
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r hereby certify that on the ..!SfJ day of November, 2016, a true copy of 
the foregoing was: 
[ J mail~d postage pr6paid to: 
[] Inter-office: · 
IX J fixed to: 
Mischalle R. Fulgham 
Lukins & Annis 
601 E. Front Street, Ste 303 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Fax: 609-363-2476 
Erik P. Smith 
Attorney at law 
607 lakeside Avenue 
Coeurd'Alene, ID 83814 
Fax: 765K911 O 
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Frvm:Eri~ P. Smith 12087659110 01/20/?017 15:01 #712 P.001/003 
ERIK P. SMITH, Attorney at Law 
ERIK P. SMITH, P.C. 
311-B Coeur d'Alene Avenue 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Tel. (208) 667-2000 
Fax (208) 765-9110 
ISBN 5008 
Attorney for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY Of KOOTENAI 
CASE NO. CV 15-5814 
DENNIS IRISH and WANDA IRISH, 
husband and wife, REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD 
Appellants, 
vs, 
JEFFREY HALL and DONA HALL, 
husband and wife, 
Respondents. 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED APPELLANTS AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY, AND 
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the 
Respondents in the above entitled proceeding hereby request pursuant to Rule 19, 
I.A.R, the inclusion of the following material in the clerk's record in addition to that 
required to be included by the I.AR. and the notice of appeal. 
1. Clerk's Record: 
• Scheduling Order filed 11/13/2015 
• Subpoena on Matt Edmonds filed 11/21/2016 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD - 1 
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2. I certify that a copy of this request was served upon the clerk of the district 
court and upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20. 
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ERIK P. SMITH 
Attorney for Respondents 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ~day of January, 2017, a true copy of the foregoing was: 
[ J mailed postage prepaid to: 
[ ] inter-office: 
faxed to: 
Mischelle R. Fulgham 
Attorney at Law 
601 E. Front Street, Suite 502 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Fax: 664-4125 
RFQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD - 3 
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MlSCHELLE R. FULGHAM. lSB #4623 
JACOB R. BRENNAN. !SB #9547 
LUKINS & ANNIS. P.S. 
601 E. Front Avenue Suite 303 
Coeur d'Alene. ID 83814-5155 
Teleohone: (208) 667-0517 
Facsimile: (208) 664-4125 
Attomevs for Plaintiffs 
Dennis and Wanda Irish 
IN THE DISTR1CT COURT OF TIIE FIRST JUD1C1AL DlSTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO> IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAT 
DENNIS IRISH and WANDA IRISH. husband 
and wife? 
NO. CV 2015-5814 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
DECLARATION OF WANDA IRISH 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
TNJUNCTTON 
JEFFREY HAT,J, and DONA HALL, husband 
and wife, 
Defendants. 
1, Wanda Irish, make the following Declaration: 
1. I am a Plaintiff in the above captioned case. am over the age of 18, and am 
otherwfae competent to make I.his declaration which is bastid on my own 
personal knowledge. 
2. I am the Mayor of Hamson, Tdaho. I have a home in Hamson, ldaho and l have 
an office in the Harrison City Hall. 
DECLARATION 01.- WANDA lRJSH IN SUPPORT Of 
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3. On Ocloher 27, 2016, Jeff Hall came to my office at Harrison City Hall, 
regarding non-government business. Ilis presence was solely to accost me 
personally about this defamation lawsuit, which is based on his acts of 
pubHcally broadcasting lhal Jam a "terrnrist'' and a uliar." When he came to 
City Hall on October 27, 2016, Defendant Jeff Hall threatened me about the 
pending defamation litigation. He demanded that r dh:miss the slander and 
defamation case that was set to go to jury trial against him. lf l did not 
dismiss lhe case against Mm, lhen he threatened to lake crlmirwJ action 
against my husband Demus Irish. Defendant Jeff Hall specifically and 
expressly lhrealened and tried lo blackmail me, stating lhut he would 
"reopen" the stalking case against Dennis if this defamation case was not 
dismis~ed by me. 
4. On January 11, 2017 at 9:30 a.m.; Defendant Jeff Hall again came to City 
Hall on m.m-govemment business. He handed the City Treasurer a letter . 
from my attorney regarding this defamation case and appeal. As he handed 
her the letter, Defendant Jeff Hall said to her "The Mayor is a liar." I told 
him to leave and I to]d him to direct all communications regarding the 
defamation case and the appeal through the attorneys of record. 
5. On January 11, 2017, at 3:37 pm, Defendant Jeff Hall again came Lo my 
office without an appointment and unannounced. He was extremely 
agitated, emotional, and visibly upset that there was an appeal filed in this 
matter. He demanded payment of his attorney fees. He repeatedly claimed 
DECLARATION OF WANDA TRISH IN SUPPORT OF 
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that "he just wanted to be reimbursed for his legal fees". While in the City 
Hall, Defendant Jeff Hall stated that l needed to make him an offer on his 
legal fees and write him a check. He threatened me by staling "if you don't 
pay me, then rm going to sue you and I'm going to have a talk with your 
husband." Defendant Jeff Hall then stated to me that he had the judge and 
prosecutor in his "back pocket" and he was going to reopen the criminal 
case and he would "win no matter what." Jeff Hall said he knew the judge 
and he knew that she had campaigned for .new attorney fee laws that would 
take affect in March 2017. He said the judge would use her influence and 
the new law to award him all of hi.s attorney fees. I told him to leave my 
office and I again told him to only communicate through the lawyers. 
6. Dwfog this J rumury 11 visit, Jeff Hall also stated that the had "no choice" 
but to come to City Hall because he had stopped by my house "sevor:q.l 
times" but that no one was home. Although I have repeatedly asked Jeff Hall 
to stop contacling me, l no tonger feel sale in my own home because Jeff 
Hall has stated and admitted that he has repeatedly attempted to confront me 
there ''several time~." There is no place that is safe from him, 
7. 1 now feared for my safety as a result of these repeated and surprise visits to 
City Hall and to my home, especially because Jeff Hall was visibly upset, 
hostile, and agitated. I had previously told Jeff Hall to direct an 
communications about the lawsuit to my lawyer and not to contact roe or 
Dennis directly, yet he continued to show up and threaten me. 
DECLARATION OF WANDA HUSH IN SUPPORT OF 
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8. On January 12, 2017 at 5:04 p.m., my attorney foxed a letter (dated January 
11, 2017), to Jeff Hall's attorney stating "Jeffrey Hall is again confronting, 
threalening, and harassing my client, Wanda Trish ... I kindly request that 
you advise your client to send aU communications through you ... Ile should 
stop going to my client's home. He should stop going to my client's office." 
A true and correct copy of this letter is attached as Exhibit "A," 
Unfortunately, however, this Jetter from my aHomey, attached as Exhibit A, 
only empowered Defendant Jeff Han to become more violent, menacing, and 
harassing towards me. 
9. On January 12, 2017, at 3:29 pm, Jeff HaH again called me on my cellular 
phone. Based on our prior interactions, I was fearful of further threats, 
harassment, and intimidation by Jeff Hall, and I did not pick up the call. I 
had told Jeff Hall several times to stop calling and contacting me directly. I 
wanted him to go through the attorneys of record. Undeterred, Jeff Hall left 
a voice message on my ce11 phone, stating that said he wanted lo speak with 
me and he wanted to save money "by not dealing with attorneys." 
10. On Friday January 13, 2017 at 2:06 PM, J rtict:ived another phone call from 
Jeff HalPs cell phone number. 1 know Jeff Hall's cell phone number and 1 
rec(1gnized it on my ceH phone. My hu::.band answered and a man who 
sounded like Jeff Hall asked for "Rick" and then immediately hung up. 
11. As a result of these actions by the Defendant, his prior threatening behavior 
against me, by letter dated January 17, 20 l 7., my attorney again requested 
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that Defendant Jeff HaH leave me alone. A true and correct copy of this 
second letter is attached hereto as Exhibit "B." 
12. On January 17, 2017, Jeff Hull again came to where T work (Harrison City 
HaU) for the sole purpose of harassing, embarrassing, and attacking me. Jeff 
Hall came into City Han al approximately 5:20pm. CHy Hall was closed at 
this time, except for a Harrison Urban Renewal Agency (HURA) 
Meeting which was Laking place. Jeff Hall approached me in a:n outer office 
of City Hall, with of copy of the January 17 letter from my attorney, stating 
he wanted lo make sure Lhe City Clerk received a copy. I told Jeff Han this 
was not City business and asked him to leave. Jeff Hall then proceeded to 
walk into the HURA met,ting, interrupting the speakers and attendees. Jeff 
Hall then loudly stated that he wanted everyone to know that I was lying 
ab,lut him. I again asked Jeff Han to leave, wl,ich prompted him to pull out 
his cell phone and shove it into my face, saying he is recording 
"everything." JefflfoU then swung his arm and hand holding the phone just 
inches from my face. I was scared he was going to hit me in the face with 
the phone as he swung it at me. In a defensive reflex, I instinctively reacted 
by grabbing his phone, just before he hit me in the face. He kt go of the 
phone and! wound up holding Jeff Hall's phone, which was returned to him 
by a witness who intervened ttl prolecl me and lo deescalate Jeff Hall's 
aggression. Three Kootenai County Sheriff's Deputies responded to this 
incident, took statements, and lefl. 
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13. Jeff Hall's intimidation of and interference with my work as Mayor has only 
continued. Later on January 17, 2017, Jeff Han and his wife Donna emailed 
a copy of my attorney's January 11 letter (requesting Jeff Hall to refrain 
from violent and threatening behavior and contacting Plaintiff directly) to 
the Harrison City Clerk. Again, this has nothing to do with City business, 
but is for the sole purpose of the Dcfondant Hall's harassing mo. 
t 4. Tam fearful for my safety, and I have had many sJeepless nights worded 
about the constant and incessant harassment, stalking, verbal abuse, battery 
,md near assault, that T have suffered at the hands of Jeff Hall. 
15. Jeff Hall has been repeatedly told by my attorney and me, to cease and desist 
from his repeated and unwelcome conduct, aU to no effect. 
16. Jeff Hall has stated that he has repeatedly visited my home and has 
repeatedly attempted to contact me there. Ile has repeatedly contacted me at 
work regarding matters entirely unaffiliated with the City of Harrison, and 
he has used the telephone and email to armoy, harass, and intimidate me. 
17. On January 17, 2017, Defondanl Jeff Hall nearly hH me in the face with his 
hand and his cell phone. 
18. An hljunclion is the only way I wm be safe from Jeff HaWi,; physical und 
verbal abuse, threats, harassment, and intimidation at home, work, and on 
the phone. T request that the Court order him to stay away from me and to 
direct all contact through the attorneys in this case. 
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I certify Uttder penalty of perjury under the 1awa of the State of Idaho that the foregoing 
m true and ~ 
I HBREBY CERTIFY that on the January, 2017, I caused re be served a tnu: 
and ~ copy of the foreaoing by the method lndlcated below, and addressed to all oou:mel 
or xuord as follows: 
Erik P. Smith 
Attomey at Law 
311-B Coeur d'Alene Avenue 
Coetn"d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
CJ 
CJ 
1 
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I LUKH~S&ANIN~S I HTORl'HU 
Via Fax and email 
Janum:y 11, 2017 
Mr. ErikP. Smith 
ERIK P. SMITH PC 
311-B Coeur d'Alene Avenue 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Re: Irish v. Hall 
601 , J ont A venue, S\tlte 303 
Coeur d' .Akne, m 83814 5155 
l 208-667-0517 
f 208-664-4125 lukintLC(.lm 
MISCI IEl.T .. F., R FULGHAM 
Admitted In: Idaho & Washington 
mfulgham@lukiM.wm 
Dire.ct Fax: (208) 666-4113 
Please Advise Client to Communicate Through His Attorney of Record 
Dear Erik: 
H has come to my attention that your client, Jeffrey Hall, is again confronting, threatening, and 
harassing my client, Wanda hish. He was warned by Judge Meyer that his reprehensible 
conduct towards Mrs, Irish needed to stop, but he has failed and refused to heed the Judge's 
directive. 
i kindly request that yuu ad vise yom client to send aU communications through you, as his 
attomey of record. HI:! should stop going to my client's home. He should slop going to my 
client's office. 
I£ we must seek a restraining order, then we will do so, but I am making this request directly to 
you as his attorney, before filing with the Court. All communications should go through the. 
attorneys of record. 1f the Defendant refuses, then injm1.ctivc relief will be requested. 
Very truly, 
01~9~s Irish, etal vs Jeffrey Hall, etal 
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I lUK~NS&ANN~S I ATfOiUEH 
Via Fax and email 
January 1?, 2017 
Mr. Erik P. Smith 
ERTK P. SMITH l>C 
311-B Coeur d'Alene Avenue 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Re: Irish v. Han 
60.1. )Front Avenue, Suite 303 
Cvl.!ur u' Al1:i111:!, m s:18"14-,,'i'ISS 
t 208-667-0517 
f 208·664-4125 Juklns.oom 
MISCHELLE R. FULGHAM 
Adm.iU!:\d In: Idaho & Washingron 
mfulgham@lukU\!J.COm 
Direct Fax: (208) 666-4113 
More Hostile Conduct by Jeff Hall 'lhrcatening Wanda Irish 
Restraining Order 
Dear Erlk: 
Wdl, that did not take long. 
Since my letter to you of 1/11/17, your client, Jeff HaU, has made things worse for my dient, 
Wanda Irish. Instead of properly directing aU communications through the attorneys of record, 
as requested in my letter to you, Jeff HaU's harassment of Wanda has increased and hls 
threatening behavior has escalated. 
Today Jeff Hall stormed into City Hall. He was yelling at the City Treasurer about Wanda Irish. 
His hostile, aggressive, and threatening behavior so upset the City Treasurer, that she has been 
unable to resume her work functions all day. Jeff was angry about my letter asking that 
communications occur between the attorneys. In response to my letter, Jeff Hall was retaliating 
against Wanda and her staff at the City of Harrison. This erratic, hostile, and threatening 
behavior is exactly why Jeff Hall needs to direct all of his communications through counsel, and 
he must cease all direct contact wlth my dient. He should immediately stop coming to her 
wo.rkplace. 
Jeff Hall also repeatedly calls Wanda 1rish' s phone, even though she has told him to cease this 
conduct He did this again on Friday, 1/13/17. After the absolutely filthy names Jeff Hall called 
Mrs. Irish on the phone, it is reasonable and safe fo:r her to refuse to answer his calls. He should 
stop calling her. 
Erik, as an officer of the court, you should also be aware that Jeff Hall is making statements 
about his insight, relationship, and contact with Judge Myer. He daims to know her and he 
Dennis lr!sh, etal vs Jeffrey Hall, etal Docket No. 44794 I 
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RE: Jeff Hall Threats, Harassment, and Restraining Order 
claims to have talked to her, outside of the courtrnom, about her ruling~ in this case, I am 
concerned about his claimed contact with the Judge and why he would be telling Wanda Irish 
about his relationship with Judge Meyer. We may need to bring th.ls to the Court's attention. I 
very much doubt there is any truth to what Jeff Hall is saying. Judge Meyer is a professional 
and. she is not likely to talk to him about this pending case, but nonetheless, I l:.hink she needs to 
be advised of Hall's stat:ements about her and what he is claiming about their contact. What are 
your thoughts on the best way lo handle this disclosure with Judge M~yer prior to the hearing 
on2/14? 
Finally, since this mattt!r il:i now on appeal jurisdiction for the tdal court is djvested. We may 
file a separate action for the injunctive relief and restraining order against Jeff Hall. His 
threatening actions today are completdy unacceptable. He appears completely incapable of 
controlllng himself and he must be held accountable. Filing a new action against Jeff Hall, to be 
heard by another judge, will render any ex parte contact he claims to have with Judge Meyer 
irrelevant. 
Cc: djents 
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Attomevs for Plaintiffs 
Dennis and Wanda Irish 
1N THE DISTRICT COURT 01" THE fl..RST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 01' THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS 1R1SH and WANDA lRlSH, husband 
and wifo, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
NO. CV 2015-5814 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR INnJNCTION 
JEFFREY HALL and DONA HALL, husband 
and wife., 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs DENNIS IRISH and WANDA IRISH. husband and wife, by and through their 
attorneys, Lukins & Annis, P.S., submit this Memorandum in Support oflhelr Motion !or an 
Injunction pursuant to 1.R.C.P. Rule 65(a) and (e)(2). 
Aller PfaintHls rested their case at trial, the Court granted Defendant's motion for a 
directed verdict dismissing this defamation and injunction case as a matter of law. 1n doing so, 
however, the Court cautioned Defendant Jeff Han regarding his reprehensible and shameful 
conduct in harassing and threatening Plaintiff. 
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fo spite of the Court's warning, however, Defendants have not only continued their 
constant harassment, but Defendant Jeff Hall recently instigated a physical attack of Plaintiff 
Wanda Irish at her place of work which resulted in three Kootenai County Sheriffs responding to 
the assault. Clearly, Defendant's personal vendetta against Plaintiffs knows no bounds. 
Plaintiffs disagree with the Court's dismissal. However, instead of resorting to intimidation 
and foar Lactic~ like Defendants, Plaintiffs have filed an appeal of the Court's decision. Because of 
the violent and non-stop harassment to which Plaintiff is subject, which now includes physical 
violence hy Defendant, Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court enter an injunction to preserve the 
peace and prevent future acts of violence while Plaintiffs' appeal is pending. 
I. BACKGROUND1 
Although the Cow.t is familiar with Jeff and Dona IIaU' s long history of threats, 
intimidation, and harassment towards Plaintiff Wanda Irlsh1 recently Defendant Jeff Hall's threats 
have increased. 
On Octob~r 27, 2016, Jeff Hall came tn Plaintiff's place of work (Harrison City Han) 
regarding non-government business. His presence was solely to accost Plaintiff about this 
lawsuit. Defendant Jeff Hull threatened Wanda Trish about the pljnd-ing litigation. He 
demanded that she dismiss the slander and defamation case set to go to trial against him, and 
if she did not, then he threatened criminal action against Plaintiff's husband Dennis Trish. 
Del'bndanl Jeff Ha.JI tried to blackmail Plaintiff Wanda Irish, stating that he would "reopenn 
the criminal stalking case against Dennis Irish if she did not dismiss the defamation case 
aguin:-;t him. 
l AU facts herein are taken from the Declaration of Wanda Irish in Support of injunction filed 
contemporaneously herewith. 
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On January 11, 2017 at 9:30 a.m., Defendant Jeff Hall again came to City Hall on mm-
government business. He handed the City Treasurer a letter from Plaintiffs, attorney 
regarding this defamation case and appeal. As he handed her the letter, Defendant Jeff Hall 
said to the City Treasurer, "The Mayor is a liar." Plaintiff toid him to leave and to direct all 
co.1:rummicatlons regarding; the defamation case and the appeal through the attorneys. 
On January 11, 2017, at 3:37 pm, Defondanl JeffHaJl again came tn Plaintiff'~ office 
without an appointment and unannounced. He was extremely agitated, emotional, and visibly 
upset that Lhere was an appeal filed in Lhis matter. He demanded payment <,if his aUorm:y feet.;. 
He repeatedly claimed that "he just wanted to be reimbursed for his legal fees." While in the 
Cily Hall, Defendant Jeff HaH slated lhat Plaintiff needed to make hhn an offer on his le~al 
fees and write him a check, and threatened her by stating "if you don't pay me l going to sue 
you and T'm going to hav~ a talk with your husband." 
Jeff Hall then stated that he had the judge and prosecutor in his "back pocket" and he 
was going to "win no matter what." Jeff Hall said he knew tho judge and he knew that she 
had campaigned for new attorney fee laws that would take affect in March 2017. He said 
because he knew the judge, she would use the new law to award him all of his fees. Plaintiff 
Lnld him to leave her ofnce and to only communicate through lhe lawyers. 
During this January 11 visit, Jeff Hall also stated that he had "no choice,, but to come 
to City HaH because he had already stopped by Plai11ti ff' s house "several time:s." He said he 
had been to Plaintiffs house "several times" but every time he went to her home. no one was 
there. Plaintiff no longer feels safe in her own home because Defendant Jeff Hall has clearly 
attempted to confront her there. I];lcrc is no place for Wanda Irish that is safe from Defendant 
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JeffHalJ's threats and abuse. Plaintiff feared for her safety as a result of these unannounced 
surprise visits, especially because she had previously told Jeff Hall to direct all 
communications about the lawsuit to Plaintiff's lawyer and not to contact Plaintiff or her 
husband directly. 
Finally on January 12, 2017 at 5:04 p.m., Plaintiff's attorney, MischeBe R. Fulgham, 
faxed a letter (dated January t 1, 2017), to Jeff Hall's attorney, Erik Smith stating as follows: 
It l1as ctlme lo my attention that your client, Jeffrey Hall, is again 
confronting, threatening, and harassing my client., Wanda Irish. He was warned by 
Judge Meyer that his reprehensible conduct towards Mrs. lrish needed to stop, but 
he has failed and refused to heed the Judge's directive. 
1 kindly request that you advise your client to send all communications 
through you, as his attorney of record. He should stop going to my cilenfs home. 
He should slop going to my cUenl's omce. 
If we must seek a restraining order, then we will do so, but 1 am making this 
request directly to you as his attorney, before filing with the Court. All 
communications should go through the attorneys of record. Ir the Defendant 
refuses, then injunctive relief will be requested. 
See Exldhit A to Wanda lrish Declaration in Support of Motion for J~jum:tion, Leuer dated 
January JI, 2017 to Defendants' attorney Erik Smith 
Unforhmalely, however, this January 11 letter, Exhibit A, only empowered Defendant 
Jeff IlalJ to become more violent, menacing, and harassing towards Plaintiff. 
On January 12, 2017, at 3:29 pm, Defondanl Jeff Han again caHed Plaintiff on her 
cellular phone. Based on their prior interactions, Plaintiff was fearful of further threats, 
harassment, and intimidation by Jeff HaH, and did not pick up the can. Plaintiff had also told 
Jeff HaU several times to stop calling and contacting her. Undeterred, Jc.ff Hall left a voice 
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message that ~aid he wanted to speak with Plaintiff and he wanted to save mcmey "by not 
dealing with attorneys. 1' 
On Friday January 13, 2017 at 2:06 PM1 Plaintiff received another phone call from Jeff 
HalJ'!} cell phone number, Plaintiff Dennis Trish an~wered und a man who sounded like Jeff 
HaH asked for "Rick" and then immediately hung up. 
As a re~ult of these actions, and the continuation or his prior threate11ing behavior, by 
letter dated January 17, 2017, Plaintiffs attorney again requested that Defendant Jeff Hall 
leave Wan<la Irish alone. See Exhibit B w Wanda lri.\·h Declaration in Support <~fMotionfi>r 
l11junction, Letter dated January 17, 2017 to Defendants' attorney Erik Smith. 
The January 17, 2017 letter to Defendants' attorney Erik Smith, Exhibit B, states as 
follows: 
Since my letter to you of 1/11/1 7, your client, Jeff HalJ, has made things worse for 
my client, Wanda Trish. Instead of properly directing all commu:nicatfom, through 
the attorneys of record., as requested in my letter to you, Jeff Hall's harassment of 
Wanda has increased and his threatening behavior has escalated. 
Today Jeff Hall stormed into City Han. He was yelling at the CHy Treasurer about 
Wanda Irish. His hostile, aggressive, and threatening behavior so upset the City 
Treasurer, that she has been unable to resume her work functions aU day. Jeff was 
angry about my letter asking that communications occur between the attorney;:;. Tn 
response to my letter, Jeff Hall was retaliating against Wanda and her staff at the 
City of Harrison. lhis erratic, hostile, and threatening behavior is exactly why Jeff 
Hall needs to direct all of his communications thl'ough counseJ, and he must cease 
all direct contact with my cHent. He should immediately stop cr,ming to her 
workplace. 
JeffffaH also repeatedly calls Wanda Irish's phone, even though she has told him to 
cease this conduct He did this again on Friday, 1/13/17. After the absolutely tilthy 
names Jeff Hall called Mrs . .Irish on the phone, it is reasonable and safe for her to 
refuse to answer his calls. He should stop calling her. 
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Erik., as an officor of the court, you should also be aware that Jeff Hall is making 
statements about his insight, relationship, and contact with Judge Myer. He claims 
lo know her and he claims to have talked to her, outside of the courtroom, about her 
rulings in this case. 1 am concerned about his claimed contact with the Judge and 
why he would be telling Wanda Trish about his relationship with Judge Meyer, We 
may need to bring this to the Court's attention. I very much doubt there is any truth 
to what Jeff Hall is saying. Judge Meyer is a professional and she is not likely to 
talk to him about this pending case, but nonetheless, T think she needs to be advised 
of Hall's statements about her and what he is claiming about their contact. What 
are your thoughts on the best way to handle this disclosure with Judge Meyer prior 
to the hearing on 2/14? 
See Exhibit B to Wanda Irish Declaration in Support of Motion for Injunction. Letter dated 
January 17, 20 J 7 to Defendants' attorney Erik Smith 
On January 17, 2017, at appmximately 5:20pm, Jeff Han again came angrily storming 
into Harrison City Hall. He was not there for City business but instead for the sole purpose of 
harassing, embarrassing, threatening, and attacking Plaintiff It was after 5:00 p.m. and the 
Harrison City Hall was closed at this time, except for a Harrison Urban Renewal Agency 
(HURA) Meeting that wus tak,ng place. Jeff Han approached Plaintiff in an outer uffice or 
City Hall, with of copy of the January l 7 letter from Plaintiff's attorney, stating he wanted to 
make sure the City Clerk received a copy. Plaintiff told Jeff IfaH this was not City business 
and asked him to leave. Jeff Hall then proceeded to walk into the HURA meeting, interrupting 
the speakers and attendees. Defendant then loudly stated that he wanted everyone to know 
that Mayor Trish was "lying about him." PlainU ff again asked Jeff Hall to leave the HURA 
meeting and to leave the premises. Defendant Hall refused and instead Defendant HaU pulled 
out hh; cell phone and shoved it int<> Plaintiff's face, ~aying ht: is recording "everylhing." 
Defendant Jeff HaH then swung his arm and swung his hand that was holding the phone at 
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Plaintiff Wanda Irish's face, which cu.used her to protect herself. Wanda Trish defensively 
reacted. blocked incoming blow, and grabbed Jeff Hall's oncoming phone, just as it barely 
missed striking her in the face. Defendant Jeff Hall pulled back his hand and Plaintiff wound 
up holding Jeff Hall's phone, which was returned to him by a witness who intervened to 
protect Wanda Irish and to deescalate Hall's physical aggression and assault against Wanda 
Irish. Three Kootenai County Sherif-rs deputies responded to this incident~ though no arrest 
was made. 
Jeff Hall's intimidation of and interference with Plaintiffs work has only continued. 
Later on January 17, 2017, Jeff Hall and his wife Donna emailed a copy of the January 11 
letter (requesting JeffIIaU to refrain from violent and threatening behavior and contacting 
Plaintiff) from Plaintiff's attorney to the Harrison City Clerk. Again, this has nothing to do 
with City business, but is for the sole purpose of the Han's harassing Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff Wanda Irish is fearful of her safety_, and has had many sleepless nights 
worried about the constant and incessant harassment. stalking, and verbal abuse she suffers at 
the hands r,f Defendants. Defendant Jeff Hall has been repeatedly to1d by Plaintiff Wanda 
Irish and her attorney, to cease and desist from his repeated and unwelcome conduct, to no 
effect Defendant .Jeff Hall has approached Plaintiff's house, contacted h~r at work regarding 
matters entirely unaffiliated with the City of Harrison, and has used the telephone and email 
to annoy, harass, arid intimidate 'Plaintiff, Au injum;;th.m is the only way Wanda Irish wrn 
finaUy be safe from Jeff Hall's abuse, threats, intimidation, and violence at home, work, and 
on the phone. 
It is rcspcctfuUy requested that this Court so order. 
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II. REQUESTED 
Plaintiff seeks issuance of an injunction to prevent Defendants from committing the 
following acts: 
1. AUempUng to make contact wilh Plaintiffs through electronic means, including, but not 
limited to: phone calls, emails, social media contact; 
2. Coming within 50 foal of Plaintiff Wanda Trish's work unless on official City business; 
. 3. Coming within SO feet of Plaintiffs, real property, home, or residences; 
4. AHempling to use m~mbers of the general public to communicate with Plaintiffs; 
S. Making threatening and harassing statements to Plaintiff Wand a Irish; and 
6. Making threatening and harassing statements to others pertaining to Plaintiff Wanda 
lrish. 
TIT. l.EGAL ARGUMRNT AND AUTHORITY 
"Whether to grant or deny a preliminary injunction is a matter for the discretion of the trial 
court." Walker v. Boozer, 140 Idaho 45 l, 95 P .3d 69 (2004), citing Brady v. Cily of Homedale, 130 
Idaho 569. 512, 944 P.2d 704, 707 (1997). 
:Even if the facts are in dispute, the granting of a preliminary or temporary injunction is within 
the sound discretion of the court. White v. Coeur d'Alene Big Creek Mining Co., 56 ldaho 282, 55 
P.2d 720 (1936). 
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A District Court may issue an injunction "when it appears by the complaint or affidavit that the 
commission or continuance of some acl during the litigation would produce waste, or great or 
irreparable injury to the plaintiff." I.R.C.P. 65(c) (2). A District Court's grant of injunctive relief 
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Mountain States Tel. & tel. Co. v. Jones, 75 Idaho 78, 86 
(1954). injunctions can be granted under Tdaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65(e) (2), where the injury 
is "great" or "im,parable". As stated in Meyer v. Fir.~·t Nat'l Bank, 10 Idaho t 75, 181, 77 P. 334, 
336 (1904): 
The contention of defendants that plaintiffs have an adequate remedy by an 
action at law, and cannot, therefore, resort to an equitable remedy, is not well 
founded. It is true that they have their remedy for damages, but under our statute, 
section 4288, Revised Statutes, a party i.s not under the necessity of waiting tm 
his property has been damaged and destroyed, and his business disorganized, and 
his premises encroached upon to the extent of his own ouster, and then resorting 
to an action at law for redress. In Staples v. Rossi, 7 Idaho, 618, 65 Pac. 67 
p 901 J, ihis court laid down lhe rule under our statute as follows: "Injunctions 
will issue to restrain temporarily an act which will result in great damage to the 
plaintiff, although the injury is not irreparable, and notwithstanding that other 
remedies He in behaJf of plaintiff." 
Both threat of injury and nuisances have been held to be sufficiently damaging to a plaintiff to 
war.rant an injunction. Save Our Summers et al., v. Washington, 132 F.Supp.2d 896, 905 (E.D. 
Wash. 1999) ("The risk of physical injury from continued field burning is sufficient to establish a 
risk of irreparable hann."), Mad~en v. Women's Health Center, In,·., 512 U.S. 753, 774, 114 S. Ct. 
2516 (1994) (First Amendment does not prohibit an injunction where mfighting words' or 
throats ... Lor] threat of physical harm,, are employed), but see Schreck v. Village ,iCoeur d'.Alene, 
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12 Idaho 708 (1906) (District Court erred in denying injm1ction where dump omitted odors 
offending health and comfort of plaintiff). 
The facts as set forth in the Declaration of Wanda Iri::.h as well as the Verified Complaint 
establish that Plaintiffs are entitled to iajunctive relief pursuant to I.R.C.P. 65(e). Defendant Jeff 
Hall has nol only continued his reprehensible conduct, his menacing threats, and his abuse by 
verbal and telephonic contuct with Plaintiff. but has now physically accosted Wanda Irish at her 
place of work. 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court grant their Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction by entering an order enjoining the Defendants from contacting_, harassing, 
or threatening Plaintiffs throughout the duration of the appeal and thrnugh the final disposition of 
this action. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing1 Plaintiffs respectfully request lhe Court grant their Motion for an 
injunction. 
DATED this 24th day of January, 2017. 
LUKINS & ANNIS, P.S. 
By 
ISB 
AHomeys for Plainliffs 
Dennis and Wanda Trish 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTlFY that on the 24th day of January, 2017, 1 caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and. addressed to all counsel of 
record as follows: 
Erik P. Smith 
Attorney at Law 
311 ~ B Coeur d'Alene A venue 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
D 
D 
* 
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Teleohone: (208) 667-0517 
Facsimile: (208) 664-4125 
AHomevs for Plaintiffs 
Dennis and Wanda Irish 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT Of THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS IRISH and WANDA IRISH, husband 
and wife, 
NO. CV 2015-5814 
Plaintiff":>, 
V. 
MOTION FOR !NJ UNCTION PENDING 
APPEAL 
JEFFREY HALL and DONA HALL, husband 
and wife, 
De fondants. 
Pfainliffs DENNIS TRISH and WANDA TRISH, husband and wife, by and through their 
attorneys, Lukins & Annis, P.S., pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 6S(a) and (c)(2) move this Court for 
a Pre1iminary Injunction restraining against Defendants, JEFFREY HALL and DONA HALL, 
husband and wife. This Application is supported by tho statements in the Verified Complaint 
for Injunctive Relief filed August 14, 2015, and Declaration of Plaintiff Wanda Irish, and the 
Exhibits thereto. 
Oral argument is respectfully requested. 
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DATED this 24th day of January, 2017. 
LUKINS & ANNIS, P.S. 
By 
TlFlCATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on tho 24th day of January, 2017, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to aH 
counsel ofrecord us foHows: 
Erik P. Smith 
Attorney at Law 
311-B Coeur d'Alem, Avenue 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
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Facsimile: (208) 664-4125 
Auomevs for Plaintiffs 
Dennis and Wand a lrish 
IN THE DiSTR!CT COURT OP THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS IR!SH and WANDA lR!SH. husband 
and wife, 
NO. CV 2015-.5814 
Plaintiffs. 
v. 
PLAlN11FFS, REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL 
NOTICE OF PROTECT! VE ORDER 
JEFFREY HALL and DONA HALL. husband 
and wifo, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs. Dennis Irish and Wanda Irish submit the foUowing Request jirr Judicial 
Notice of Protective Order i'i.med in CV 17-795. Specifically, the Plaintiffs seek to have this 
Court take judicial notice of the Protection Order signed by Judge Marano (attached hereto as 
Exhibit A). 
Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 20 l ( c ), .Plaintiffs seek to have this Court take 
judicial notice of "records, exhibits, or transcripts from the court file in the same ca..:.e or ~ 
separate ~He .• /' (emphashi added), Based upon I.RE. 201 (c), this Court has discretion 
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whether to take judicial notice or not and Plaintiffs have identified the specific documents or 
items that are requested for judicial notice. 
Plaintiffs Tequesl lhal Defendant Jeff Hall not attend the attorney fee hearing in this 
matter . .Plaintiff Wanda Irish wm be in the Courtroom and Defendant Jeff Han mu~t stay 300 
feet away from her. 
DATED this 25th day of January. 2017. 
LUK1NS & ANNIS, P.S. 
By 
TSB #4623 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Dennis and Wanda Irish 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 25th day of January, 2017, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to an 
counsel of record as follows: 
Erik P. Smith 
Attorney at Law 
311·B Coeur d'Alene Avenue 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
0 
0 
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Protection 
'f'.j-Temporary Ex Parts Order and Notice of Hearing OAmended ::I~;?:i7"· ,1f1 Cffi~~-:::ij 
OOomestio Violence (I.C. § 39-6304) Court_ 1111 _ Judicial District 
~allclous harassment, stalking, telephone harassment (I.e. §18·7907) Coµnty, Kootenai, State Idaho 
. PETITIONER __ '""""'!I PETITIONER IDl!:NTlf!IERS 
First Middle Last Dliilhl! of Birth (DOB) cf Petitioner 
Petitioner D other Protected Person(s): (Ii~ name and ooa) 
D Minor family membar(e): {lli.t name and DOB) 
RESPONDENT RESPONDENT IDENTIFIERS 
Middle 
Re~pr.:mdent's Address 
Relationship to Protected Person(s): 
D spouse; Of orrner spouse; 
D living together; D previously living together; 
D child in commot1: D intimate partner. 
8 parent; D related by blood, adoption or marriage; CAUTION: Cl Weapon Alleged to be Involve~ are In, or O rela • 
ljl.other. Q. 
The terms of this order shall be effective until at 11:59 P.M. /untess 
terminated earlier by another court order. 
If the Respondent does not appear at the hearing aate l!stad on the last MQB of this ord§!r, a longer protection 
order may be issued against the Respondent. If the Petitioner fails to appear, the petition may be dismissed. 
WARNINGS: This cm:1er meets all "full faith and credit'' requirements otthe VAWA, 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (1994) 
upo11 notice of the Respondent. This court has jurisdiction over the parties and tlitil subject matter; the 
Respondent has been or will be afforded n9ti~e and a timely opportunity to be heard as provided by the laws of 
this Jurisdiction. This order Is valid end entitled to enforcement in each jurisdiction throughout the 50 states of the 
United States, the District of Columbfa, all tribal lands, and all U.S. territories, commonwealths, and po~se:ssions 
and shall be enforced as if it were an order of that jurisdlctfon. 
As a result of this order, It may be unlawful for you to purchase or possess a firearm, lnc!udlng a rifle, 
pfstol, or revolver, or ammunition pursuant to federal l~w unc;ler 1 B U.S.C. § 922(9)(8)~ If you nave any questions 
whetl:'ter these laws make it illegal for you to possess or purchase a firearm, you should consult an attorney. 
Violation of any provision of this order t;iy the Respondent or a person who is restrained by this order\ 
which could include the Protected Person, after actual riotioe. of its terms, Is a misdemeanor and may result in 
arrest and ssnten u to one ysar in jail and a $5,000 fina, even rf the Protected Person consents to the 
vlolatioR.ero~ . lbR~nge this order. Docket No. 44794 447 of 590 
TEMPORARY EX PARTE PROTECTION ORDER & NOTICE OF HEARING Page 1 Of 4 
To:12084461188 
TH! COURT ORDl!FIS: 
1. . 
Respondent shaD not harase, stalk, annoy, disturb the peace of, telephone, contact or otherwise 
nlcate with (Qfther directly or indirectly, fn person or through any other person): 
PettUonar 
Minor family members 
B Family or other household membere Other Protected Person(s) 
To further the protection of the Protected Persoo(s) no Protected Person(s) shell oontact 
Respondent. either directly or Indirectly. 
Thia Ordet is subfect to the fcHowlng exceptions: 
D no exceptions 
D to pmifcipate In legal proceedings invoMng the protected person(a) orto communicate through 
attom8)'8 about legal iseuea irwoivfng ttm Protected Per8on(s) 
D contact by tetaphone/electmnfc means to anange visitation of the child/ran D contact by telephone between _______ .m. and _____ _ .m. on 
________________ for the following purposes: ____ _ 
D to participate in oourt omered mediation 
O to respond to an emergancy Involving your natural or adopted child/ren 
O other: _________________________ _ 
Respondent shall not, EVEN IF INVIT&D SY THE PROTECTED PERSON(S): 
riJ knoMngly remain within ";00 feet of ths Protected Person(s) 
fB go within feet of: 
f:;il Protected Person's residence a1 __ \o ..... 0 __ 1;;_,_'f;c,_~_~_lll_Co;..,,:I_~_~_~_ .. _,,_ 
~I D Reapondent is ordered to move from the residence at ____________ _ 
___________ immediately upm, seNic8 of Chis order a~d take from the residence 
only items needed for employment and necessary personal effects (at peacs officer's discretion). 
Dennis Irish, etal vs Jeffrey Hall, etal Docket No. 44794 448 of 590 
Tl!MPORARV EX PARTE PROTECTION ORDER & NOTIC& OF HEARING 
)D 
JHN-i:::::>-201/ 14: 31 From: To: 12084461188 
4. 
Law enforcement officers are ordered to: 
D Remove the Respondent from the residence listed above upon service of this order. 
D Place the Prot8cted Person in possession of the resklanoe at __________ _ 
D SupeMse the removal of O Protected Person's .0 Respondent's Items needed for employment and 
necessary personal effects (at peace officer's d~ictetfon) from the residence. 
Peace officers are inetruoted to enforce this Court order by all necessary means, including arTEl$t. 
Custody of the minor chlld/ren Is awan.tad: 
CoeJ D aa provided In the eXiating chtld custody order/divorce decree cease#, C.Ounty. Judge, o..it~ emerec:o: 
0 as follows: 
Nam 
D Protected Person O Respondent 
(1)9J D shall NOT have ihe chlldlren until further order of the Court 
O shall have the child/ren as follows (l~t dl:rp, tlmn •nd oonditlom): _________ _ 
D supervised by. _____________________ _ 
O neutral drop «)ff/pick up location: ________________ _ 
O childlrffll to be transported by: _________________ _ 
O Neither party shall remove the childlren from _______________ _ OOther. _________________________ __ 
5. ConflkVDI Qldars. . 
If any term of another oivU or criminal ordar conflicts with any term of this order you must follow the more 
restrictive term. Dismissal of any.other order wil oot result In a dismissal of this order. 
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(07) 
(OBJ 
e. Qlher: ----------------------------
7. ~ It is further ordered that the clerk of the court shall forward a copy of this order to the 
appropriate law enforcement agency for immediate service upon Respondent; and the clerk shall deliver 
or mall a oopy of this order to the Petitioner. 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
A hearing to decide whether a longer Protection Order will be IMued wm be held: Oa.m. Date:___ _ ____ Time: __ ,_·--_c_· ____ )Z!P,m, 
___ ..___=;..;..:,r,....,......,;;.. __ County 
~~~~--------' Idaho. 
WARNING: IF THE RESPONDENT DOES NOT APPEAR AT THE HEARING, A LONGER PROTECTION 
ORDER MAY BE ISSUED AGAINST THE RESPONDENT. IF: FAILS TO APPEAR, THE 
PETITION MA V E SSEO. 
Date: ___ \ Signed: 
NOTICE: 
It is a misdemeanor under Idaho Code§ 39-6312 for the Respondent, after notice of ttiis order, to violate 
the provlalcms of this order. Further, it is a crime under Idaho Code § 1 a.a04, for any person to aid aod abet 
a crime. ori not being present. to adVfse and encourage a cri~e. In addition, under Idaho Code §1&-304, 
any parson who oouneela. aide, sollcfts or inoltes anoti'htr to commit a misdemeanor is gullty of a 
misdemeanor. ThsrefQli• It may be a qrlm§ for amt QiliPD tp encourage or invite ggQtact betweeo tbft 
R.Mcanckmt and fug_petttjoner, except such oontgm as i1 exprassJy carmltted by the above,g['dar. 
I have recaived a copy of this order O and agree to receive copies of future notices by cartifled mall. 
Slgned: ____ ~---------
Petitioner 
Date: ______ _ 
Signed: ____________ _ 
Respondent 
Date:. ______ _ 
AlTENTION: KEEP A COPY Of THIS ORDER IN YOUR POSSESSION AT AU. TIMES IN ORDER TO 
ASSIST PEACE OFFICERS. IMMEDIATELY REPORT /!IJY VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER TO LAW 
ENFORCEMENT. 
,. 
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MISCHELLE R. FULGHAM ISB #4623 
LUK.INS & ANNIS. P.S. 
601 E. Front Avenue. Suite 303 
Coeur d'Alene. ID 83814-5155 
Teleohone: (208) 667-0517 
Facsimile: (509) 363~2478 
mfulcllam!'alluk.ins.com 
AHomevs for Am:,eUants 
Dennis Irish and Wanda Irish 
To:12084461188 
IN THE DlSTR!CT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS IR1SII and WANDA TRISH, 
husband and wife, 
NO. CV-2015-5814 
Pa'i!e:V11 
Appellants, 
V. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
JEFFREY HALL and DONA HALL, 
husband and wife, 
Respondents. 
TO: THR ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENTS JEFFREY HALL AND DONA HALL. 
HUSBAND AND WIFE AND TIIBJR ATTORNEY OF RECORD, ERIK P. SMITH, 
AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. . 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. Parties: 
a. The Appellants to this action ar~; DENNIS IRISH and WANDA lR!SH, 
husband and wife. Appellants are represented by MischeUe R Fulgham, 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL: 1 
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LUKINS & ANNIS, P.S., 601 E. Front Avenue, Suite 303, Coeur d'Alene, ID 
83814-5155, mfu1gham@1ukins.com. 
b. The above~named Appellants appeal against the following party characterized as 
Respondent here: JEFFREY HALL and DONA HALL, husband and wife. 
Respondents are represented by Erik P. Smith, Erik P. Smith, P.C., 311 8 B Coeur 
d)Alene Ave., Couer d'Alene, Idaho, 83814, epslaw2009@gmail.com. 
2. ~- The above-named Appellants appeal to the Idaho 
Supreme Court from the Judgment entered by lhe District Court on December 1, 2016, the 
Honorable CynthlaK.C. Meyer presiding, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." 
Therein, the District Court granted Respondents' Motion for a Directed Verdict, took the case 
away from the sining jury, and dismissed aH of Plaintiffs' claims. 
3. Jurisdiction: The above-named Appellants have a right to appeal to the Tdaho 
Supreme Court. The Judgment described in paragraph 2 above is appcalablc under Idaho 
Appellate Rules? including but not limited to Idaho Appellate Rules 11 ( a)(1) and (5), . 
4. issues: The issues on appeal shall include, but not be limited to, the following: 
a. Did the District Court error under I.R.C.P. 50(a) in taking the case away from 
the jury and grantlng a directed verdict by determining that that Respondents' 
published, and WIFI broadcast statements, that "Mayor Wanda Irish is a Har'', 
that "the Mayor lies", that the Mayor runs a corrupt government, that Mayor 
Wanda Irish conducts usecret government :meetings" in violation of Idaho's 
AMENDED NOT!CE OF APPEAL: 2 
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public meeling laws, that 1• Mayor Wanda Irish Terrorist," and "She really is a 
Terrorist" were all statements capable of only one meeting? 
b. Did the District Court error by taking the case away from the jury and 
determining that all the evidence presented was not susceptible of any finding of 
a defamatory meaning? 
c. Did the District Court error in refusing to draw all reasonable inferences for the 
non-moving party'] 
d. Did the District Court error in refusing to grant AppeHants' Motion to Reopen to 
allow additional evidence from an additional. witness regarding the widespread 
publication ol~ and I.he public reaction to, the Respondents' defamatory 
statements published against Appellant Wanda Irish? 
e. Did the District Court error in ruling that the Respondents' statements were not 
statements of facts, were figurative hyperbolic language, were incapable of 
being proved true or false, and were therefore protected First Amendment free 
speech? 
f. Did the District Court error in failing to fully disclose all details of prior 
contact, communications, knowledge and fo.miHarity with the Respondents? 
5. ~.C£O(d. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
6. Transcript Appellants request the preparation of the following portions of the 
.Reporter's Transcript in both hard copy and electric format: 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL: 3 
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a. The Entire Trial Transcript; 
b. Vior Dire Transcript; and 
c. Opening Statement Transcript. 
1. Exhibils. The Appellants further request the following documents be included in the 
clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Idaho Appellate Rule 
28: 
FILED/ DOCUMENT 
ENTERED 
L 8/14/15 Verified Complaint for Injrmetive Relief 
2. 8114115 Swmm:ms to Dona F. Hall 
3. 8/14/15 Summons to Jeffrey E. Hall 
·-4. 8/24/15 Affidavit of Service 
5. 9/02/15 Notice of Anncarancc 
6. 9/28/15 Three Day Notice of T ntent to Take Default 
7. i 0/02/l 5 Answer to Complaint and Affirmative Defenses 
8. 10/05/15 Schedulin~ Order 
9. 10/05/15 Notice of Heariru~ 
--10 11/10/15 Notice vacatinJl Ht.::adm.t 
11 11/10/15 Scheduling Form 
l2 11/13/15 Notice of Pre-Trial Conference and Trial 
l3 10/07116 Notice of Aooearance 
~31/16 Notice of Ch,1:mge of Address of Plaintiffs Counsel 
14/16 Defendants 1 List of Witn.esi:1e11 
16 11/14/16 Defendants, List of .Exhlbils 
17 11/15/16 Plaintiffs' List of Witnesses 
18 11/15/16 Plaintiffs' List of Exhibits 
19 11/21/16 Defendants' Amendment to List of Witnesses 
20 l 1/21/16 Subpoena - Bob Pool 
21 11/21/16 Subpoena - Mark Wamer 
22 11121/16 Subpoena - Don Britton 
23 U/21/Hi Subooena- Joe Cornell 
~ 11/21/16 Trial Brief 
11/21/16 Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury Instructions 
26 11121/16 Defendants' Suooiemental Proposed Jury lnstructio:i:rn 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL: 4 
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27 ll/23/l6 Trial Brief - Plaintiff 
28 11/27/16 Plaintiffs' Sunnlemental Proposed Jury instructions 
29 12/01/16 Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict 
30 12/01/16 Judgment 
31 12/13/16 Memcmm.dum of Attorney Fees and Costs 
32 12/23/16 Plaintiff's Objection to Defendants' Memorandum of AHomcy Fees 
and Costs 
33 12/23/16 Declaration of Mischel!e R. fulgham in Support of Plaintifrs 
Obiection to Defendants' Memorandum of Attornev fees and Costs 
34 1/10/17 Motion to Strike a Portion of Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants> 
Memorandum of Attomev Fees and Costs 
35 1/10/17 Motion to Disallow Attomevs' Fees and Costs 
36 1/24/17 Motion for .lniunction Pending Appeal 
-~--37 1/24/17 Memorandum in S1.mno:rt of Motion for iniunction 
RFm4/17 Declaration of Wanda Trish in SuMort of Motion for Tnhmction 
25/t7 Plaintiffs' Reauest for Judicial Notice of Protective Order 
8. Certification. MischeHe R. Fulgham, auomey fbr Appellants, hereby certifies: 
a. That a copy oft.his Notice of Appeal has been served on the court reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out 
below: 
Diane Bolan, P.O. Box 9000 Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-9000; 
b. That financial arrangements have been made with Court Reporter mane Bolan 
for the estimated foe for the preparation of the Reporter's Transcript; and 
payment of the estimated fee. 
c. That the estimated fee for the preparation of the Clerk's Record has been paid. 
d. That the Appellants filing fee has been paid_; and 
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e. That the service has been made on. all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Idaho Appellate Rule 20. 
LUKINS & ANNIS, P.S. 
By 
, ISB #4623 
Attorneys for Appc11anb.i 
l HE.RlmY CERTIFY that on the of January, 2017, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to all cmmsel 
of record m; follows: 
Erik P. Smith 
Attorney at Law 
311-B Coeur d'Alene Avenue 
Coeur d'Alene, ldaho 83 814 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL: 6 
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ll,, 
12-01-'16 12:35 PBOO-ltocitsna1 Dist court 208--446-1188 
., 11;1h~H"' r. ~iu ui 12087859110 11}3012016 11 :27 _ 
T-<173 P0B01/B004 F•260 
1382 P,0041008 
ERIK P. SMITH, Attnmty at Law 
llRJI( P. SMITH, P.C. 
311-B Coeur d'Alene Avenue 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Tel. (208) 867~00 
10 
Attorney for Defendants 
}as 
20l60EC ... , PK 1213~ 
cumK OISTRCT COUit 
~
IN THE D18TRICT COURT OP THE PIR&T JUDICIAi. DISTRICT OF rHe 
STAT! OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THI: C0UN1Y OP KOOT!NAI 
DENNIS IR18H, et al, 
Plafntlfft, 
vs. 
J&PIIRIIY HAU., et. al, 
Dafendeu,ta. 
CASE NO. CV 16-6814 
JUDGMINT 
JUDGMENT IS HERliBY ENTERED as follQWS: 
Pfalntms• Complalnt and ali dafma therein shal be dlsmrssed with 
prejudice. 
De~~vs Jeffrey Hall, etal 
r 
dayaf 2018. 
Docket No, 44794 
JA~-25-2017 16:17 From: 
. 12•01·'16 lZ:35 FAOl'l .. Kootemj Dist Court 
Froa:Ertk P, Smith 120876&9110 
I heraby certify that on the 
the foragotng wa,: 
[1 prepaid to; 
n 
IX J taxed to: 
Mfschefle R. F'ulaham 
Lukins & Annis 
801 E. Fmnt etreet. Ste 303 
Coeurd1Alene, ID 83814 
Fax: 609..Se!s..2478 
•rtk P. lmlth 
Attarney at Law 
807 ulceslde Avenue 
cceurd'Afene. fD 88814 
Fa>e 768•9110 
To: 12084461188 
208-446-:J.188 · T-473 PB002/0004 p .. z50 
11/30/2016 11:27 1382 P.005/005 
day of November, 2018, a true copy 0f 
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ERIK p, SMITH. Atiomey at Law 
ERIK P. SMITH, P,C, 
311-B Coeur d'Afene Avenue, 
COeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Tel, 208) 687-2000 
2016 DF.C - J PH 12• ~Ii 
Cl..eR< 0!8TA,CT CX)URJ 
~ I I a IJCM IJY • w 
1D 
1,$.B.N. 
Attorney for 0.fendants 
IN THI! DISTRICT COURT 01' nos PIRBT JUDICIAi.. DISTRICT OF THE 
STATS OF IDAHO IN AND FOK TH! COUNTV OF KOOTENAI 
DENNt8 IRl$H, et «t, 
Pf Blntiffe, 
Jl!PPRl!V HALL, et. al, 
Oefendanta. 
CASE NO. 0V 16-8814 
ORDl!R ORANTINO 
fl8F"NDANrS MOTION FOR 
tHRECliiD V&RDIQT 
Thie· matter oomfng fer trial <:0mmenoing NmmmbM 28, 2019, the 
Piain~fft, DINNtS IRISH, at el, pl'8Nnt With their counsel, Mllohelre R. F~em, 
.and the Oefandants. JEPFR&Y HAU., at. al, also Pl'GHnt with their counsel, Erik 
P. !mlth. At the CIOS9 of Plafntiffs' case. the Court N«:eivad the Oefend1nts1 
Motion pursuant to I.R.C.P. 50 and takfng 11 under oonstda-a~n. Th.naftat the 
court pleotd rts findings of faal and oondusrons of law on tho record, NOW 
THEREFORE IT 18 HSR&SY ORDERED: 
The Deforu:.tanta' Motion for Dlreoltd Verdict e1he1U be gmnted. 
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I hereby ce,tlf\J that on the~ day of November, 2018, a true copy of 
tht fo(egolng waa: 
( J mal prepa~ to: 
fJ 
IX J faxed Co: 
Mflob•H• R. Fulgham 
Lukin, & Anni• 
eo1 e. Front Street, Ste 303 
Coeur d'Alene. fC 81814 
. Fmc: i:i00 .. 863-2478 
Erik P. Smith 
P&meyatLaw 
607 ~kealda Avenue 
coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
fax: '766·9110 · 
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ERIK P. SMITH, Attorney at Law 
ERIK P. SMITH, P.C. 
311-B Coeur d'Alene Avenue 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Tel. (208} 667-2000 
2017 JAN 31 PH ~: 09 
Fax (208) 765-9110 
I.S.B.N. 5008 
Attorney for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS IRISH and WANDA !RISH, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
) Case No: CV 15-5814 
) 
) 
) 
) 
vs. 
JEFFREY E. HALL and DONA F. HALL, 
husband and wife, 
) DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR AWARD 
) OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
_______________ ) 
COMES NOW, the above-named Defendants, JEFFREY HALL AND 
DONA HALL, by and through their attorney of record, Erik P. Smith, and 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54, Idaho Code§ 12-121, and Defendants' prayer for relief 
in their Answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint, respectfully move this Court for an Order 
awarding attorneys' fees and costs to Defendants. 
This Motion is supported by the Affidavits of Jeffrey Hall and Deputy Matt 
Edmunds and the Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Award of 
Attorney's Fees and Costs, filed concurrently herewith. 
MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS- l 
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Defendants are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees on the basis they 
are the prevailing party in this action. 
Defendants give notice of their intention to produce testimony, evidence, 
and oral argument at the hearing upon this Motion. 
DATED this 3-L day of January, 2017. 
' Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ;3;/ day of January, 2017, a true copy of the 
foregoing was: 
[ ] mailed postage prepaid to: 
~Unter-office: 
~axed to: 
Mischelle R. Fulgham 
601 E. Front Street, Suite 502 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Fax: 664-4125 
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Dennis Irish, etal vs Jeffrey Hall, etal Docket No. 44794 463 of 590 
ERIK P. SMITH, Attorney at Law 
ERIK P. SMITH, P.C. 
311-8 Coeur d'Alene Avenue 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Tel. (208) 667-2000 
Fax(208)765-9110 
2017 JAN 31 PH 4: o, 
LS.B.N. 5008 
Attorney for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT Of THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS !RISH and WANDA IRISH, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
) Case No: CV 15-5814 
} 
) 
) 
) 
vs. 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
JEFFREY E. HALL and DONA F. HALL, 
husband and wife, 
) DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR AWARD 
) OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
______________ ) 
COMES NOW the above-named ("Defendants") by and through their 
attorney of record, ERIK P. SMITH, and submit this Memorandum in Support of 
their Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, seeking this Court's award 
of attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54, Idaho 
Code § 12-121, and Defendants' Answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
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t DEFENDANTS ARE THE PREVAILING PARTY AND ARE 
ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS. 
As this Court knows, to determine whether there is a prevailing party, the 
Court should first look to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) which incorporates LR.C.P. 54d(1 )(B) 
which provides: 
Prevailing Party. In determining which party to an action is a prevailing 
party and entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion 
consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief 
sought by the respective parties ... 
From the inception of this case, Plaintiffs have sought damages from 
allegedly defamatory conduct. 
"In considering a motion for directed verdict, the trial court is to accept the 
truth of the adverse evidence and every inference that may legitimately be 
drawn from the adverse evidence in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. The motion should not be granted if the evidence is of 
sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could 
conclude that a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party would be proper." 
Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 91 
( 1991 ), quoting Stephens v. Steams, 106 Idaho 249, 252-253 ( 1984 ). 
Defendants have always asserted that they have never defamed the 
Plaintiffs in any way. As such, since the Court has ruled in a directed verdict that 
reasonable minds could not conclude a verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs, 
Defendants are the prevailing party in this action for purposes of costs and 
attorney's fees. 
In this case, Plaintiffs failed on each and every cause of action asserted in 
their Complaint. On the other hand, Defendants prevailed on directed verdict 
despite Plaintiff's persistent and unreasonable efforts to accuse Defendants of 
defamation. 
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The Court should consider the resultant judgment obtained. This Court 
should determine that Defendants are the prevailing party for all purposes in this 
case and are entitled to an award of costs and attorney's fees under LC. § 12-
121. 
As stated above, a motion for directed verdict should not be granted if 
reasonable minds could conclude that a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party 
would be proper. Sun Valley, at 91. Therefore, the Court has already concluded 
in the directed verdict that the Plaintiffs acted unreasonably in pursing their 
defamation complaint, and the Court should find that Defendants are entitled to 
an award of attorney's fees under I.C. § 12-121. 
Despite the order granting directed verdict, and the subsequent entry of 
judgment, the Plaintiffs persist in their unreasonable belief that defamation 
occurred. See Plaintiffs' Objection, filed on or around December 27, 2016. 
it DEFENANTS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS' FEES AND 
COSTS UNDER tC. § 12-121 FOR THE ENTIRE CASE. 
Idaho Code § 12-121 provides in pertinent part: 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees 
to the prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not 
alter, repeal or amend any statute which otherwise provides for an 
award of attorney's fees. 
Idaho Courts have held that LC. § 12-121, read together with LR.C.P. 
54(e)(1 ), allows the award of attorney's fees in those situations in which the 
Court finds that the action was "brought, pursued or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation." Ortiz v. Reamy, 115 Idaho 1099, 1101 (Ct. 
App. 1989). 
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1. Plaintiffs engaged in the following acts during litigation which were 
unreasonable, frivolous, and/or without foundation: 
A. All of the Plaintiffs' actions failed to survive even a directed 
verdict, which is by definition without foundation. 
Similar to this case, in Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658 { 1982), the 
defendants moved for a directed verdict after the plaintiffs' counsel had rested, 
and the court granted the directed verdict in favor of the defendants and awarded 
them attorney's fees pursuant to LC. § 12-121. Id. The court concluded on 
directed verdict that the complaint was without reasonable foundation. Id. 
Also similar to the Plaintiffs in this case, the plaintiffs in Anderson argued 
against attorney's fees stating that the testimony at trial indicated that the 
defendant had in fact committed tortious conduct. Id. However, the Idaho Court 
of Appeals concluded, "The trial court had the opportunity to observe the 
witnesses and the evidence which was introduced. The court concluded that the 
testimony did not support such a contention when it stated that the claim was 
without reasonable foundation and when it entered a directed verdict in favor of 
respondent." Id. The Appellate court affirmed the directed verdict and award of 
attorney's fees. 
B. The verified Complaint signed by Plaintiffs and their attorney pied 
causes of action that were void on their' face because of the 
statute of limitations. 
A defamation claim must be brought within in two years or it is barred by 
the Statute of Limitations. Idaho Code§ 5-219(5). The following time-barred, 
frivolous causes of actions are found in Plaintiffs' Complaint as follows: 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION - 4 
Dennis Irish, etal vs Jeffrey Hall, etal Docket No. 44794 467 of 590 
a. Plaintiffs specifically reference time-barred claims in their "First Cause of 
Action," (paragraph 30 of the Complaint) stating, "upon information and 
belief, Defendants communicated information concerning Plaintiffs to third 
parties" by: 
(1) "making verbal threats towards Plaintiffs in front of others;" 
(2) "ordering the Plaintiffs removed from the public parking 
easement located on Defendants' property;" 
(3) "proclaiming to several third parties that Plaintiff is running a 
corrupt business and has corrupted the local city government by 
favoring Plaintiffs' family members;" 
(4) "accusing Plaintiff of lying;" 
(5) "accusing Plaintiff of stalking Defendant;" and 
(6) ''accusing Plaintiffs of spying, hiding surveillance equipment, 
and disseminating written information with slanderous and false 
information." 
Each and every one of these claims was barred by the statute of 
limitations, when initially pied by Plaintiffs on August 14, 2015, by the 
Verified Complaint. 
b. In paragraph 5 of Plaintiffs' Complaint it states, "on or about May 28, 2012, 
at approximately 12:00 a.m., Defendant's truck and boat trailer were 
towed off the public easement due to it being illegally parked. Later that 
same morning, the Defendants called Plaintiff Wanda Irish at her private 
residence approximately nine times within one hour. During those calls, 
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Defendants repeatedly called Plaintiff Wanda Irish obscene and offensive 
names." This claim was barred by the statute of limitations and the 
verified Complaint states it occurred on May 28, 2012. 
c. In paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs' Complaint it states, "in or about June 2012 
through August 2012, Defendants accused Plaintiff Wanda Irish of 'lying' 
in front of third parties. Specifically, Defendants posted signs on their 
vehicles and on public trails stating 'Mayor Irish Lied' and 'Mayor Irish 
Lies."' This claim was barred by the statute of limitations and the verified 
Complaint states it occurred in or about June 2012 through August 2012. 
d. In paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs' Complaint it states, "in or about May 2013, 
Defendants made false statements to the police and initiated a baseless 
claim against Plaintiff Dennis Irish for disturbing the peace. The initial 
claim was that Plaintiff Dennis Irish was stalking Defendant Dona Hall, 
which charge was later reduced to disturbing the peace. However, the 
baseless claims were not prosecuted and the case was fully and 
completely dismissed." This claim was barred by the statute of limitations 
on its face as set forth in the verified Complaint. 
e. In paragraph 6 of Plaintiffs' Complaint it states, "on or about May 2012 to 
present day, Defendants continue to demand an apology and payment of 
$200 (the cost of the towing) from Plaintiff Wanda Irish for the towing 
incident that occurred on May 28, 2012." 
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f. In paragraph 7 of Plaintiffs' Complaint it states, "on or about May 29, 2012 
to present day, Defendants send Plaintiff Wanda Irish dozens of harassing 
emails." 
g. In paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs' Complaint it states, "on or about July 4, 2012, 
to present day Defendants call Plaintiff Wanda Irish repeatedly, often 
several times a day." 
h. As set forth in the Affidavit in Support of the Motion for Attorneys' Fees, 
the spy cameras were installed in 2012. The Defendants' 
communications, complaints, and City Council meeting attendance 
regarding those spy cameras all occurred in the years 2012 and 2013, and 
were barred by the statute of limitations. 
C. The Plaintiffs improperly sought punitive damages. 
The trial preparation included jury instructions on punitive damages, 
despite pretrial failure of compliance with I.C. § 6-1604, which requires a motion 
and order of the court in order to amend the complaint seeking punitive 
damages, allowing Defendants to file an amended answer and possible 
counterclaim. I.C. § 6-1604(2) states as follows: 
"In all civil actions in which punitive damages are permitted, no 
claim for damages shall be filed containing a prayer for relief 
seeking punitive damages. However, a party may, pursuant to a 
pretrial motion and after hearing before the court, amend the 
pleadings to include a prayer for relief seeking punitive damages. 
The court shall allow the motion to amend the pleadings if, after 
weighing the evidence presented, the court concludes that, the 
moving party has established at such a hearing a reasonable 
likelihood of proving facts at trial sufficient to support an award of 
punitive damages .... " 
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Plaintiffs submitted both jury instructions and verdict forms that included 
claims for punitive damages. The Verified Complaint in this matter failed to 
assert punitive damages, or reserve the right to move the court for an 
amendment of the pleadings to include punitive damages. The Plaintiffs failed to 
file a pretrial motion. Such actions are contrary to established law and practice, 
and to proceed to trial on such errors is frivolous, unreasonable, and without 
foundation. 
Had the Plaintiffs so moved, and the issue of punitive damages was fully 
briefed and presented to the court, it is likely the case would have been 
completely dismissed on summary judgment, a standard which is similar to the 
courts analysis granting the Defendants' directed verdict. Defendants did not file 
a motion for summary judgment because of their reliance upon Plaintiffs' 
statement that the case would not proceed. See the Affidavit in Support of the 
Motion and in the briefing on accord and satisfaction set forth below. 
D. AU of the allegations and trial evidence presented failed to 
establish basic elements of the case. 
Defamatory Slander [sic] is the cause of action the Plaintiffs named in their 
Complaint and failed to prove during trial. The Plaintiffs failed to prove 
defamation under Idaho law because they failed to show that the Defendants: ( 1) 
communicated information concerning Plaintiffs to others, (2) that the information 
was defamatory, (3) that Plaintiffs were damaged because of that 
communication, and ( 4) with malice since Plaintiffs conceded that they were in 
fact public figures. None of the "Factual Allegations" in the Verified Complaint 
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;-""-.,. (paragraphs 5 through 28), including all evidence presented at trial, could meet 
the prima facie elements for one count of defamation as shown as follows: 
a. Paragraph 5 failed to allege any element of defamation (and was time-
barred); 
b. Paragraph 6 failed to allege any element of defamation; 
c. Paragraph 7 failed to allege any element of defamation; 
d. Paragraph 8 failed to allege any element of defamation; 
e. Paragraph 9 failed to allege any element of defamation; 
f. Paragraph 10 failed to allege elements 2, 3, and 4 of defamation (and 
was time-barred); 
g. Paragraph 11 failed to allege elements 2 and 4 of defamation (and was 
time-barred); 
h. Paragraph 12 failed to allege any element of defamation; 
i. Paragraph 13 failed to allege any element of defamation; 
j. Paragraph 14 failed to allege any element of defamation; 
k. Paragraph 15 failed to allege elements 3 and 4 of defamation; 
I. Paragraph 16 failed to allege elements 3 and 4 of defamation; 
m. Paragraph 17 failed to allege elements 3 and 4 of defamation; 
n. Paragraph 18 failed to allege any element of defamation; 
o. Paragraph 19 failed to allege any element of defamation; 
p. Paragraph 20 failed to allege any element of defamation; 
q. Paragraph 21 failed to allege any element of defamation; 
r. Paragraph 22 failed to allege elements 1, 3, and 4 of defamation; 
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s. Paragraph 23 failed to allege any element of defamation; 
t. Paragraph 24 failed to allege elements 1, 3, and 4 of defamation; 
u. Paragraph 25 failed to allege elements 1, 3, and 4 of defamation; 
v. Paragraph 26 failed to allege any element of defamation; 
w. Paragraph 27 failed to allege elements 2, 3, and 4 of defamation; 
x. Paragraph 28 failed to allege any element of defamation; and 
y. Paragraph 30 is the only other paragraph in the Complaint with factual 
allegations, but it is a summary of the above factual allegations which 
did not set forth prima facie elements of a proper defamation case. 
E. Plaintiffs persisted in the trial despite having come to a valid 
accord and satisfaction with the defendants. 
"An accord and satisfaction is generally defined as a method of 
discharging a contract or cause of action whereby the parties agree to give and 
accept something in settlement of the claim or demand of the one against the 
other, and perform such agreement, the 'accord' being the agreement and the 
'satisfaction' its execution or performance." Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 
909 (2009). An accord and satisfaction may be implied from the attendant 
circumstances. 
As more fuUy set forth in Defendants' Affidavit in Support of the Motion for 
Attorneys' Fees, the Defendants relied upon the December 2015 statements 
made by Mayor Irish, that the litigation would be resolved, and performed no 
pretrial motions or discovery. They were reasonable in such reliance, and a true 
accord and satisfaction occurred. 
m. CONCLUSION 
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Defendants are the prevailing party in this matter and are entitled to an 
award of costs and attorneys' fees under I.C. § 12-121, I.R.C.P. 54, and 
Defendants' Answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint. In addition, Defendants should 
receive an award of all attorneys' fees and costs against the Plaintiffs pursuant to 
an Amended Memorandum of Costs. 
DATED this li day of January, 2017. 
--
' Attorney for Defendants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST ATE OF IOAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CASE NO. CV 15-5814 
f!l 
DENNIS IRISH and WANDA IRISH, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
AFFIDAVIT OF MATT EDMUNDS IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
vs. 
JEFFREY HALL and DONA HALL, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
ST A TE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
I, MATT EDMUNDS, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state 
that: 
1. I am over the age of eighteen (18) years and I was a POST certified 
Kootenai County Sheriff Deputy in 2012. 
2. J was generally assigned to the City of Harrison civil conflicts and 
criminal docket 
3. During that summer I received dozens of telephone calls from Mayor 
Wanda Irish regarding Jeff Hall and Dona Hall. In all my actual visits there was 
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never a complaint of an actual law violation or disturbance of the peace. 
Generally, it was clear the Mayor did not like the Halls. 
4. I actually went to the City of Harrison as a result of those telephone 
calls dozens of times during the summer of 2012. 
5. During that summer I had dozens of personal contacts with Jeff Hall 
regarding the conflict with Wanda Irish. 
6. I saw Mrs. Irish and Mr. Hall interact several times. 
7. I never saw Mr. Hall be rude or use profane language to Mrs. Irish. 
8. In none of my personal visits to the City of Harrison or the gateway 
marina did Mr. Hal! breach the peace, and in fact he was always very 
levelheaded despite a high level of conflict in some circumstances. 
9. In May 2012, I was called by Mayor Wanda Irish regarding Mr. Hall's 
vehicles. When I arrived, Mrs. Irish met me at the Gateway Marina and she was 
insisting that I issue a citation to Mr. Hall for his own vehicle for being illegally 
parked. I confirmed with Mr. Hall and Mrs. Irish that his vehicle was parked on 
his own property. I informed her in a face·to-face conversation that it could not 
be cited. She then insisted that I have the vehicle towed. i declined to tow his 
vehicle for the same reasons that I could not cite the vehicle. Mrs. Irish was 
noticeably displeased with my decision and left my presence. 
10. The next day, I received a telephone call from Mr. Hall that his vehicle 
had in fact been towed. I expressed my disbelief and frustration at the result, but 
since his vehicle had been returned I did nothing further. 
11.Later that summer of 2012, Mr. and Mrs. Hali requested that Mr. and 
Mrs. Irish be trespassed from the Gateway Marina. I contacted Mr. and Mrs. Irish 
by telephone and gave them notice of the Trespass Order. They received and 
understood the notice of trespass from me by telephone. 
12. Within a few days, I received a telephone call from Dona Hall, outlining 
some facts that appeared to be a violation of the Trespass Order. l followed up 
by telephoning Mr. Irish directly. Mr. Irish agreed to speak with me and admitted 
to violating the Trespass Order as well as other facts, and based on Mrs. Hall 
statements and Mr. lrish's admission, I chose to issue a citation for stalking. 
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had no further contact regarding the citation with either party or the prosecuting 
attorney. 
13. The tenor of Mrs. lrish1s contact with me and her complaints regardihg 
Mr. Hall were obviously meant to harass Mr. and Mrs. Hall. 
14. The constant calls were so frustrating and without merit that I 
eventually asked and received permission from my Captain to be relieved from 
the City of Harrison dutyf and it was transferred to another Koot~nai County 
Sheriff Deputy. /J 
DATED this;,L- day of December. 2016. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this __ day of December, 2016. 
Notary Public for: Idaho 
Residing at: cc \t4 I . /.. 
My Commission Expires: /tl ;le( Miff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 1_ day of January, 2017, a true and complete 
copy of the foregoing was: 
[ ] hand delivered 
\t1 faxed to: 
( Tmailed, postage prepaid 
to the following: 
Mische!le R. Fulgham 
Attorney at Law 
601 E. Front Street, Suite 502 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Fax: 664-4125 
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